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Abstract: 
J o b  Rawis prermts a carduly ded-on af h i  designed 
to bc aaeptable to &phmMic .oCi&. The amqtability ofhis 
j ~ ~ ~ ~ t i o n  depends, i  1- part, on its being 'naraalaal w i t h ~ g d  10 the 
reasonable c o m p M v s  d o ~ s  *thethe -etier. The mb idenir that 
wahin sotieties Dvhoremembas do not have a rb& mxepion ofthe good the 
jusLG5atbn ofpolitbd htimions cannot be based onasuqtions which are 
50matious to aoy r-oablc p u p .  In this paper, I d e R w u W  mnoptto 
provide anemd justi6carion by b&g his justkidon h t  three nages: 1) cbe 
attempt t o m  adopting 1 mncepti'on ofjudce gmcrslly; 2) the attempt to 
junfifV adopting a normative liberal cmw+n ofjustice; and 3) the attempt to 
h%tEy doping a s p d c  mmAve liberal conception ofjustic+ i.e., his 
mnc~ption ofjwti- ar faimw. M nwel way oflooking at Rawls' work ~ Y D ( Y S  
us to best waluate the and rhomming~  ofhihi j-tion and the 
projest ofliberal nwvality more gmmlly. Menring Rawlr inthis way also 
iuumatn how witen We Sand4 Habwas, ~ndRor7ymirinterpretkey ~ P ~ M S  
ofmwlr' pmjest. I concludeby saying that M e  RawIs is m y  meted in 
providing a muel jum3catioo for & liberal rodstieq msintaining this 
oeuwlity hampor Tustise ar faimeu' 6om canminting more clearly to -nt 
political debates within h i d  rocictiea. 
Aclmowledgmems: 
Thk pp" arow out d a n  early venion in which I a i d  to dcfmd what I 
thm Ealled a wml c o n e  ofjusirri. In this previous drift I 6.4 primvily 
on the junification of I r W m  whish1 saw p-ed in thework ofJohnRawk. 
While the themes of Ir%&m and nmtdity and the work of JohnRawin remain 
the maal fonu of this paper, instead of Iff-g to defend the neutrality of a 
libsal wnception ofjunia, I now examine boththe a d w c s  and shmtwming~ 
ofRawlr'junificarion. This off- allowed meto both address many of 
the miticknu made agabt  the first vaioo md give a more fair d u a 6 o n  of the 
p m j a  ofliberal mflality. In addresskg these &dm, I have had many helpful 
diwurdoos with munaoun people within the departman of philosphy. Iwould 
ewcialy like to thank h. Brian P-5 who intmduced me to Rawls' work 
and supervised some ofthe previous draft &this m y ;  and Dr Peter T& who 
supervised the complnion ofthc &st draft as well as supmising all ofthis draft. 
Both have wmamly b e a  therewith helpful mnrmolt~, uitidrm~ and 
encouragement. Without th*r help, this thesis would not have been wmpleed. I 
would like to thank rhe depament of philo~ophy for pmvidiig me with a number 
ofteaching assinantstips wkich helped support my M o d  of study. Fkdy ,  I 
d d  like to thank m y p m t ~ ,  Eric and Dorothy Chafe, for theb mrismsemd 
uodernandiog during the wri* paiod and my brother Mark for his invaluable 
computer crpenire 
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1nInduction: h i m  md J"Sti6c~tion 
Ibis papa ctamincs thc just&xiion of h U n m  o f f d  by John Pawls. AI a 
gaural l e d  we can i d e n e  l ibdana.  m p p n  for, at the very lurf the following 
t h e  claims! I) a raciay'r pubtic imitd- nharld not be designed to p m t e  a 
cmrsqtion of & ~ o o d  iftbat conception in mmmtious w+hh tha rob-; 2) 
the devdopmeot of fpir pmced-r for vttling dilputeP regsrdiog basic public inntitdons 
should be &en p d e m  over attempts to etabliah a common conception of the gwd; 
and 3) individuals should be gmxed cefiain tights under which they can p m e  their oam 
conception d a  g w d  life While a0 tibeds semhgly  weewith &Y basic &im, they 
d i m  about what el= is mtailed by the l i b d  position. For -pl+ the split W e e n  
classical and d u r i a n  h i &  -tern OD what should be the pop" b a l m  b u w e n  
tighu to equality and rights to individual h i . '  This baLvlu is a c i d  in determiniog 
&e degree to which h i a l s  should ~ p p n  the Rdi~mhtion of- within a sod*. 
Egalitarian l i b d a ,  e.g. TH. Green and RonaldDwarldn, holdthat liberals should 
ruppn a M y  large d- of wealth Rdist6'bution 00 the p u n &  that it helps 
the equal d u e  ofpolitid rights within a mcicly. Cknical h G %  cg., Robert Nodck 
and Milton Frredman, on tha nhcr brnd hold tha h i s  should oppose i large d- of 
 buti ion on the sow& that it i m e  with the hd+Adualuals dght w 
plopcm, 
Rnwls' projed is bawd on k n g  iibaalirm as a position whichquirua 
plrticulartypeofjfjusti6mion L~beralirmisoRen~~.ociafedwiththE~thst pblic 
kdtutionsshould bejvstSabiem thore who liw w w d e r ~ . '  It has been claimed 
that what dirtinguih l i i  theoryhm otberpolitid theories is this concern 
c on' There is how- a great d d  o f d i m e m  among* WI a h  nmst 
urrutituter an acceptable j u ~ ~ o n  oftheir position. There ate even some, e.g., Richad 
R W ,  who quafion whether liberals should be dl eogaged in the p d u  ofju16ficatim 
a dl. One ofthe maincauw of dirpure a-from l i b d  w o n  form* mongn 
conceptiom ofthe good. A conception ofthe %wd refers w L perxlnX1s o w d  view of 
how t h e  Gfe should be lived. For -pl+ a -n's urnception ofthe g c d  m y  be 
b 4  upon the idea that the pvnuit of d s f i s  achiwemenn b the type dl& most worth 
~ ~ o r t h a a ~ i n ~ w i t h G o d ' s W 1 i s ~ 0 1 1 ~ ~ o u l d l j , w t h a m e  
happiness bfbfound iofoUowing acollcctian ofpmdr  psbap foeused amwrd M y ,  
employment and r w i s c  to one's rnmmtdy 
AU pmpls can be seen m hold somcmoception ofthe Swq mn athey do not 
n p W y  formulate it as such or ifif is not t h U y  wiiGstenf! Tbc concspdon ofthe 
gwd one adopts a s  m m ,  ifnot all, arpsu ofths -n'a 1s. Ifone fhinksfbnt the 
pursuit of arrirtis acbiiwunmts is therypedlife most worth M g  this will affmtk 
person's careschoices, eduatiamal choices, t h e m e  of ppolit~d anangemem the pcnan 
is likely to favou, the rypc of people they d likely associate with, etc In some sadctie~ 
then is widespread m m t  on large por6m of a common conccpton of the good. 
C ~ R  Russia o r m m w z a y  may be ~ e e n  u examples ofsuch yldetia.' In 
other societies, r g  . mmempomy Wwfan sotietie$ no one  ono option of the good is 
shared by the vast majority of d h '  Om of the problems which these plm& 
soticties faoeia that they -f appeal to a shared conception of the good to detamine 
how their basis social innitutionr should be -Ed. There basic insrimdm include the 
&.m hold && ~ o f a f ~ u u u u f  BC& 
a m M ; ~ ~ & . ~ m o o c p ~ c o f 1 b c ~ ~ 2 & ~ ~ m .  i t . ~ ~ i n ~ & s b ~ r r r k ~  
Iri* a-m m 2 a-eon of Ihc gmd am om -popowimes - not having bbtm?d 
m ~ ~ - ~ r ~ n n - t h e ~ t o f t h i r D r m t h i h i h k m n c n a d o ~ Y ~ t b p m b l c n y  
rodcfy'r pnlriplepolitissl, cronmnic andjuditial8n8npeotr. L a  rocicryinwhich 
there is n-f on awnqt ion  ofthc good there basic imlkwioo~ canbe -ged 90 
as to b m  fosterthat shared caxepioa For example, in a rotiery fo-Kd OD achieving 
religiovr o l l w t i o ~  Ihc basis inddoa. -Id be arranged ro as to m x h k  Ihe ti&*' 
adherence la rdigioy3 pnstifer. Dir- rsgsrding the hasis Lutinniors mvld bc 
w l v e d  inrmns ofwhich armgemen1 b m  ashi- the sodew's I- god. Appdhg  
to a shared careption ofthe g o d  is 0-1 an optionfm p I d 5 i c  sodetier The idea of 
n~tn l i ry  mma into play bae Natdify is bared on the daT- khvez 
~oncqioos ofthc g o d  wkadefemining a sodcry's s h a d  public hituti011l. Rather 
than daemhing thebasic oocid hstwioos in 1- ofonly one cmwption ofthe gwd. 
eg, t h r ~ ) ~ ~ m b r l d b y I h e m o s t p o ~ p y p ~ ~ r o d e r y ,  mpptfm
wwlity en& nying IO mke m u m  of sll the differem mncqtioos of the goad wit& 
a r o c i ~ w h e n f o m ~ n g  i s   ti^ Ptrvcme. 
Libemir are in agreement in their  upp port for n d t y  In fact. m e  h i s  
haw argued that it is the nemdity ofthcirporitioo which dirtingnisber l i b d m  es the 
preferable politid arrnngcmad for pluralistic rocieties." Liierala dim- howwcr 
s b o u t ~ i s d c d b y a m m m i m m m a m f f o ~ .  Tberearcatl-threedi%bEt 
Om a d  n c v ~ l n i  ss -ot~dlnom LO & lamu ofphucll P~LIWPW I! u  an a vodlhsr 
a u ~ h a ~ r ~ m , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ d a o l h L b ~ b ~ b ~ r m o  rrcPl ~ 1 9 1 )  Y e h d c a  
afnd~ uma, rcrpsl for rar on ,hal bor m c r c o t  mncmorsd~bc &.-am b found 
lo ooc famo,aoo8brr a l ~ b l b c  annos  o f 1  IobCrpl RTII1n tn~IYdlW LDCLF M M U  OICm 
H n b e m u u a o d ~ k  
" %e P4 pp. 9-10; aod Tho- Nags1 "W Co* aod Pol iM h W i I M Y M  
M f i c ~ V o l .  16: pp. 2154. 
- a mmmimrem to w." The Kmt is d e d  'neutrality of c-.' 
N d t y  of eftel fo- on the coaxquences an klimtiod m g e m e m  has on the 
pmrpcnr of di&rm concepfonsofthc g d .  N o d i v  of cffecf ir adricved ifa 
sccie+y's public indtutions do nn d y  advantage (or disadvantage) any putisulu 
conception ofthe g o d .  In ofherword% ncumlity of &m holds that our PYblic 
hsi~tionn should be equally accmmodating to all mncepfons. It thun prrcluder such 
 ear, formvlarions of the political conniDmoo w h i 4  even UnintentiW, 
&dvantage puticular -pq a . d  be the - athc d t i o n  enfomd 
psuppodtionrwbich diyomge ~~partid~vconcepfon ofthe good A xmod me of 
namality is called ' n m t y  ofrim.' M s  type ofncutral&y stater that public ~ m t i o ~ s  
are only prohiited h m  aiming to funha any @dill  mnapdon ofthe g o o  It may 
be distinguished h m  g~eytrality of&& in that nevtrality of aim imh not concerned &h the 
unintmdad &N which the fornulation ofour public klimtionr have an the pmqecn 
ofany conception ofthe g o d .  As long s t h e  ~ t i o ~  are not atablished zo to 
foster any paddar conception ofthe& n d l y  of aim is achieved. The third type 
ofrmeamy is called ' ~ ~ t y o f j u d 6 ~ t i o .  Nnmality ofjuEti6cation isthe idea that 
rntditymed only mend to the jml&ation +ti for fo par6dar set of public 
Worm. I. other words, vnda nCuValityofjuati6sation the neutdily ofpublic 
inrtitutions is estabfinhed not by examining the insmutions thnndva bnt by emmhing 
theirjurfifidcatin Earnetbod ofjud6cation is zmqtatle to all groups thm the 
- &thUi~~j&cd by it are -to pqwlyrerpnt  ditraeof concsptimr ofthe g o d  I 
Prrrumably, an idmiand  amngemm d d  ootbejusdfiablcto a p M i a k g m u p  if 
its out- m g l y  diro-gedtbaf pmp or ifit was arranged to pursue a wdicthg 
wncep6oo of the goo& The jusfifiability of I portiNLar im6miolul -mnn d d  
certainly &pad on the pm- each gmup would have under. Yet for c a m d t y  of 
j d u t i 0 9  the prospects wbich -pr have under an hdlutional anangcmmt are 
w n d a r y  in establishing mwlity. That public ktimd- d be judlied 
withom making mlki srlppositicm is key. Neudky ofjudlicationfo- thm m the 
devclopmmt &?air p r a c c d w  fordcfmmbhg basic ktimdolul rathatbaathe 
whichthese inhtiom have onme di&rem conceptions o n e  adopted. 
Most l ibaaln have talrm mwlity ofj&cation as whnf is required to ratis@ a 
wmmitmm to mtnlity." Yet mtnlity ofjum3otim can itnelfbe consued in at least 
three ditfarrn ways The lmt type is -1i6ed by b'baals like KLm a n d m  Both 
attempt to achieve jus@caforyn~mlhy by estabti~bing rtandpoints which am seen as 
qudlyacmrhle  to all members of oociny. Kant bases his justi6ution ofliberalinn on 
bin conception ofthe person ashaving t e e d . "  Giwn that all people are held to have 
fcee dl, ajustification aven in terms of w hat is r q k d  to respect it Iould be m y  
appIiEablem ever/onq rnprdhr of-uhat conception ofthe p o d  pmpla hold. That 
+.tie, for gam, is daived i n d e p d d y  of any a m  tc a concqtion offho good 
&o,",itbenarmlmauthed&-mtco-pli-. r n ~ t h a t l i b r m l ~ 0 r n C M  
k j u d K e d i n t - o f t b ~ p l c o f u ~ .  F o r ~ w h a t ~ e s l i b ~ i r t h a t  
glvm everyme's di&ring wnceptiom ofthc good, h w  -rim allow for the 
mest am- of ~arisfacdon of people's desires?' Thc prindplc ofmllity ir bawd on an 
universal perrpeoiive in that it taLes wayone 's  happines nr thcy define it for t h d v a  
in tams oftheir ow conception of the good, as equal.'' Ihzmians mppm the 
instimional m m g m t  which &OW forthe greats  m u m  of mfisfdon, regadless 
dhow this m g e m ~ l t  dimibufeo happiness across the d&-mt conqi iorn of the goad 
found a a raiery. It is this disregard for haw ratisfaction e d r  up biw dirtniuted 
m s r  the d i 6 m  wnccptions Umich allow rn to be SM as also maintai@ a 
Many contempow l ikds  quafim however, whetherpr&g ajuJtification 
in fmns of a u n i v d y  accessible pwspxive, in the way which Kant and l*Wl do. 
l e g i t b t ~ r e s p a s  diffaenser bctwrrn pple'n conscptiom ofthegood." While Kant 
and Mill prcsatjuJtifica5m v v h i l  attempt to d t i I  a mivmdy accessible 
d p o i n t ,  in both ~nne. tbe .sc- o f ~ s  stadpikit depends on sfsepfing aspects 
o f t k k * r n r d ~ .  K a n L ' a j ~ n ~ ~ ~ t b e ~ o f b i r  
&on ofthe hearbjest. Tbc -ty ofMiU'li d i t y  prindpld as a meam for 
justifying lib& inwitdons is b a d  oa -g the principle as the basis of all maal 
delihemiom. W e  both do mt d c t  the conception ofthe g d  held by people mithin 
their juptificatiom, the -mnce of their method ofjusIi6cafion m r  on the lceepwcs 
of s a a i n  sububnantiveporitim~ which m y  d h d m o g e  cabin groups. Wth regard to 
Kn4 oumerous witm haw fordldly q u e d  that the pesupporitiom built into 
-ce oftbcKIotiao subject deny certain conaptions ofthegwd =place ruben 
jumrying political M o n s . l s  Wdh regard to the prindplc oftdity, Kadms -c that 
it is mble m provide ajuptification for categorical right% and that it theseby rjsu their 
ponitionfiom the nan.' 
The other two types of nevtralty ofjusfificatioo are based on wid- the scope 
of the neutralty to e m  that it does respm di&rencer in peaple's conepions oftbe 
good, even with regard to itn presupporitions The 6rst claims that neutralty of 
judkaion exteadl to all aspecu of my mmqtion ofthe 8 d ,  -t appeal9 m pure 
k m m d  reason" Thc -nd mends o~aality only to thaae ofmmaprions 
of the good which are in d i m e  within B particular smicty. Yet not dl mntempanuy 
libaalr are rupportiveatthacrypca of mended o f j u ~ c a t i o h  Jcao Hm@m 
aeu the pursuit ofpn&W-ry  n ~ m l i t y  as "quhotiq" " d ~ p l y  mi s@iM and 
daogemua to key h i d  pori t io~u.~ Extad i i  -ety of j&don  to tbe 
prrsuwritionr ofajurtiSsatbn seemin& places ahoat impnporolile demands on 
pmviding an adequate judicatim How are h i d r  to p w  ~WrnLm Which doer 
not in the pmcar violate a mmmimat to mtdiq if for emmnle, they carmot maLc 
claims about the ~ o t p e r s o n s ,  rheiimotimtiong ortheir beliefs? An mended 
ju s i6a toa  nnmality utdermtr tbe mmpt to junify aay politid positioq 
including support f o r n ~ m l i t y  &Ifn More aoubling to l i k &  EkeHnmpton is that the 
very submmiw idcnlr of libsalirm, rg., rupenforindividud's rights and support for 
tdaw'oq may be put at risk Ha commimem to mtdiq is purPued too far In 0 t h  
words, n commitment to an ortmdedjuPtiflcatory namaliry may @e too mush mom P 
mdibaal groups ro as pot to allcw the kdmt ioo  arrived I to be libaal. For atample, 
Hhi& have to pmvidc aj&oatioati which d o  nuwn lhe 
. w b o ~ o n  (or wen the mnihiinfioo) of other p u p s  -within a rodcty, this would most 
mrainly pmduce m ~ ~ f i o n a l  w m e  a b h o m m  h i  The qud011is should 
hienrlr accept a n a w l  indhltiod -gemsm even Hit is llOt h W  in characted 
Hampton mma firmly down OD the side ofddendingthe substantive as- of t i b d m  
A n ~ t r a l  conception ofjustic+ she holds. '%at allowed diE-tial economic 
s F o r c x a m p l ~ ~ n s Y l ~ ~ t o l t o l t a o - a w ~ ~ b v M s m a n d ~ m  
&epic, - m vio,a,e a 0,;nmim.M I0 mmdity * 0,na"ea For nn - dms UgYmen,s SgE 
Samuel ssbmro'a %A@ ~TPo l iML~k raUsm" inE&fcsVol. 105 (OR 1994). 
o p p ~  d-diog upon REC or .us or th.rtalostcd rcvcrrimpmeishment or 
fmm of nGgious intolac+ w d d  be an inegifhastc c h m  for that radtry - 
ad deserve the adj& 'unjust' - no mmrrhow much q p o n  it nseivsd bornthe 
-."% Furthermore. Be denies thar m adequatcjurtiS~ationti o f  h i m  even 
needs to bcnartral. For Hamptoo. Irhralian can claimtobe'cbjectidy tight'wkhout 
being paradmid.* Even h W s  who rct the connistacy oftheir podion as depndenf 
on providing aneuwljusti6cati1q wauldlileiyagee that not any u)u)crptio~ ofjustice is 
~sqabk even Zit mlrld be rln- w beneumrl. So how -ring should 
liberals be towards nodiieral psitiom in orderto maintain a wmmimmt to namality? 
Yetlhir very question s e e m  to u n d m  the  &maof0 n d t y  How &sac san 
liberals ba to n mmmiment ofn- ifthey d only accept h i  Oufmmes? Is a 
commitment to neutdityviolmed bomthc start Z h i r  hold to certain mbrtPmive 
pooiti00~ which they an not milling w abandon? Thesequstiom hit atthe hcan ofan 
apparmt d c t  w i t b P i e d h  between its suppon for m e  type of nnmdityand its 
support f o r d  arbaanflfle podti- F-d with fhis cadi% Hampton Caos tor the 
abandonment ofjustSmoty nsutdity. Liberals who e justi6mtory numality as mdal 
in providing an adequate and coadstsntjusdication o f W  podion fascthc d'icult task 
of showing how such ajunifiation mbdb -re key q - 9  of libwlirm (as 
demanded by libnals like Hampton) withoutundemming the worth ofthe neutrality &y 
arettying to establish 
" ~ ~ p P l O : W ~ b e r % ~ R r m b u ( l b u ( l b u ( l . n d ~ ~ ~ ~ i n E m ~ d H H H ~  
JoclNlneez Ed. I Coleman& h Bmbmn(Cambddgc: CambddgcUP, 1995). 
The pmblems related to support fm n d t y a n  not the only on- liberals ha- in 
providing an adequatejustbic~tion oftheir p s i t i 0  Another key problem 6 regarding 
the rtarruwhich ahould bee- to the basic tenets ofb-sq e.&, the 5amr givm to 
individual tights and ~ p p o n  f m m l d o n .  Literals bold that thereare certain ti& 
granted to the individual which govmmmms urmot 1 d M a y  h i  
hold that these tights must be stegotical and u n i e  Fonov&gKa% armmber of 
liberals hold that in order m jnsrity univslal categorical tights, hiadirm requires a 
jurtifidon which is independem of  helie& m prcccpD which a n  comingcm a d  h b y  
opm to pourile &a We fhup 6nd -me h W s  preren6ngjWiftcafio~ which a n  
b a d  0 9  for example, a mncqion afthe slbjecf (Kmt), the preruppositioos of 
m m m u n i d ~  action Wakmm) or the prenupposhbos of plrrpmdul d o n  (GeariRh). 
AU ~esejustikations aim to establish Eatainindiidual rights s categotical and 
m i d .  Not all liberals ho-that individual ti& need be megotical and 
w i v e d .  ?dJl -estbxl individual tights can be sufficientlyjWifted by ap- to the 
pMtiple ofutility, even thoughit dtimately rests on the coming- dpeapte'n 
m-tion ofthegood." Historicistn, Wn Rishard Row and MichneI W b .  dismiss the 
v e r y p o r u i i  . , f j e g  uni~nimal beliefsefsefs nere writ-$ a n  hisoticis in thatthey 
hold the& ofany hrmtedge slab is solely the p r d  of B ~ c y I a r  society, and that 
popkstau&u. ~ & ~ w l h u s ~ a i m I ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ' & u w i t i l ~ o n t b i . b a b . t o ~  
slrirmvilbvilbf k n m i o g t b e ~ ~ w b u s b & y r v i U b e ~ Y d l E d .  ForRarq,..lueannattWbeybeynd 
our o w  r n h 1 1 ,  m c h  is what ththdaim dunherd n w  shlrttrmplr 10 Po. % e W r  unpublhhd 
p a p ,  "UoiuerSality ad Tnnh" -tdat UBC in March ,991 
W o r e  mnh is conthgmt m the biaory ofthat moiety For historidst% rmtb 
is not 0(1& tha uul be dirmwrrd whhde of II pad& d mmrt. They thvr 
m k d i a j u s a i ~ t i o ~  inclumng the type d d e d  by Kant and IU 
king not available The problem fn providing ajusti6catk-n ofhi& is the liberals 
are divided -svritcn, WDKam md Habermy who me not ds6d srifhappeds 
simply t~ the comicgem beliefs within I wciety and w d t 4  like Ray and Walra, who 
deny that we should w to mah dabs tba are beyood those m r n h g d y  held W our 
society. By chwniog one side or& other inthis debate, ajusaiuuion daksoot only 
violating its mwity, but alro prrrarting a posbim which is -&Ic m &her group 
of h i s .  
Yetltortyrees mnxqucnce o€hiaoricirm other than B mm a rejectionof 
cafegorid and vniverPal rights. Hs claims that the mtirr M c c  ofmoral md patitid 
juJrification itxlfshodd be abandoned. Ku rejection o f j ~ c a t i o n  is bared W on an 
amptance ofhistoricism ar arcll onargumema aboutthe conditions of rocid pro-. 
Rorty holds that historicism limits moral md politidjuati6uuim to tk men anicvLation 
ofbeliefs cum"* held within a society. Yet he holds the inability to provide a 
juJrifidon is agood thingfmtiberal~ because I) a nodery not c o n m m d w i t h ~  
rmth more dovlyasmrds with the pmper ideals of a h i  demoostic society, e.g., 
m p p d  oftolerion md acsepwce of diversity; md 2) It clears theway for s d A  
aiticism to employ the more && toob of& andutopimpotitia 1% a 
'as.pu. 
- juPtifisation of m e d m  d pomile Swr gnm h i m ?  And prbap more 
impomrdy, do poIiIiEBtjusIikmi~~, ~Bony-ests , inf lCthamperthrypcofd 
pm- which l i d s ,  Wre KW and & b m ,  re as dependent on fhem? The very 
place ofjmlilidon in d d m i h g  ~ ~ n m m u s  also beconsided by any adcqwate 
jvd6mion of* h h m l  positioa 
IntICs p a p ,  I argue h t  Rawls' method ofjuMiatition is able to address m y  of 
the iuues that divide bberals mncembg an adequatefu&ication of their podtin. Rawls' 
mntegy ean be srrn to juniry Libdim in a n m b u  of stager. cacb sage employing its 
own mnhod ofjunifisittion At the firrt sage, Rawls argues forthe pMlacy ofjvrriss in 
tams of the need for 6% w3rk.1 a ply~alisic society. W l s  holds thst it is in 
everyone's int- to give ptinwyrn justice over ooe'sca-tion ofthegwd in order 
to aUow for the panviility of8 mble %xi*. This ar@mrnt dies 00 M appeal to 
prudent behaviordthio a panidar  nmJsti4 much in Ene withutilitarian andHobbesian 
ugumrns for the pc imq  ofjustice. It is at this .%I atage that the name ofRawIr' 
cammilman to n d ~ ~ i s  d d m d  to bejunifiatito'y in nature, and limited to MBI~ of 
md ic t  -within a panimlm sm.iery. The second stage addresw the need f o r j w h  to be a 
mod u)mqion. At this stage, Rawk m j ~ ~  mccption ofjustice should be b d  on
prudential cam id do^ ifit is af aU pamile. It is impartant m recogriz how this m g e  
dates to the 6m in ordm to see how Rawk b bdng nither inmndnnn nor violates his 
m m h e n t  to namalify At the .%I me, Rawls argue for the awqmnse of a 
conseption ofjustice g d y ,  regardless ofwh&it is I h i d  conception or not, a 
- nomaiiw m&on m not Ha- established the need fm a p I ~ c  rodny to adopt 
a mccption ofjurtia, he then mova to mndda  .uhat rypc ofco&on should be 
adopted. Raanr holds that in tarm oflchievinga ptable god gmted inthe 
fist m) it h bctfer to have r nor& uroccpSon ofjustie i.e. a &on titirms 
ban me affashmcnt to beyond the mere p"gmati5 rnnddemtirn of maiminkg p- if 
svch a conccpSrn h available Rasvln dl- for a nonnative conception by a& to 
the Em that the Ei6rea ofsome plwdidc MEiedea. wbiIe nor Pharing the m 
mneepaion ofthegood, may &are enough common belie& t om which to dwoiop a 
normative comepion ofjvlrice. It is also the case ht the belie& inhaem in the public 
cvkure of some . odde r  allow forthe developman ofa h M  wnccprion ofjustice 
whish is neural regarding thc divare coneeptiom ofthegwd p- 
.ode?..= That the belie& which underlie B h i  concqtim ofjustice CM be s e a  &% 
inherem inthe pvblic ari- of cmnin sotinier dlow aliierd &OD ofjunice to be 
adopted forthow sotinier while not vioinfing a wmmimcnt to nnmality E.wsdally, 
Raouh awidr violating neutrality by limaiog the applimbiW ofhir comepion ofjudos to 
those wcictiea whish have key li%d beliefs, cg, rrsgen for individuals as free and sqd 
beings, inhanrt in t h e  public dm. At the third stap, Rawh argues for his 9 d c  
lib& concqtion of 'juaricc as h a . '  Raana wss for j d c e  as fhimcs~ as the 
prmnble normative liberal m n W m  b a d  on the ideas of wide equilibti- 
and an ovalapping wnruuur For R a w 4  the ability ityracomepion ofjwrice to achieve 
wide deuk q d i i  depends on it ability m ''m the rational ~ d ~ o n  of all 
h b l e  carceprions [ofjustice] and dl  aso on able argumann for themmL In ortrer words, 
far a w d a o  ofju.6se to be b r&&ve q d i m  it mvSt be acceptat15 all thins 
coruidard." That judce as rpimrpim can ben ashievewide&& equilitim Jh- it 
m be the most nppropMtc 500c&m o f W m  for cemin ~)ciede.  Appaliog to wide 
rsn- eqdirium also worh to tie the d r e  I- o f ~ w l r '  vgvmem to-. BY 
q ~ i n h g t h a t j u b  as ficss is ultimatgjudged b a d  on all somidaatiom sonseming 
jusdce gives o M t y  to Rawln' m8um-t in Ust the q u m m t s  tor a general 
-+on ofjunice at the fint stage f l e a  the aKky m achieve dgtive tqviliium in 
the third *e. Lt- the acceptme of ageoeral maqtion ofjustice depends on 
the mnnwinu the rpKific conqtionofjustice (adopted inthe third stage) p h  an
are's wn+on dthcgood. The idea ofan ovslappiq mmeams a190 enswesthat the 
mn+on6mJly -vd at is able to maintain stability w i t h  the roday. Rwls' 
jwti6cation can Uau be ion as m@ng 6ml forthepirmcy ofjus6m gemally. Hethen 
arms for a nornutie GD& mrrcptioq withouf ~~ b W  mne@ioo of 
judm nhould be adopld Fiiy, Rawk argues for= S@C h'bwl socxeption of 
M c e ,  justice as fairre+ b a d  on in ability to achieve wide debin  equilirium with 
wide d- equilibrium maldngthe three stages interdqendcm. 
RavAs' method ofjstilication is Eardully &to ~ s p a ~ d m  many ofthe 
problem 5cd in pmviding an adequate jurti6safions of h i e  Firs ofa4 Rawis' 
jud6tiftion show how mppon for ncumlity wed not be based on prrJaiptive beliefs 
about respecting differrm mnceprions ofthegood Rawls I& shows w o n  for 
-&yto be based solely on pra@mtic Eonddwtions in presming apolitical thm'y 
for s pl-c sodety. She* libaal Nppon for mumbty to bci tw(fn~ual  is m d d  
in address the suspicion tha l i b d r  only mppon mmality bdausc nmh'dtyleads 
mosdyw ovtmmes whcb fhey suppert" Scmndly, Raw16 prenentr ajurti6atim which 
avoids vio!aing n u)mmimem to the ncumlhy o f j l  Rawln makes two type of 
stipulations which allow him to pre~iem a ~1WLjud6ca f io .  HE holds Ulnt it is only 
beliefs uat are w n ~ o u s  wi& L socictywhich camof be auumed in a w e d  
j u d a t i o n  This relnnr a mn- -dh n d r y  to the problem of d i t y  a a 
plumlido sociay. -1s thm h i t s  the applicabiJity ofhis jurti6~1tion to l i b d  sociniu, 
i.e., rodetin in which Eertain key h i d  be l i e  arc not wmcndous. By limiting& 
a p p l i d t y  dhis jud6uuion a -oh s o d n i q  Rawlr is able to maintain au)tnm&mem 
m neutrdiry without ripking the submtive elements ofthe liieral position. Thirdly, 
Rawk offen a jud6carionwbich foIIow%g hi3 and Rorty. is tied to the dmMItmces of 
the pad& society to which the wnscptioo is addressed, while at the -617% 
foliowing Kant and H a b q  can guarantee categorical righe. Rawls is able to do this 
by avoiding the very question ofwhetha liberalism should be presented in univosaliR or 
historicist-. He argues that mppon for categorical rights can be found inthe public 
culfun of artain Jacieties, without asking whether m h  rights wend to  all other 
'SceNagd. P. 116. 
~ ~ d e t i s . ~ '  F ~ Y .  ~a-wls' of r d l d ~ e  -5- fa a w ~ ~ ~ f  a 
pmi& conception ofjustice which ndther violates a mmmitmem to historicism nor b 
simply an midation ofthe bcliefp inh-t in the pubtis FulNrc In other word% RawW 
use of rdl& cquillhium b able to m a t  Rony'n mn- about the p o ~ ~  of 
p o l i f i s a l j u ~ ~ o n  @vm hist~ri&rr.~ F d y ,  ,Rnulr prescnu a jdurt ion  of 
libaalirm which b clcarb tied it to its historid moa. Judith ShWar claim that libaalim 
is, at i ts d-st I+ a rapme to  ththprohlemr which are f a d  by &es whose 
members an pmfwndy dhided in their views &om what mnaiflltes a w d  life3' 
RaarW juniBcation hi@ghs the fact that the suer& and mbm- of the IiW 
position is only yrmly apymiatd when it is v i d  as a Y)- o f a d  pmblm to 
whichp lds i c  sotieties arc prone. Wtdle many yhavec mmplained ofthe absmcmeses of 
his w o k  I argue that a ge&m undmanding and appredion of R a d  o v d  pmjcct 
can be painad by seeing how closely it is formed by I it b m address and 
thetype of satiety to which it is adb~sed.  
Pmsemting RnwW theory as a multi-lwel jusdlication of hbMli~m b a novel way 
of Lwldng at Rawis' work For Rawln, thejurtifidon dweloped in A Theory of-ee 
and PofiIeslLrWsmis ON united argument forjudcc - faLncs. Inpruaaing 
h w k '  @on in terms of a mlti-level j d c a t i o  I & not mean to deny thc u d y  of 
i3s m t .  Fmihemior~ myrrdculationatRawlr' positionrqdk bruldng apvl 
w ~ l c  o f k k '  u)- and d E & g  thcy paru separately For example, the ides of 
a p o l i r i ~ c o n ~ p t i o n o f j w r i c e i n c l ~ d e s t h ~ i t i ~ b o t h ~ m ~ d m ~ ~ ( ~ ~ d a s ~  
the apphbiity ofjustice to questions d g  thc basic s t r u m .  As I p m t  &Is, 
I split the m o d  asppa ofthe political 60m its limitstion m quwions o& thc basic 
msfuR dealinganfh each at d i i  I& ofjdcation. I& not fhinlj however, 
thatmy w o n  inthe d subnamidy alters dths bis rnnqtion of the +cal or 
RawW overall position. Ahhough this is not how Rawk prerenta his argvmolt forjustice 
as fairness. there are a &a ofadvamager in viewing his theory in famS of the hemninct 
lmlr  ofjustification which are clearly present witbin his wok. F m  it shows explicitly 
how RawW tuo main worh nlafe to tach other. In the way that I penan h w b ,  we can 
say that A Tacolyoffm'rrprimarily deak with p-ting the argument forjustice as 
h c s s  as a partisular liberal n o d v e  conception ofjusti. The main aim ofpolif id 
L i W r m i n  pMlarily to present the arguments for the stability and neutrm ofjudce as 
fimess both in terms ofit being a general cooeeptionofjurtice and in terms ofitbejng a 
nonnative lib& mnapfion o f j ~ t i ~ e ~ '  PoI i t idL~Wirmalm aim to align the 
argument presented in A 7 k e y o f J m ~ c e w i t h  the wider argument whichit pnwmr. 
This d s  r e f d a t i n g  the acuum of Nlbdily *en in the last section of A T k o l y o f  
~ ~ c e ~ c h  p-justi s as fairness as a moralurncsptioninviolaDionofk~ 
mppon for neutnlity. We can say thm &at A T 6 c o N o f J m ~ ~ w r l o  primarily oa 
(wbt I have Ealled) the third stage ofRaovln'ju66~~tion what Po~EalLitem&m in 
m o * - c a n d w i t h t h e h - ~ .  W ~ o u t m y . p p n d * t k ~ I e m e n t n r y  
of -Id main fan ararlir, the reada mi*- the full rcopc and power dRawk' 
pdrion Pnrmfing Rawlr' theory u ilrnulti-l~~~ljusti6cado0 dm DS a defense of 
his psition Many of Rawk' ~ E J  tms their cri+itm on misintqming the nature of 
Ys P f w .  Far examplg Michael Smdd argues that Wo, foUorring Kam. b- Yr 
awment for tk p h q  ofjurticc on a conception of the pclsOnnn Another poin of 
mntmtion m m g a  Mends a d  critics is Rawls' placewitbinthe hintotiddobjmkist 
deb*. Rawlr is sithacharaaerired m an obje&isEberd who is misraLdy takento 
be a hinorici%" or is ahintotidnt who mist&+ maintains the Enlightenment projw 
that political imtimtioru need justifJsation~.~ -8 RawW po&ion in di&rrn 
stager all-ur to clearly nec hoar Rawb in able to avoid S ~ d e l ' ~  c r i t i d s  u 
seeing how Rawls h able to amid br&gvdh dlher hisoticia or objcsdvia Ubnalr. 
F d y ,  in w&Uy the - m e  ofRzarb'jud6catioq we TUI came to 
m m g i z e  the lunits afthe entirepmject ofj~d6catory neumlity. RawlZ jlutificatioo 
pushes mud -trw to its funhest poin. BY lookg atthe ~hornalls of his 
justifJCstioq eg., im di6iwlty in mnmiu6ng to a mba of mmcmporq pofi'tiul 
debaq  are a dcady we not onlyfhehimdm of RawkIr 0-*m j~stilicarimbut dm tbe 
&hate limitation of my n d  h W  rnmqion ofjustice. 
Chapter 1: 
in this &per, I wt out the k t  pan ofRawIsIs~caricaricari for& ~onmptio~ of
justice as fahers: his -em forthe phacyofjydce. Beyond its p a  inhir 
jurdfiution gemrally, Pawls' wpnrnf bere is important for it is the fosur of om ofthe 
mat iotlucmial o i t i t i m  msdc qaim his podfion. in his book nh-alrh &the 
Limitr o f W c 5  MiChad Sandd argues that Pawls' &im for the p- ofjusice, and 
svhatisdedbh-erhimtoviolatehis~t~neurmay-~~ 
sonscptionr ofthe gwd. S d d  holds that Raarls is P ~ m o I o ~ c s l  h i  ?he 
deomologid popitinn is based on the acceptance of s pvdevlar &on of tbc -o, 
a mnccpticm which Sandd d l 6  t h c u n m ~  self. Thcunenmbend &is based 
on the idea that we can divided the capacity for choosing ends fom the acNal ends pmple 
choone. For those who adopt this wncsption, what i p s  
capacity for choice. In other words, what is moat impanant about us - Bt lean h m  the 
point ofview of m o d  and politidtheory - is independent ofthe pan ida r  punvits we 
follow and is tied to ourhdonn to  Eboosethese pursuits for o u r r s l ~  If is mailed by 
this tbt none of the subjm's en45 are esseotialto i ro that the subjebjen is mt mcumbved 
or emtial ly tied to my panievlarpunvit. No pvdaular end is Sea  as wnStiDnive ofthe 
m b j q  regardless of how M y  that cnd is held. For the unencumbered %% dl ends can 
ultimatdy be mired. This wnccptiou d t h s  wbjubjm. Sandel dghtfdy points nq 
underlia amat  ded ofthe h i  tradition dating back to Kant W s  moral and 
polifid philosophy isbased on the idea that dona1 pubjms arenot totally dimled by 
e n d  f- but have hives the capacin, to direot thdr o m  aniom. It ir this 
M o m  which d i W r h * i  humans from mher an@d objects and maLa people 
worthy of nrpea. Fmhemar, Knm holds it is only by ~ppedhg to a &on ofthe 
h j k t  in which the cppaciryfoo choice is ?=dependent of* ah we shwxthatw are 
able to m i d  b.ring morality u d  politics on mere or empirid fmdalions. in 
his moral phil-phy, it is theunivemdiw and vnsonditiorvlity ofthe categorid 
impermivs bared solely om f o d  aspect of the moral law, which provide. a p p e r  biuis 
formorality. h his potitid philosophy, it isthe apriori dictates ofjustice, derived Iiom 
the m o d  law, which m e s  catsgotid rights, i.e., rights which cannot be o d d m  
cvea by appeals m tk general w d f k  ofthe soo'ety. 
Rawls' poJirion is dearly indebted to the- liberal wdition 1 For Sandel, 
Rawls' Kantiminn mends m the adoption with some d c s t w m  of thir u1wqxion of 
the LmmNmbered Jelf Sandel also sees Rawlr, meKant, giv iq  thir wncepfion ofthe 
m b j a  afouodational role aithin his p m j e  nndynderlying its claim forthe primacy of 
jutice The problem which Sandd sees forbathKant and Rawlr is thatp-ppoJing 
luch a conception of the prr~onbothvioIafer t i b d  W ~ ~ S  to n ~ l d t y  and baxs 
theirmodthmries on aflawed w-tion of& person one which m o t  account for 
t h e m  range of- moral and p o W  expaimw. For Sandel the ~~bered setiii 
uab lem maLe - of a great d ~ d  ofour moral We, e.g., Otron@y held W o u s  
wmdmarn In this chapter andthe next, I argue that Sandel misinterprets the m a t  to 
which Bawls is ~Kantirn. B-re he rcer Rawls as a m e p h g  Kam's mong mjeaion of 
dlhimies Sandel fails to mgrizetbeimponam mleufilitarian mddedom play in 
cstabliohing RawW potiti04 inchding its claim forthe primacy ofusice. Rawlr' ckb 
fortheprirmEyoTW~~isbawdnnon~partidarm~oTthe~b~~tmth~ 
w vgvmcoa wmm%ngthc limbemwe of poplei mring Eonoepfionr of thcgmd 
witbin a common society amh s h a d  public ~ O I U  Th timatla witbin p l d d ~  
raid= .Ira dcfemirw,  kPawis,  the afmt of liberal commhnonu to -nab. By 
cxaminiog the underlying d d c  ofPawls' claim for the plimacy ofjudce. we rhall see 
fhat the limits and rationale of liberal u)mmhmu to nanmlity do not depend upon the 
acceptance of P particular wnqtion of the -0, but are dammined by the typu of 
codice pmsnt wltbin pluralistic rodetier. 
Section 1: Rawls and The Circumstances o f J d c e  
In order to appre5atePawis' arpmem for the p h a c y  ofjudce. we need to 
examine the type of society forwhich be - dmI& a conception ofjudce 85 a 
dableproject and the role a mnEepGoo ofjustice is  ruppored to play forrush a society. 
The need to dcvslop a conception ofjustice arises only wtan there is d c t  ~ o n g a  the 
members of a society. ffa society- not marked by wrdiar, orifit had a ~ m d  
m b c d  for qrickly wUir@ such wdicts whenthey did arir, it would have no rred to 
develop a cme~t ion  ofjfjudce For example. W l n  poims out tha "amollgrt an 
asmiation of dnts, if-h P ccmmuity could d y  &sf the ~~SPIIICI bout justice 
could hardy oecu: for they would all werk densly tweth for ON end the s l q  of 
God as defined by thdr common reli8i04 and reference to this end would d e  mq 
question ofrigbt."z Althcugh d c t  is cuentialfordrrr to bethe ocsd to d d o p  a 
conception ofjuda,  net al l  mdict  b a ~ f o r j u I t i c e  In faa, M a i s  quite 
q d s  &ant thetype ofcodicf with whichjustice b mncemcd F W  Rawb h i t s  
relevant mntlctl to those concerning 1 ~odcry's badc srm- Amdw's basic 
m- b "the way in which the major mdal indmiom [which include tht prindplc 
economic and meal m p n e r d r  and thcpolitid m n d t d m l  dirmitcfundamcmal 
rights and dutis and detmnincthcdivisio~ of adad- from Mdal mopwion." For 
Rwlr then, d c t s  which are a mn- forjustice focus on the f o l l o ~  types of 
questions: Should the m e  lib& be mended to all members ofaodety, Should 
w t h b e  d m i u t e d  within society? Should the &c strumre of a sociely be 
constructed m best ~ ~ I i ~ o u s  snlva.tion?* Not d y  does Rawls lpc* that justice is 
concerned with s o d i c f ~  regarding the bani= srmrmr+ he is also quite clearabmt the 
source of cn9ictl regding the ~as i c  with which he b cmmmed. For Rawls, 
conflicts about the basic mu- primarily arim h m  d-ds made onit h d a t e d  in 
. tam. ofpp lc ' r  divme moral, religious end philonophial d o e . 5  The% domines 
an what I refemd to in the imdus6on as unrcepdmu of the good To aa in 
rccordrnce with the dictates ofrush doctrbes, or on'$ -@on afthe good, 
mmtimm req- making Fatnin demands of public M o n a .  PerhPpathe mast 
wmmon example would be a rrlipjon which required its memberr to mimain a certain 
type of xrtiew yet amoral domine whi& rapid that -one be mated q u U y  ora 
philonophial docainc which wkmined &at the basic nrmrmrc should be determined to 
maxMire economic g m h  ihrmtemoral Md philo~ophid dominer d%chmaLc 
similar demands ontheir adherents ForI(1wlS. the med to develop a COmcpti011 of 
jvrriceonly dwr for pludktic sode i a  and is w-ed only with conflicts mmning 
their buic W o a r l  suucturrs. 
'The p r h q  mle ofjum'ce. es RawIs wnceiver it ism ad& the p m b h  of 
d 3 i t y  witldn p l d d c  societier The development of a wnceptim ofjwice addresses 
the key question for Westem poLtics ToUowiog the Rcfo&on: How ir RabIty a a 
plumlistic society possible? WiththeRefomatioq E u m w  nodetin became divided by 
pmpk holding d&ct religiousvis\y~. This bmught to the fodomthe question of 
toleration: What arimdds should people have towards othss who hold wmmy (religious) 
vim? Surprisingly, imdsrmce - and quite often brutal inol-cc - was the atritudc 
initially adopted by many cat he ti^^ and RofermnfS. Part afthe reanon for thiria, a$ 
SusanMmdus points out, "inn sociqwhich was devoutly and favartly religious 
sPLp.4 .  I t w r p m t b n t x l f - ~ c m d d ~ b e a p ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~  YnarlbellKIaf 
e e j  at whish s moaplian djuuiuui i s  - 1 . ~ 4  such xIf--would i W f b  to be 
kmm"latEd m mrm afa puoropbiral poriY04 Fbapr a f o r m o f b a o ~ c  gobrm. 
- ~ E g i m  l&m wm ofta nee. as fhe g a t e s  heresy of sll: in m m  d r e w o q  
ma'n  immortal wuls were at sake, and mledon  in fhis world - not to be gsmed if 
tha price- dvnnatioo in the red. Moreover, and indepeadmtly of consid400 of 
~ t h a h e r r r j s ~ W ' d f ~ b e ~ 1 ~ 1 & a g & G o 4 m d f o r t b a f  
-n alone wm not to be tolerated.'" Rcganlleu ofmir initial bias m d s  intolerace, 
many b e p  m see the cruelty ofi iolwnsc as bdng uhriatian Somq Wa S e b d e n  
&S~&OR began to espeuw t0lW.m as 1 Chridm virme. ABs mam/ yun of- 
both sidcr oftheRsfadonhad widely embrad UIe principle oftokation Yet 
mod ae qucstioo o f t 0 1 4 4  thou& d o d y  tied to 4 thaMottmim a110 broached 
the quaion d h o w  pla and mbility m f o  be mahtdmd within plumlidc soddcp. 
BothPmt&c&m and Catholi- rvae authoritax& ralvatio& @onin md 
d& religions? Thlhin fanhmught them &om imo almost immediate d q  
which Wimatdy resulted in numerous wm. For many at the 6m% stability could only be 
achieved ifooe side orthe otherwas defeated. Stable pluralistic societies, for many, were 
inconseiMble an eitherpdssl  or n o d v e  gmundr. As Rawis pointr out, 'libaal 
mndmionalirm came as a dircovuyof a o w  social posrib*: the powTlity ofa 
reuoonbls ~ O U S  and stPbleplwaMsoci& This initial problem of &ty 
lo bold r a q  ow lhu mcmbm *"oms! mcu.r 1h.t bnh hbc.".D vmcd mud. d. uhnuhnuhn uhn ** 
om l l .  uqaoMnul rcfa  10 Iblfscl fsclblbl Wh ehs)s)s)s)s)mpccd cdcdcdcd papk W U u r  UIIDOU 
aod rax a0 hl lo *horn lbol d d  trv m-L and fd1,  holk rrhplolu m r  d& ul Lhat n  ha 
wahinplurolistic mcicriu. f i c h  is 5 the historical mot o f h i d m  remaim Smrm to 
Radr' pmjen. As R.ark sates: ' % W i d  liberalism rtans by takingto hemthe abmhtc 
depth ofthat F.c., the W o ~ m ' s l  kre-mndlable 1st- w d i a " 9  ForRawk one of 
the mdn -N for atablishbg a conepion ofjwice is w help smk and mdiafe 
w d i u n  rcglrdingthe basic rrm- of a p l d s t i c  roday. Pwistmt md d e n t @  
~ ~ r e g a r d t o t k b a s i s r r m -  a s i l l ~ b y t h e y a r r o f m i f c f o U w i n g  
the Refomtioq are a ~ O Y I E ~  of p a t  d and d instability. A conception ofjurticc 
i n m e a m w h ~ ~ r r a b Z t y b y ~ d ~ t b s e ~ d ~ s . n 3 l i c h ~ d o c r i n m m  
wayr. Fint, a oonc40.1 ofjusfila d e s  Eertrin fUndunmtal irpua c a e  1 
mciety% basic icuuiom. For example, Radr' conccprion ofju%irti c Faimfaimers holds 
&all po*tions in ~ ~ - 5 9 r h o u l d  be opcn to all members. In a rod~yarhish adopted C i s  
conceptio& the memba would tbat q u c d o m  concerning whnhcrporitions should 
be open to dl would be settled and not open to timber debare. 'Ibe claimthat 4 
positions should not be open to all would be urjnst. Tddng potmtially divisive q u e d o m  
as h d y  snfled server to limitthe rmmbs of w e  codictr con-the baic 
smmre Secondly, a conqt ion ofjustice -r as a common refmmce poim born 
which dainu made in debates cancamingthe cstab61hrm.t of a wnnrifytion and the other 
major in&tio~ of 1 rodety may beadjudicated In other words, a wnceptionotju~ce 
pmvik a ~ C I V O ~ ~  agreeable to a4 fom &ch all aides w m r k  w-ds the 
resolution of social conflicts ngardingthc bark -.lo 
In o rds  for a m&on ofjustice to cgenivcly add- sonflicu stamming Emm 
mcmbm' diverse poim of-, it mun be given p n b a q  over the corn* demands 
msde born there diverse pim ofview, at 1- with regard to c o n e  the 
basis WmUr" Foriunticeto play the mIeebichRmk aces IhM doer pcopleluill 
sometimes h to an c o m q  to haw they would Kthcir adom were d d e d  solely 
bytheirconseption o f t h e m  vnFencrrd bythe d e d a  ofjunice. At Ulir poi% it is 
worth noting that we have not m yet made my ddmrination about the sbancta ofthe 
mcsp6ot! o f ~ c e  wtkh may be adopted by L p l d s r i c  kxiety. We are only 
mncsned withthe argumcm forthe pinmy ofn mnccption Of jus t i~~*511d~ .  At this 
general lev@. Rawlr holds that it is the gmd of stab* which emres the p* of 
jud- If however R a h '  Ulim forth primacy ofjwice is based on its ability to hip 
~ ~ d i t y , h o w i s i t t h a f h ~ ~ b ~ ~ l d t h a t t h a t c h ~ ~ ~ b e ~ t e d ?  It 
i not initidly obious that pmp11 W d  be wiibg to grant ptbmq to j& Far 
example, apemoowho holds theview thet ralntion b granted only to thoso who ntrin to 
dewlop a phsular  type of~ocietywould d y  mu, deny tbnfjudce should have 
primacy o m  their conception ofthe good. Such r&gious devotion may also owmide a 
person's desin for stability and peace w i t h  a mciety, -the &n that d d o n  in the 
derlacir ofprime impottmco, as isk - for example, aith panidpants in ahfudim 
- jibad. Admilarm would be sowone, eg, a a m m & i s t h * c N e x d e r B ~ U  
* hcld an atlolute philosophid domineand nfud  in aw.qu1  mmpmmiuthdr 
msmptr to m b b h  what they saw ar the d y  just humudd anarrgemmf. Can rve 
n a U y a r p c a r v ~ p M n r t o a s s c p t t h c ~ o f ~ m n & o n o f j u ~ ~ E h r m y b e  
mntrarytothdrvim? Whatisclesrhmthe-ir~@~p~to~ccaill 
requke a sacrBcq aod in somc a great on the par! of some people witbin 
socictyl%e sadice they have to make is that they M requind to mi* thdr mm4 
religious or @osophical vim SO tbat the danandr they make aM&g ouf of thew vim 
ace not at odds *the diEfa(es ofjnsticc EpsmtiaYy this ~ c c s n &  acceplhg at 
the very leas some son of privafdpublic didnFtioo and ldngjustice have pimacy 
*thin the pblic & This dou not mcamrily require the p- to abandon the mth 
oftheir moral, religious aal philosophid d d s .  It is posiblefarjustice to 6dKU irn mlc 
evemapeople simply yiid to the dictates ofjustice in the public regLR while maintaming 
the mth of. contrary position Without the mnnben of a society yieldingto justice at 
least in public ma-, a mIIccptionofjustice is vnable to W its role ofmaimidrg 
rtabiliiy.14 
~ ~ a s o ~ o f j l u f i a r r q v i m p M u s y I t l u B i n r r g . r d t o g u a f i o ~  
d g  the basio m a  many people when ini* faced with the choice of either 
&g h b i l i t y  or &sing their moral, rcligioun or phiorophical d&es w d d  
choow to ti* insPbiGfy. The choice to *ecf fhe pMusy ofjvrri~c is not. however, 80 
appdhg. Fhrt ofa4 t h e  in tbe &e drtability. This d u e i s  clearly flustrated by itn 
absence. The reactian to tbe m d t y  sbwn by both sidcofoUowingthePmteNnt 
Rdomtion is at the rwt ofthe LiW posi?iot~ Fora recent example ofthe h o r n  
cauncd by thk fyp of politid instability, we sm look m the break up of Yugoslavia and 
t h e ~ s i v i l w a n w ~ & i n t h e ~ ~ 5  Ihc wofnrabilityisnotbow-Emhedto 
the aMidance of& -did. Artable rodq &o ~ O W I  Lrceater d mapaation 
and the benefm which eomefiom such wopwtion. Thevalue of rodal cooperation is 
that it "makes possible a bmer Wefor 1 Ulan any would haveif each wento live soIc1y 
by his o m  &om "16 For example general adherence to rulu within a rtable aaiq 
dbws for m6xeabIe comraas, d e r e  each pany b bound to W mmb 
-Flubilitiea to which %ey had prrvioudy @. This allow people to "like the 
bettcr &ilk of a penon in one area snd their dlfzhg the othr prson's b t m  M U  in 
~ J ~ m a ~ ~ b i s a c s o u n f o f r o m c o f ~ b a m r r ~ t h i l b i ~ a n d ~ p ~ ~ 1 o p h i d ~ 6 a m . a r  
cdmim AMncKinnon, 'CmWorWar,  cntnaofPe%ein O a H u m a o m ~ * : ~ L r s m n r  
1993 Ed. S. Hdeymd S. S b q  WRIYY~L: BadcBmLs 1993). 
.notha w allowing for a net benefit to both.17 The value ofthese ten&% of swid 
coopention .re evm more i m p o m  e r n  the fact that soticties adst in in condition of 
moderate rani?. of rraurw. The mourn of nrnmrs which a rodcty has ruder its 
sonaol is dwys  Me4 so that theunregulated upe ofther -mr may lead to a 
situation in which ersdal  ICIDUTCCI M depleted or the essential mx3 of one or more 
pupswithinsocicty~mtma18 T h e ~ m a n t o r t h e ~ ~ ~ c c o f s t a b i l a y i ~ b a w d  
partly then on the advamage davoidjng instability and the h & t s  - physical economic 
and social - to be derived !%m r o d  cooption in E&afthe h e d b n  of scarcity of 
m o m s .  For many, the toleration of those mith oppo- viean is seen as a d i m %  but 
sthe earliest popo~crm of ~ O U I  tolaadon came to redre, it is "a disaster that has to 
b c ~ e d i n ~ o f t h e a l t e m o t i v e o f l u r m & g  ...civilanu"l9 
Rawls' ar~yman in a p p m  ofgranting the pdmacy ofjustice is not only based on the 
b& it b&s, but on the fan that the al- to its rejection is mending u)din 
This point addresses thepordble charge that peoplemay bedling to 6ght for* limited 
pen'od in order to estabilnh theit p,ridon within a partidar rociay Over the I0"g term. If 
the akann+iw is unending sa&, ro that the ponnibilityaf easily mblirhing one's podtion 
h g b  fom i not a &Ic option. -pr would be even more likely to yidd U, the 
p r & q  o f j r n k  The mended M o d  ofci.4 mife f 0 n 0 W  the RnntMt 
R d o d o n  otfers nsood histodd for the pnincnsc of p l d m .  Bawls 
d w  no< h o w a ,  rdy solely on hinotical argumem. He also pmvider a ptdosophid 
argument for the peninace of p h d i m .  k w l r  sees the pludty of moral, rdd- and 
philosophical d&er as bdng ths & oftwo fanon: I) thcunconraaMd use of 
human reamq and 2) the diversity of peoples expcrimsn with mcinynyB Due to the 
&fanor, we should expea i n a d  di-in socider which allow for Ebat ia  mch 
ar W o m o f s p c s h  and 6& of~onsirncc Due to tbe sa;ondfactor, we should 
cxpa i n w e d  diversify in aadctierwhich arc mhd by CIW and s u l d  di%ken~~~.  
AS Long as these societal fastnr remain, we should expect suchdiversify to persist Cim 
i,meme). now thcsc tlw radon relate to the otp1"mlim k tbt ow choice 
of dgious moral andpbil~ophid do& is ai%xed by anvmbcroEwmid~na, 
e.g., our qc r i en~e r ,  the type of wideoce whish we accept for or @mt panimlm 
positions, theweight wegive to thin evidmse, etc. Therst)per ofwosidrrafioq whlch 
lead equally m u a b l e  people to hold different moral, religious or pmosophid views 
Rawls d r  'tbe burdmfjudgmrnt.'21 h t a  M o m  ofthought and diversity of 
arprimce incnaser the plurality rrulting from thae burdens ofjudgxem. That there 
arc there burdens ofjvdgmmtr n d k  h e r  the posibity ofmoral objativislloor Ihc 
idea that a coouvvr m y  bc u l tbady  aEhi~ed, but fhsy do explain why w cmszms or 
mm-  should not bc w e d  upccially In a society which is d m d y  p l v n l i . t i ~ . ~  
W e  &odd c x p a  then that p l d s o  sad&= 4 M y  d p l d I f i c  unless rbey go 
through tigd6cam mxt"d C h m g  or employ a g,m deal of- for* BuOd on 
this lrgumcm for the likcly pemiol~ce ddi- positions, the choice bso- o m  o f  
a-pthg ths pdmacy ofjustice, at l e s t  with regard m quertionr wxming  the bade 
m- orlmlming civil d o t  wsr the wderlykg auvshac of the -q. 
Rawls argues for the primacy ofjun;ce by rpecif$ng and dhhhbhg the 
demands which the heacseptance ofa mncepti'on ofjustice make on a pmon's w n c ~ i o n  
ofthsgwd. Aspaint- out abcve, R A r  makes a distinction b- queaionr wbiuhich 
are a wn- forjurtia and qvcotions ha+a widex scope, i.c, questicmn&ted by 
one's comeptionof the good. He 4 s  a doRrine 'political' if it is Med to questiom 
concarins the basic mume He 4 s  poplc'r wnceptiom ofthc gwd which Mdrar 
a wider domain of issue. 'compnheosive' d o h e r .  For -pie, a conceptionofthe 
goad may $et wt certain permoal ideals to fouow, as well as make d-ds about what 
type oflifutyle to live, whish wd not dircaly mncem a rodny'~ bad5 mshac and are 
c e n d y  not not& to it.23 Not only istheapplicationof apo!ilid mneeption d j w i a  
Ihnited, so too are the dPims employed to jvrtify a p o W d  conception ofiuslice. Ifwe 
claim injus@ing o political w@on ofjustice thatthe p o d 9 i a t o  be mncdved in a 
W y t i ~ w ,  eg., as a fair system ofcwpsariq this d a b  needs only to be @med 
,.it& the politic4 Xedm For Rlans, the podtiom one wepa io .do@ns I politic4 
mnceptim xlbod only in the domain ofthe potitid. This bcludu even the mRbod of 
delibemion which we emp1oy in dewloping 8 mwqtion ofjudce. The use of'public' 
o l a h  application ody with regard to the domain ofthe politit*nl.2' The 
sonFEpdm ofthe political nalm .Lao a t d l i  t he  D politid w"sep6On 0 t ~ s c  & I 0  
be freestanding To dlow for wnsenw sboutjwtice v i t b  a plurd?dc society, Rawin 
holds "the canseption ofjustice should be, ar &as possible, b d w d e n t  ofthe omring 
and wntlisting philosophical and rdigious d-that &CM a5rm In f d a t i n g  
rush a cmcqxioq political h i m ,  applier the principle oftoleetianto philosophy 
i t d " Z 5  E~~fl 'al ly ,  the idea ofa- u1xep6on ofjmab'ce ip ahat I have- 
&g up to now a wmmhent toju5iKEBtoty n ~ e .  Rawk has come to appreciate 
d m  landscaper but, not like Quine, for their authnic appeal, ratkerfor the pmsmtic 
wasorraw that mking ninjmd prruppdtions is the caties and don secure vmy to m- 
the pMlasy efjluticesithin a p l d c  sotiery. This appeal to the domain Dfthe 
political d imbkk the  demands on qt ingtbepdmaq afjuntice by mt d e  
people to abandon the% beliefa, but rather d i n g  than only to yield to the ccqtatzcc of 
d b d e f ~  within the politic4 nalm. One m y  grant a Mef in  the d d m  of a 
s o w t i o n  ofjuab'cq while holding a wmary view wahio me's swrp&cdve d a a i n e  
m g  the Refomtion, people's be&& were a political CO- eg. go-r I 
Mmed poplc to abandon tbdrrcli@n wbi& A political snreefion o f j w  on the 
otbahrod is u)ncemed W-uitb wbatismted wit& therealm ofthepolitid 
regardlmr dpmple'n svidn belie. Aparon can have a split mgnition of& pmicular 
claim: dolied by one's umrphmsivc doctrinn, but gamed whendeveloping amnception 
ofjusticc. This w e  of split -gni&n may b e m t e d  due m the urnshaima on the 
developem of a conception ofjustice bawd an an l lgr~emmt  amongst people within n 
pluralistic rodny and the lack (or Ilasming) ofthese m h t s  whmcmploying one's 
conception of the gwd. Agaiq Radr is sftempting to lawnthe damageto pp lc ' o  
5 0 ~ p t i ~ l ~ 1  ofthe good in- p+ to justice. The rslsfio&pr h c e n  the 
political -+on ofjustice whish a society adow and the comprrhensiic doctrines 
which people hold can be nymoous. Apolidcal s a n ~ ~ o o o f j u n i c e  may be m& 
as bdng ddvable from a person's comprehmrjve doctrine, or this fit may be b a d  onthe 
abhorrat fast that no bmeroption than the- ofa u)ncqdon ofjustice 
To p m  prkmcy to a political judcc, how-, the domain of the poLitical m u  have 
some fit nith P person's compshmpive vim of Gfe. 
AlthoughRadr' argument for the primasy ofjustice is quite appealin& it is dm 
that some d nill chms to ti& W i t y  mAer than miw their mod,  ~libous and 
philosophical domines. The quutionthm h: how docs the fact thDt som may mt grsnt 
primacy m ju5ice affest the viabile of developing a conception ofjvlticd The a~lver 
to this is amvidly one ofrumbar. If m3dem n m b m  afpmplefail to gnm judce 
primnsyinthe public realm L conception ofjusfice would not be able to &Ell its mle It 
is cleady p o s ~ b k t h a  the ofpeople w h o  
be@ enough in- cases SO as to make attempts to develop a wncsption ofjustice 
poses If is this d,,ation which cdned, for arample, chctly fouowlng tbc Pmesant 
Rdormsdon d M y  cdru in p m  ofthe hm=rYu%odwi& ForhwW pmjof 
howevez, prbacy to jlutice is dnc qua no- Developing Sir Tor 
stding rnfioico -caning the basic mmm -ot pmoced ifthe pMlasy efWce b 
not @d ! 3 s d d y ,  any wciny for which Rawb' pmject b viable would h a w  m 
%not pMlasy to jrutice. Rawlr thus stpulaten that the E i h  ofnasieties m which his 
project is dinned h a w  IYI " f i t i v e  mviuion of& primacy o f j l u t i ~ . "  Rawls' 
stipulation that rodetie. grom primacy to jusrice satDinly b t r  the appliaion ofhis 
projof for it is not the casethat societies univedy  gniot pMlasym j d .  A key test 
for Rawis' pmject is thcndwher any real society UUI be so chamdaircd. Ifno society 
is d willing to grant p-cy m B wrn+on ofjustic+ the dmlopmeot of a 
wncsption ofjustice would not be a viable project. RBwIs' argvmem for justice as 
fainens depends a. p t  deal on the Ehantctaktion ofthe societywhich he dims his 
argument beingtrue of wrme rociny. Althoughk dw not arpe& point, Rswla clearly 
holds that wmempomy WcLm ~~cicries. at thevery 1% ate willin$ to grant primacy 
to m e  wn+on ofjustice Given the surrrm public mhm o f ( ~ c b  rodetip? and the 
important mle appalr tojwtice have and wminuem play in shapbgthcir bad= 
~ I s ' a r p m r n f  fortheprimaeyofjvrtiseiabarcdathe claimthat peopleam 
d!5g to grant primacy due to thdr prefemxe for mbility over the dmage the 
c o d t ~  ofjustice hava ontheir conception &the g o d  A conception ofjustice, the 
acceptability ofwhish &irately relies on -1s' preferences, d d  r&y hanm 
maLe appeals to a con+on of the goad. If what underlies the daim for the pdmZ~ of 
justice in people's pref-, it would wmr that the gmundr for that choice n e d P  to be 
determined. Yet wouldn't appeaum a co@on ofthe goad dolateRawIs' 
mmmihnantommdity? ItbLeytorrmembahaethyforRawIs,theroIcofa 
conpt im ofjustice is to help d e  & codicu M c h  exist wlulin a society. Key to 
its roleas a dippute rnechmjm. the development ofa conception ofjudce must be shown 
to be &k, even in its pmppodtions. Acmc&on ofjustice wbich make 
lurumpriom m o t  rewe ag a viable bask for d g  disputes concerning the basii 
srmcfure. Thaeforr the jugdfication afa conception ofjustice must be shorn to be 
ncuwl, iie., not making unfair suppppositiom en in its ruppod60m. Yet this ~ r y ,  
. which& needed to enwe fahes need only aRod to v h t  is in disputewitb that 
partisulu society to ensue fairness. If a clsim is not dirxxed within fhc public debate of 
a society, it can ba asmmd in& j u ~ d o n  &I conscptioo ofjustice forthat society 
&om king &.  or example. athas are no people who chrirrimity. appalr 
to Christian beliefs inthe public detate withinthat society A d  not violate dainum 
neutnlity h such a society, msldng appealsto Chdian boliekwould not be o b j d t o  
as being unfair. In other word% g r b g  non-mntedous &aims does not fbrrucn the 
f a h a s  of a conception ofjustice. W e  can say thm that, for Rawk, the nmtdiq of a 
omcqion ofjustice is I c d l y  ddbed in t- ofthe co&s which rdst within a 
paddm aodety. Fm Baa* it b not that appeals to certain elcmmts fnmd in D pnapnapnas 
mo.cq&m of the good are not I l l ovW Nher what is mt allowed are appeP1s .nd 
assumptions ofdements found inpsoplc'r unceptiom ofthe good which are conmtiour 
withinthat Jadefy. By claiming that dtireru have an inoltive convicfion of the primasyo? 
justiq I(aruls also allows that the good of satsty, i.e., the rariode for graodog primasy 
to jusacc, to be n o n - ~ ~ m m ~ ~ ~ ~  within thth x)a'&er fm jusfice PS ~ C S S  ia a W e  
conwtian ofjushes. In other words, Rawlr mtr the g o d  of stability b a r e  he holds 
the of mbiL'ty to be granted by evsryanc within the tppc of ma'& he addram. 
Sestion2: Kmtian L ~ h d i s m  
Muohof Sanders criticism ofRnwls is b a d  upon his slain that Rawlr ir K d y  
solmnmcd to arrain key .opeas ofKm&an Iiicalirm Before utting out Sandel's 
qumenf we need to be clcarabcm some ofthe basic dmcnfs ofknm's monl and 
politid philosophy. Q u d m  e3mmtngwh.f spec& ofRam's pos3iirionRwla -tr 
d ~ t l y . ~ e t h e - R t i o n u l c f O r ~ g ~ ~ - * ~  
demmkd once we an W a r  with &PI'S posi6- and the rationaler for them Ram 
kghs his moral pMomphywith anandysis ofmral obligation, or duty, as the 
mori(w'm for dl moral wiom.28 E~vayadon h.E bath a caure and en e m .  Who the 
anion b dirmed by a rational agent. its cause is the agent's motive. The d t  offhe 
anion is its effect. Anions taken by a rational agm also involve the idea of an end. The 
end ofan anion ir whal the agent expects to be im effect W h a  someone twists the top 
ofapiU bonk, the end oftheir anion, i . e ,  it* expected result, is to open the bottle As 
mmn o h  do not men a r p s ~ t i ~ ~ ~ .  the end and fhe &ea of an action need an bc the 
-. It may bc the -that you m o t  openthe pill bottle by simply fuming Be  cap. 
The motive ofan adon a d  its end we howcw oden the same. In fscf Paill holds that alI 
dm are motivated by theirends.z9 Kant diwees.  He holds fhat when weare 
motivated by duty, our m o M o n  is not &mcd by any mnsidmtioa o f end  Whowe 
rmly art out of &ty, M am motivated only by duty M. This view of duty hu a number 
ofimpntam csmsquen~e~ for &PI'S moral theory Fist, the moral wm+h of- .Stion is 
independent dim wnqu-. Ifycu have amoral o(,li&m to lend dri-cefo 
- m e  in dimes, and you act dth d y ~ p ~  to ofm assistmce your adom are 
m o d y  canmcndabk re8udlsss o f w h  tha -- &I= you astlully to heip 
thaprnonoroot G i v m f b a f d ~ i r m ~ b y t b e 5 W m e m o f - 4 t h  
~ c m o f a n e n d d o c r o n ~ t h c ~ w m h o f a n a c 6 m .  S d y . w b ~ r  
morallyimpoMm about an adon is not it$ end nor its but its mtivc. Ifm o&r 
aom- assistarc5 but do ro in the h o p  of some rnuud, thm y m  anion is on d l y  
mmmclldable even thovgh performing me uan same phyrical .ction d d  be morally 
w m d a b l e  ifdone b m  I ofduty. Whetha one astr out o fa  sense ofduty - snd 
t b d y  b not directed by the anainman of my end -done is morally si@EMt Thirdly, 
thatthe prospees ofbrio&?ngabout some end are morally i m l m  form Kam to wee 
many traditional approaches to politic4 and moral juprification, including tho* 1% on 
tdeologid rrarordng or calmhiom ofprudent behavior Even aju&catioo based on 
the attainment ofa porn%ly vnivcrrally -fed en4 ep., thcm-ce of w W v e  
h m  happinens or of neIf-pres-ti04 is unablcro xrve s a b e s  formor&y BI Kam 
conECiveJ hf0 
Kanr pmpores that morality b baxd an ourfaarlty of pramid-OR ro that the 
d law is iselfa law of-nfl Practical r m  is 'Wle capad?. o f d g  waxding 
to the u)xqI i ion  of lavm"32 We en contrast pmeical 1-n %vi& d o n s  done OUf of 
impulac. Whcnwe u* out of in&.+ we M in-dance with empirical k w 5  Lg.. 
pryshologicll or bioloBid ILM. W e  do ra boarrvawahouf being m i d N  of the fact actthn 
ollr sehPvior is so ~~ in the helame aray that a n h d s  M seen to u* out ofimpulre 
amhout being mindful oftheir 00 do* Practical -n allow YP to form a &on 
d t k  empirid l aw  as l a w  and thseby allows ua to be ndfu l  of the herPct that our 
anions are iduenced by them Rather than bdng blindly dimxed by our impulses, 
practical reason allows YP to r e c o p k  our impulses as a;anp@hg h. I t  is the abifity 
to form mnccptions d t b c ~ e l a w  as dl as ourabiity to direct our actions 101dy by the 
sonceptioo of. law, which SFmdaur the poruiilityro act comraryto our h p u l r s .  
Wtthout pradcal -OR iiee the capacity to form and be motivated to act according to a 
sonqdon of law. 1 cur anions would -ply be g-ed by biological er 
paysholo@,cal impulaa. The m o d  law san be d i d c m h e d  600 other empirical l aw  in 
thar, as a law of-s the moral law holds with abrohne ncceuity." Empirical l aw  of 
nature d d  have b m  dm- e.g, our volal i m p k  d d  have boen dcnigned to be 
amused indifferat ways; the moral law cannot be otherthan it is for retiompl bdngs 
Being *pure k o f - 4  it also docs not &ow o f w  - h i d  elem&.= In orderto 
avaidarry~~al~a,Raothddrmatthemodhnustbeahlvhisbpnstid 
rurrm$ivertoW. R a t h e r t h a n ~ r m p i r i c s l , f h c m o R I l a w i ~ a l a w ~ c h i s ~  
soldy h practical -n. Saying that fhc m o d  law is rlaw which @d mason gi- 
to itrtrdocn not mean how- tbx each w o n  Biw themehe their o m  m o d  law in 
tamp oftheir owa bdFddual mnce@on ofwhat is reasonable. Kam is appding hae to 
the W r y  of rraran II M t y  d i s h  is d v m d y  The employment of mason, 
while done on an iodividual buir, anploys a facultywhichis the lame foremyme and 
doe. not ~JIOW for dispute35 ~l though we can be sem ar *+ fbe mmal CD 
ouraelvcn. M do so in t m  of1 u i v e r d y  shared capcity for -on removed born any 
rmpirical diEamcesth5 nda befw- people, po that the mnception we to 
ourselves is the name asthat d i c h  everyone else eves to themselves. 
Yet how is it that a m o d  law which p m  @cal -n to able to 
dinnm to .st m d y ?  Itthe moral law isto deterdm adon but -Of do lo by 
appdhg to the prospect of* rrsulu e m  tbx actin wtat is I& in the moral law to 
demmbe what actions we should tske and to mativate us to take those actions7 The only 
+~a;nkina~-~-wfarfaritlcaorinlhrbc;~~pirid~~h.~ 
~d~mrr~lo~m~~Ivd),m%ybEdeded~slruiruibutbut-~m~laru' W m S- 
6: Ak. 389. 
"Kammim: ~ s r U r r c h , a b j & ~ ~ m U o o l y ~ ~ ~ - ~ U c r r s n o ~ b c  
-pbil+es: ... madmit~tbeteumoVvr(md-)phil~hy ... ~ d b c . d m i t d n p h t k  
ue w dirmennl pworophies mnmmbg ex - mmg. and LhaI aauldbe w l l w l l ~ . "  MU, 
P.5-5; M 0 7 .  
fbing ldt in any dinctivg ourside ofthe abject it is direned towxds. ir its form For 
KanI, the Eangmical -which dim39 m to moral %?ionis b a d  on the formal 
a r p a s  dsi law whish m s m  muld giveto it&. Kant formheathc categorical 
imp& u the command to an so h t  "?he mudm of your will could alarayr hold U the 
lame time u a principle mablkhiw u i v d  k n ' 6  Hwe am mnivlfed solely by the 
idea that our Mion souId be univerdkd, then we an om of dury to the coral law and 
thereby our a d o n  is morally commendable Yet wha b it that motivates YS to M 
scMding to the categorical i m w v c  and poru%ly contrary to our wMlal impulses? 
Whar could possibly motivate tes fo an in a d  with meforrml a%& OEP law, 
cvcn one givm to YS by ow -04 over d other m&atiollr to M d i J T d y ?  Far 
Kanf ~irthe~thatfhemoralB~isahwthatweginf~~d~~~,ndamLh 
our rme n m  DJ 6ee beings which motivaeo us to act in m r d r o a  -with i t  
AEdng in mrdance with a law which we give to O&I r d s f s  our human d i m  as 
firt ratiohol beingr. In anins morally, we rocc@izc our shad human d i P t y .  
M o u g h  thc categorid imperative is derived b m  the f o r d  aspa of a hw 
which mason g i h s  to ifself and is derived independently of any empirical ends Kna holds 
thatthae ir an m4 or o b j a  to which the atwrical  i m p m  aim. This object is not 
d and is not to be confusd with the portulnfion ofa ~arficular mn@on ofthe 
good. The highest good (or the sunmum bwum) is  an end given a prio* dnamined 
rolely by the m o d  law. The highest g d  hthe md which m be aiwd at u given by 
the camgorid imp&. h tic4 ss Kam presents ic the highclfgwd is an alternative 
formulation ofthe cate&dkpcnnive.37 Yet what muid be ao apriori End, d-that 
for Kant only good la gmd ~ o y f q ~ c a 6 0 0 ~  Knm holds that tbe only thing 
which can be abrolmcly good init~If .  ie, ntva be d d  lo as to bdng about 
romstbing el- b omelves ss rational being. From t k  penpestive of tbe moral law, 
rational beings are always and only a& in t b m c l ~ ~ ~ .  Yet whar d o c r ~ s  mean. in temu 
ofdirecfing o w a c t i o d  That rational agmts area& in themrdves m Only to limit 
moral h o w .  h acting norany, we can n- acf mch that we mat people d y  ss 
 mu^ to the maimmt of mother d. It fouowrr h m  this fha "nnry m t i d  k ing  
m b e l l b l e m ~ ~ P o m e n d i n 6 i m n e l f a m b r d ~ t ~ d ~ ~ t o a r h i s h h e  
word$, a law, ifit is morsl, -0: mat people simply ss a mwx,  but m m p c t  them 
as bdngs with the capacity t o  acf in ~ccordancc wah a mnapdo~~ of law which they &ive 
to thmdvcs. Given the ~miwdbjkg  mdi6on on the m o d  law, and the fief that 
rational beings mua betreated ss a d n - i n - t h m d ~ ,  we Mive at the mnccpt ofthe 
rummum bonum ss aiming to bring about a realm of end Kant miten. '3- law 
detemheadr with regard to ~u~ validity, ifwe abnwn bornthe p d  
di~ereme of rational beings and thus fmm a0 mmmt of their prime ends, M EM t h M  
of a whole d.U adds in sptematir: mnnedo% a whole of rational b&gs & &end. in 
- M w s  asd of the partiFular 4 s  which each set for -."3 It is this 
arocept ofthe wUecti* of mtional beirgs YQI m endrin-thErmdErrnds whioh is the abject 
n which the cmgorical imperative aims, ic, the rvmmum boprm. 
S e n i q  out tbe nature ofkam'r m o d  l lar doer not byitselfemblish tha morality 
in am& or ewn possible. ffreo~~n-ot dinn d o n  by it& withan d-ce to 
anything empirical the0 morality- Ksm d w s  it is not p ~ n I  Kant n&dP ta 
cmbkb POSSIW ofth. pm employment ofpmdcal rraroq is, fhat our fao& of 
rrnoon can d i m  adon by itself W o U f  refecme to empirical ctlds. For maraliry to be 
possible, pure pradd reason must bc po~sible. It is k e  tbnt W r  m o d  theory m m  
to s traosoendd cgwnmt.a Having set out what is y u k d  in order for &em to be 
morality, and &a fhat for Kant we know that the u)mtdm of m o d  obtisafion are 
red, Knnt holds tblt the conditiom which rue requid for the pansiim ofmodtymust 
be p n t e d  as long as they are not wmdicfory ideas .  The key requirement for pun 
~mndmmwhiEhdo"f01thth~-bilin,. ~ o r - ~ k , I n h i r ~ p h i l ~ b y . ~ & s a  
m d e  mlc In mPinBI Wdma 10 Ihc NbjcR cR CR d 6 c m  of& poslbIliI of- I prim 
lnwwhishlxc bold c e , t b e l a w o f a ~ .   or ~m~"amorcmdermlpdndl,~cis one thmthmawhish 
werrpr-tapnori theuniw m n d i 6 6 6 6 ~ ~ ~ c b a l a l n e L b l o c ~ b s o m ~ O b j ~  f f  -
mm.J.m gemrally." me Critique ofJ"d-Bmm Trmr. by Iama Me& (O3fOd. c-n Rar); p 
20, Ak 182. RinSipls mted  tbm@ a -sJd w e n t  I kId 10 bold aqa ivdy ,  I.% be
univnrsl aod m s s a r y , b u l c ~ m d e n m ~ s .  rn w w n g t b e s w a  m u q p ~ n / ~ n / m ~ ~ m u u r m e i n  
m p m d  d m  r n ~  mm -PI% 5 MY MYY 4 tbe tbmpnd me= o f h b  
pwbalagl ~ . d y M ~ ~ n m I p M . i p l a ~ > * ~ P P P * ~ h i h i h . n m u n b d d r o r  
npmenoc s we -dm 1, to bs w b l e  
l b r  m&cd ir fd Ihrm@.mf K.nttt o i t i d  P h i l W y .  In Ms sprmativc 
p h i l ~ y ,  KMt aimr to WabM tbe le@imate m acd limit5 of- m n u b o w l e d ~ ~  ofthe w a d .  
k 6 n e  Nm6nniaoohnini aitb ihih msuMon of f tbdc  C k  whish r a n k  kbrolyu: -. 
pmxid reason h that fhe fhebjM ULI act frrc of empirid deeminant. K.m hem makes 
use ofbis d i s h d o n  betwen the phmommal and o d  & The acfianr of 
obj- in thcphmommal rralm, cvcn the hcbuman body, are mmplcf.ly detemined bythe 
-a .sting an h Witbin his Ppsulafivr p ~ 1 0 p h y .  the idea o f m  Mm not compIaeI7 
dnermined by its mtscedem U- c.g., human free -will, is at bert seen as king not an 
i m p a n i i  mr r cmmdictory idea Monlity -CI tha people do have h will. 
Given that the idea of h will is nn m d a e d  within r p e d d n  philosbphy and thc 
tht &at hum= do live -&c m h t s  ofrnomBy. Kanf grants that people do h v c  
hd. B o t h e & e s n o t g r a m h d ~ ~ m c E p t h t h e p h m ~ ~ ~  Tonam 
Gse will in the phaommal &would violate the hi* on rptioml howledgethat Kam 
establishes in his Criti99c o f b e  Reason T~CR in no such problm howwer i f h  win 
granted an an unconditioned edoumaal conccpt.42 Ali anowned concern w e m o t  
fmmatiom OfKMt'S phllo.op41 Is rn 'mc@m Ofthe * m a  the mk it pm in lmmhtbg 
-ma. Kanbol&itirthe&~mlepbosbIhcPmj~harinf-mang~cll 
W r n -  which allom forthe lam%Ilir/ d d  WS cdcd pdpdri k l e d B S  ie.8.. 8 KRV, m. l2-3; 
*re---,. ~ ~ r ~ t b e n m j a ~ n a a ~ ~ c d ~ ~ a b a ~ ( t b e ~ b c r ~ b u f b u f ~ b s  
plqrnnacfivemle m f o d ~ o u r b m ~ e d g e o f t h e  cw T h a t t h e N b ~ P L n y r n m m  mle 
i n f o r m i o g e ~ - ~ - h w ~ ~ b a t ~ ~ o n b e m a r l m a r l ~ ~ c ~ j m e n i t ~ m o u r  
* ~rapd" 0fil  and Lb 04- 8s it is iueu. Funbe- on Kam'. anal,=. OfrmpmBI 
~~ns2rrssannnbowtheobjmglg l t1 in inrpl f  WbsfrrsfaregluoulrydatahItbewddb 
W l y  a mmbbtion Ofourbrmg a 6 d  4 4 d a b j a  and &c &eR Ofour rn f m h e  
naugblprmrur. Wba,Pchwcmpuid~.f~rKan5irlbthpbsbsbsd~rId Wbatve-wa 
mms ta k n m  lbewrlddob1ENd6ooed4byby~gpmampmam s t h e  n o m d  world Bg 
h u o g  the apphcabwj tyfa PPPP ymthem dams to LC ~ h a m d  r n ,  mt rn- mending om 
knowldgc &the m l d  Wonb lbe ~1mpcaL c a ~  8.. 10 &en- O C W  ~ a i  byma0 M r n  Ya lnlbin the 
empimd w r l 4  -m d l b e  F F F ~  mlml ofthe Nbjq thoE  tho^ be cemin claimr m k h  m 
=hells but dm a mod K8m.S analrtir hem a -d. HE d a a  not rimDlY -* aa IbIb 
arb,- has th,. -",r",m XIC, "C,Ihh d d  h h p ,  1.6 won",,wc m,c for Lbc Nb,m Dud on 
pn.,,o,og,sl n .m,,lnAcknr Kan, clator. b, lbr won:n,n"e mlc of &c d,a il"S br g m l d  vl 
odzdr. lo dl,", fat cx~cnm- ta h h hh hh h l ' r  Wnl n h l l a a ' \  15 Dud an l h c c l u m  mat W 
m1m mun be @v& m rnmhmue mi% far i x  IO br d i e  far ullobavc the w n m a r  rrs do. 
~ ~ a ( o n h d o a ~ a n t r c u s l t b ~ d c l l c n d r c n d r b c t h e ~ o f m ~ ~ ~ i n ~ ~ ~ ~ d b . ~ &  
h w h d  nor canwe show m p l u  o f h  dl in theemfiulrvorld~3 ForKam 
the existence dbe 4 is YL objectivemod pomtlace~ Essermhlly Kam'r m o w  here is 
to midm asstt nor deny the idea of human M o m  within his specdative pbilo~ophy. 
but to hold that its c&e!xe myst bc-cd h to i s  fmmdationnl mlcin r n o d l ~ .  This 
&sly pmblcmaric a s  8iv.n to human M o m  allows Kam to mint& the 
p o d *  of modty  without Be@hat4 d g  the emplopmu drudorudo in his 
specdative philowhy AS hewites: Tor speculative-% the ccmept of* 
was problematic but not impmlle; t b t  is to ray, speculative mason could think of 
Momwithout contradictio~ but it could not &sure any objdve  d i t ~  to it 
... Freedom however, among atheideas d s p d a t i v e  r-n is the ody one whose 
posn i tywe  h o w  a priori We do not undantand it. but we h o w  it as a condition of 
the mod law whishwe do h 0 ~ . ' ~ 4 ~  By gmrting M o r n  as an objeRive postulate in 
this way, Kaot a r e s  the poruiibj drnoral pNorophyas he conceiver it. 
K a m m n l r r J ~ k c y d i r r i n R i o n ~ ~ m d p h i l ~ ~ ) p h y ~ t h e c t h i u l d  
thejuxid Kmt diatinguih these m pyfs of his d philosophy with regard to the 
type of motivation dowd within each Both me dhical and thc juridical are g m e m d  by 
the sategmiul impcntiye. As we bye seen above, for- what is moral b demmind 
witbout any d d a a t i o m  of empirical endr The part ofmoral pbilosqhywbich deals 
with aaiom which also m be the sole m~fl~~tim ofthe aoim is the ethical. 
Thejuridical deals with +hat pact of mornl philosophy which is rat wnoemed with 
questions ofmotivation. Thejudicial is  only concwed with aning in a-rdme withthe 
d i m s  ofthe moral law, regardlens of motive.^ This l ackofwnc~naah   ME 
seemingly p m  the juridical at cddn with the main tbm of Kant'r o d  moral 
pMorophy. It is importam to xe howthe pmbl- with which thc juridical i concerned 
dlow for this lask ofwn- with motivatioo Kmt'smord philoraphy is dinned a thc 
individual r a t i d  beiog with &e dl, w g  cutd m  is morally wzeprable Br that typ 
ofbeing. The juridical is wncemedwith a question having a narrower smpe: what is 
morally aoccptablefora -ety of such individuals~ The factthar the m o d  Isw is b a d  
on the u o i ~ i l i t y  of anions d m  not mm that mnflicfs will mot cam. For KMt. 
it would tole a society o f ~ g c l r  - mtioaal beings not having I -arl - to aswe 
thattherr-nownflia~~asade;~&etothe~a.cco~withthcmonI 
law. KamKanfrjuridical (or politid) philoqhy b dirmed at d- the rules 
the wadstace of k e  kine. Tke ldoptibn of a wmeption ofjustice for h 
bdngs is not k e d  however on choice For Kam, the adoption of 1 mnception ofjunice, 
i.e, t h e ~ g o € p ~  to justice, is some&& people lU1K a m o d  obligation w do. 
Gmmbg phacy to justice is an abwhrte duty rc&cfing people's nsnuc ap rational beings 
endowed with fie dl." E m  tho& the juridical only q m i m  that pmple act in 
w r d -  with what is morally r id  or jun, without regard of their motivation for thdr 
ro doing, what hiun is m out a piori by the m o d  law. Wh3c our acting in -dmcs 
with the juridical may allow for OYI astiom to be direxed by thdrthdrwmen~n. wht is 
pa is not dam&ed by an* empiria rather it is daanincd objkfively by practical 
-or. 
The key con- ofKant's political philosophy is to atabkh haw the & d o n  
of more than om being mdmed with fieeanll can be m g e d  in adcr to rcnpsf the 
h d o m  ofothera without unduly limidng one's em M o r n .  Kant set8 our a number of 
conditions on thetype ofu)ncmm wEch a n t h d o r e  a d d r e d  within political 
philosophy. Fir% justice is om concerned ru i th the 'wca l  relationnhip ofone peMn 
to aaotha in which theiractions 2 in facf wen arr idumce on each aher ( M y  01 
indirectly).'* Unlike nhid pbilo~phy, qusfiors ofjustice are concaned only with the 
e5m ofone p a n ' s  adom an other. Innherwords, politicalplnlorophy is only 
coocaned with astiors that have mafedi ty .   his hitation w a d  Miom dso 
m- that quedons ofjustice do not enend tothe beliefs pmple to hold. The second 
condition ofjustice in that justice b only wonsaned &th the RlatioMhip of one prnon to 
. .naher. C l d y  related to thin. t h e W  mnditionwhish Ksm SN enjum~ce is that 
justice is not m n d  withwhat objea modvatcd each -nns action, but only with 
the tormal condition oftheir relationship. As dclived from the mad law, wh.f isjust can 
only be damrind  by the f o n d  chmcter of a b.. For Kaq jurtise is not directly 
wncemed then with quertions of red or m with questions d e w m m i c  dinmbution per 
%but only withhe formal darionship befareen fe rational 
Kant proposthe foUaawguoivasal principle o f j d s e  to gwan the interaction 
ofrational 6ee b-: 2ve-y action is just that in iuelfor in its maxim in wsh that 
6eedom ofthe d ofeachcao coodst togetherwahthe M o m  d ~ a y o n e  in 
~ m r d a n s e  with a uninrral lm"m This principle ofthemulml madon of-Orm sr 
the detamining p u n d  of the proper limits of L M a  is a them fmmd tbroushout mush 
ofthe liberal &or." B~ccauae dthe formal nahxe ofthis miterion ofuiv.MLLation, 
it can only m e  sr &miterion fordet- whether a pMicuhr.aiom or la* is just 
The fact that certain actions or lam LVI me* this lud~e~mhtion critaion shows them 
04 to be in aecodmse with the mod Im. Sh-g an action or a l m  to bejust is 
however quite impom.  This importance in part rests onthe claim that L penon 
perfomring an unjust act LVI be I e d y  d to -their dm. TIE 
ofjudca authorizes the use offorce againstthe unjust. Showing alaw or an 
d o n t o  be unjus madly I+&nize taLing anions against it. For Kam, "'right' [or 
'junice'] and 'authoriration to we c-xrdon' mean the m e  fbiok"52 K d s  u w m m t  
for thc we of -c+,e force is that ifthe universal Pri.siplc ofjustice determines v h f  is 
thc m e  condition o f r u p d g  people's €reedom givm the &ace of& dad 
beings, any anion opposed to if stands in the way ofrmly -resing thekdom of 
individualr T W o r r  a d o w  c.g., merdve fox% which help to muntennthe mve 
away60mthisrme~onofrrrpea,wenif~acti~ns~thckd~of 
padcular individuab, do h fast b e e  qamess the self-worth o f ' i u a l *  as & 
ntiansl bsinrn.53 Foraample, r panon who lies in ~ l n  acts vojurtly. i.c, c m e q  to a 
madm which could  to the w i d  principle ofjustice. It i s  monlly ex-ptable for 
the~lrtmjdthatp-asad~6nn&g~ntly,01rmth0~Bhdo4~) 
I b n i t s t h a t p a r t i d a r p m s m ' s f r r e m ~ .  ~ t h e p r s o n 5 X ~ b Y U I  
appmp&tiate amount off- -even gaming the ~ t p t i o n ~ c h  it pnts on the pmsm's 
h d o m  - more closely accords with what is truly just. The wivwal prhciple afjustice, 
by rhowing w%at is mmpatibleviththc €reedom ford, j u a e s  the emplopent of 
merciveforce agma individuals anthe barjr of respedng the W o r n  ofiividuals in 
this more g e d  -.
Kant's argument here not only on. out the gmunds forthe legitimate use of state 
menioq a also rcts out the areas h which State cowion is hppmpriate. For Kam. the 
worth placed onthe Mlvidual is &ye rll price and admits ofno equivalent. Rerpecfing 
. the intrinsic ult-wrtb dthe pnoq b a d  on their cap- for choice, b the ul-c 
basis ofpolitid Ic%ifimasy. m s  political philonophy advocates apoliti01 a r u m  
that rrrpecu and pmt-thc h will ofindividusls The main mechanism for 
.dministe&g urersivcf- within a Padnyis its public hdwitionr, primarily itsjuridisll. 
asPlt iveandle@atiwbdes.  Tt-eatntebjwSedintheuseofdTor~e 
~ p o p k o ~ y w h m t h d r . c t i ~ ~ c o n i n T a n b c r h ~ ~ ~ f o b c ~ n d d s ~ t h e r r s p ~  
of the 6xe will ofindividuals more g e n d y .  For -PI+ punisbbg ~010mmnc f w p j u r y  
. c c o n l r a r i t h t h e ~ ~ t h e ~ m o m g ~ d u e m ~ f M f h n f m ~ u r y  
mdedrm the famess of tbc cmm system, which is dnig~ed ta qb.7 thc ri& of d 
pmplc. OD the otha had, the state -ot legitimately force wmpabWllay on b- of 
beliefs, e.g., tormdngpeoplewho do not hold n particulu reli* d o h .  The state b 
only anthorired to act to w u m n a a  actions which mjuNy limit the 6xedom of dm. 
Tbir mpkncnt  paUy  und-u c b s  on both rids i n t h c R e f o d n  to use m e  
powam enforce doctrinal poaitionn. Kant also holds that this r u p a  for the individual 
at& that there are d righm whicb must bc granted categorically by any ledtimate 
govannent. mecategorical include many ofthe key t e M s  o f b i d  politics, 
e.g.. support for private propm, freedom of conrdence, Md main other protenionsfor 
the individual. For Kant, t k  rigbts due to the fact that they areulhately daivcd 60m 
the ~ b j e n i ~ e  moral law, must be granrcd vnconditionany and M beyond debate in any 
society Udke dlbimjusti6cations ofindividual rights, Kant placcrthepe individual 
ri& bsyod all ulsvlntioar ofsocia1 * . 54  n u s  are find in Kam the raongcst 
posale claim fm b 3 d  @+lea b a d  onthe u n i d  and objktive m o d  law founded 
ar our capacity for paid -0% 
Before -piering our overview of W s  mod and political philo.ophy, 'Ye d 
to 1-k at bis use ofthe orighl  pi t ion  qummt, g iva  tbe importance which his typ of 
.rsummt bas forRawls. A l h g b  the uoimlal prindple ofjusice MI out v h t  is 
rno* ri& thsc may be some queslion asto whctber L law acldb accords 4th 
tbe principh. Kant hem employs amoriginal psi6011 argmmt as B test for A= 
with the univmal principle ofjustice. Ratha tbm rmp1qh.g the orighl  podtion in UL 
&tempt to snllbbh the legitimacy of political institutions, eg., ar Hobbss usa bk appeal 
to the m e  of n a m  Kanr's UY ofthe o r i w  pdtion argument is u a t e e  forthe 
justness of a law or h t iN t iona l811ang~ .  The ultimate moral basis of a political Lnu 
is that it rdectr thetrue W o r n  of the coUktivk6v ofindividuals ForKan+ the 1-q 
ofpolitical 1- rrru on the fan that they reflect the 'biq oftbe wiU of all marbm."55 
A. Kant bold* that kpibm l m  &odd b e  is 
at I& pan i l e  that -one 000 in a mdny could m e  fO an ageemernl OD 
Legitimate laws must be able to be shown to beggreea.ble1thin ahypothetid FirchoiEe 
simatioo, the original position It is cleufhenfhat the original pJirion is %sclyan idea 
. of-9 which wnefhclem hap undoubted p & d  reality; I% i~ rm oblige cvcry 
l w a t o r  to hm his laws in such a way thn they could have been pducod by the 
u ~ c d d o f a w h o I e n n i o ~ . n d ~ 1 ~ e a c h 1 ~ b j e s t . i n r o ~ ~ h ~ s . n ~  
~ , a s ~ h e h r d ~ ) ~ w i t k U e ~ w i n .  MsirtbetePtofthc 
ri-s d- P U ~ I ~ O  law.-56 ~ f r  law can mecr this t a  of bdng able to be shorn 
witbin the o t i w  paition thm if is s h m  to bekL md pwpIc have an absohm duty to 
obey*. Kant's original position 20- not make jupdcca question ofchoke, nma 
wedon ofdtther a Iw accords with people's c o n q t i m  of tbe gwd. Rtha it stands 
sr a t a  to the j m c s  of aLrw 
Section 3: Deontological LCoeralimr 
RnP-Is' psition is mmidy iduencod a gren deal by Kant. As we d see in the 
nm chapter, Rawls' use of the ori* porition to identify a conception ofjustic+ for 
pmom considered to be h e  d equal CIOICI~ ~ m b l e s  Kanffs own use of& original 
position argummt57 Rawk alro follows Kant in mainainingtbat individual tights 
e ategotical within a society, md arethmbybcyond 1 considemion of^^.'^ 

- inmmirtsnq m-b p- on what he - rn uodal$ng deomol~cal claim for thc 
pimaw ofjluda 
As we haw s e n ,  giventhat principles ofjudm m &dyewith regard to 
people's conceptions ofthc good i.c.. the principles ofjusticsnr. rvppooed to ovnridc 
~aaind-dr G i t g  fmm a p-dr conception offhe good, thase principle re- 
some typc of primncy. Sandel di-er two diJtioCt claim for the primnsy ofjuaice. 
T h e m  &I m o d  authority forpMdpln ofjudm over conceptionsofthe good. 
For -PC ifa claim dsing fmm a mnceprion ofjusicc. e.g., a claim for fire spcCq 
conflicts with a claim arising 6Pm someare's conception of the gmd, c.~., the beliefthat 
Gnd should not he criticid, the claim arising 60m jwrice should W U y  be adopted. 
hother words, the d e d r  ofjvrticc munp the demands arb+ghm one's maqtion 
ofthe good. Sandel & this Uaim a. claim for the 'moral' priorin/ofjurticc. Both 
deomological and utilitarian W s  claimthat justlcc. in nome me, has moral priority. 
'Ilk should be clear fmm the m l e W  is suppoped m play witbin a sociuy. What 
d?dtt@es the two papitiom for Sand4 is that dantological h i s  also claimthe 
p d  ofjusficeinterms of"* privileged form ofjustEEa6on." 'Ihir privileged form of 
juntificafion which deootological liberals Uaim" me which do- not depend on appalr to 
any concepion ofthe good. Juaieeir thus developed indepmdmt of - md inthis sene 
prior to - people'$ conceptions ofthe gmd. It ir clear fmm Kant'r f i d a t i o n  ofthe 
m o d  lawthat for him what is mmm8Uy right is determid Mependemly ofum~eptions of 
thegmd. Kant's ponition c a n b  be distinguished fmm utilitarianism. in which 
concephnr ofthe gogo o d t d y  dctsminc what is morally right. 
The claim for n pkikged form ofj&Eation is all that is set oyt in the -nd 
pan dSandd3r dean ofthe dmntologisd podtion. He hold. ho- that there is 
another key position d i c h  all deomological L%& hold baxd on their s h a d  -n for 
kilsirtiog on a privileged fonn ofjvsti6Eatio~ Sandel Erst claims that pan of the -n for 
claiming a privilcgcd form ofjustlftcatim is the fact thet the principle0 of j u d s  am meat 
to be replake with regard to U ) ~ ~ O O S  ofthe g o d  As he says, the claim for p&rity 
in this a- ofthe tom=arises%m the problem ofdi$inguishing a standard of 
rraunmmt kmthe thhg  being arseued.* Yet ut$imim d d  claim that the principle 
ofudity is clearly didnu h m t h e  conEep6m ofthc good vhich it regulates, wen ifthe 
utility pMdple ifneEultimafely rests onappeals tothore very slm conceptions ofthe 
good. Ifthe priority ofjusicc in t- of privileged form afj&sarion only~quirrs 
th.f we can dl- 'a standard d u a u w c m  h m  the thing being a r W  if seems 
that the p-lc of utiliry can claim u d d  prenvnabb nrry 0 t h  conccpdon o f W a .  
to he so distinguihble. S d d  holds howemthat deootological h i  dcmatldn for a 
privileged h n  ofjud6cation are d s o W  on how such L jusdfiEation h suppossd to be 
achieved. Kant holds that morality camof be bared on empirical foundations. Ksm 
thereby bases momby on a conception ofthe rubject in whichwht is s d d  to the 
subjest is indcpndrnf of its en&. Sandel holds that all du)~mIogiEal h r  &opt a 
Kandpnntyled, or urnnunbered, concapion ofthe nubjest. Far Sandel, onthe 
deontolo@cal vim, "main things mua be m e  ofus. We mn be maturer a f a  d 
kind, related to human &omstance in D camin way. We must stand at a M a i n  dimme 
*m our cirmMtMce.... we mun ngard oumlws ar indcpcndeot: i"dcpnd"u %*the 
60 LLI. p. 16. 
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interan and attachems we may have at my momem never idmeed by our aimsbuf ha 
01-I capable of Jtznding backto nuvey and sr%s and pos%byto revirefhan*l 
Wac above w-e saw how Kam's mweption ofmoraliry leads him to postdate this type 
a r r u b j a  Sandel holds that all deamolo@'ul lihanls - including Rawls - W their 
pmn'legadjurti6sations on acceptma of this m q d o n  of the unencumbered wl€ In 
tan, &s Sandel praenuthc pasition, gettiag ti@ abmtthe nmue afthe &is put ofthe 
reionale ofthe dmmolo~cal podon  and lends a great deal of lvppon for the -cc 
are h to los i sn l  mncqtbn o f j w t k  
A key question b whether d-ntoJog5cal h i s  -base tkk81~ymon for the 
primacy ofjusficc onthe Eoncepdon ofthe unencumbered selfvvithovt violating the5 
mrnmitmem to camlily. Wnba or no t  this in the cnrc dcpendo on the wnc&on of 
one adopts. lfwc follow Kant and hold that nemdity only quires  a 
jus3dolr whish can be I- sr equally applicable to w"yone, them - to h e m  
thncatto theonwlity ofthc deontoiogisl position. Given that the dmntologjd position 
treats all pmple ss unemmbzw it b equally lypptilicable to -0% regardlus ofwhat 
wnccption ofthe good people hold. Yet this limited mnception ofmXdiry has been 
rq'cctd by most mmrmporary liberals, imdudingthosewho support the idea afllberal 
n w d i t y ,  on thssoundr that it doer no* rmly respect M m t  conqdom ofthe good. 
@ onthe 0th- ban4 we foUowR.wls and CXMd neutrality to incbdethe 
pmuppositionsused to estabbh a -&on ofjutice, it is clear that the unenannb.rcd 
LLJ, p. 175 
M p h  @ 6 m dewloping ansvtral dcomologisl wncqtion ofjufice. For 
Ra-wlr, liberals need to maintain a d t y  aith regard to mntmrious imes  within a 
acciety. On this view, maintaining the rwwliw ofthe d m f  o l o ~ i s l  argument w d d  
require that the ~ m m n u n b d  m Mn- Yet even Wtmm democracies, 
which do middy accept a $mih wn@on of the sclfmifbio pubk dehte, cmrm be 
chammkd m king this m @ o n  of the ~ B J  the C O ~ ~ O Y I  hasis for 
~gpr imasyrnjus t i sc .  Bydaimingtheprirmcyofjurticebd~onthe 
vnmcumbrred selC dmmologid liberals e y  claimthat the -n for@g 
p~rnju&ismtheg~dofntabi~butrpthathatitdCS1Pthcme~of 
the d. Yet even, h Westem demwaciw the " e p m s e  ofthe unencwnbsed d 
would be inWly rejeaed by ymme~ous goups. For -PIC all groups who hold 
-@om ofthe good which give any end a u)nstifutin mlc for Be mbjw would 
GWly opposethe mpponition oftheuneocymbsed *If This hcludcr w q ' o o s  
which bold the subject is amtidy tied to their historical or cultural chmmnceor 
thonethat see the essence ofthe %individual tied to their plass in na- or rdigious scheme 
Funhennore, onthe dmntologid vim, p u p s  which ini6ayl reject the ~pporition of 
the macumbered selfwould have no reason to change their podtion due to the fm that 
the mle ofjustice is to d e n  a nnwt ion  of the selfwhich they do not mppon.62 In 
comast, ifthe role ofjwice w e  to ndntdn IaMity, fhQ g o u p  wuld be e m i d  if0 
&B s mocapdon of the dwhich  they did not i a iWy  support la a Y of 
achieving the p o w d  stabWy thcy &. ln order to maintain the ofthctr 
m e r i t  farthe pkmq of+- @an the u ivmdty  oftheir &im, deomological 
Wxnlr would .Is have to maimin that the vncooumbsred selfis noo-u)menrioluaabin 
.LlsocIetiu Y c f s g a i R ~ c n f ~ r W m c m d m ~ e r , t h e ~ t h a t f h c p k m q o f  
justice ir bas& on xcqtmce ofthe unencumbered xIf- wmmhle. It wema clear 
that t h e  is an inmo*-bCtMm b%4ng the primacy ofjustice 00 accept- of the 
vnancumbered r e l f d  arpporting nemdity. 
If are pn t  W d ' a  shsrgc dicamistemzy aithin the deomolo~cal positiq the 
n m  question is whnha Ra& is a dmmologid libmi? This quertirm o m  to the b o n  
ofthe relatiomhip between Ram a n d h k .  Rawk Wrm doss daLn pkmq of 
justice in the two sasss of the tam &.ch sandel rpdh 0~1.63 Rawb Wrc Kmt, .Is 
gm.? that People have catcgorid rigbs. For Sand& as was the case for Kanf il is only 
by appdhg to a p u 6 d a r  ~on@oo of the -m that h i  can adequmdy gmund 
their clahnnto categorical r i m .  Funbermore, Rawk seems to 0pmiysIme his slpport 
for the m e n d e r 4  self for example, in the Ian d o n  ofA Tharyoffvriig Rawls 
0 ~ t r  that the desip ofjustice la faimem rightlUy WCI ofthe p-nas being prior 
to the ondr dishthe person ch- forthemel- and that th isdal ies i s  daim Lr 
p"dY0f"sht h W r r 6 0 ~ .  h ~pp~$ft ibn to t d ~ l e d f i S & i & 0 ~ f i d ~  & 
'Tk mcNm oftdeolo@ d&es is radicaUy misconcdved: &the ntm they relate 
the right and the good in the wmng way. We should not attempt to give form to our life 
b y r m t l m ~ m t h e g o c d i n d e p d m t l y d ~ .  ItisnatovrahnnthatpimdyRval 
ow nature but nth= the principles that we would acknowledge m govsm the background 
wnditimundnvvhichthc~~aimsantobefo~od~ndthemarmsin~~uhy~~mbc 
pummL For the &is priorto the cnds vvhich DR a5med  by it; sycn a do- end 
munt be ohown born among numemu% p o u i b ' i . .  We shouldtherefon m the 
rela600 between the ti@ and the g w d  pmposed by teleolo~cal doccines and vinv the 
tight prim. The moral theory is the0 developed by woddng in the oppasite 
dirWioa'* 
Although Smdel && makes a stmng case that Pawls is bleed a 
d-alogical h i d  it is  clenrfrrrm of ow analysis o f b l r  and KaM that much of 
Slmdel'r qwtIent is based onmising m y  ofthe key difeyrocc~ bdwem RawIsS and 
Kant's projects. For example, it is clear from our 6 s  analysisthat rhac are major 
dBkmcer with regard to the B e  of contlict with which S B C ~  witen 3-8 justisc to be 
concerned. Kmr &justice to becamemed with a n y c o n 8 i c t ~ ~ t h e r e l a t i ~ p  
oftwo people. For Kam the relation ofa bake. to a Mefin adirea wnamafjurfice. 
Rawls, on the other hand, limits thetype of wnflictwithwhich justice is concerned to 
wntlisu concaning a society's badc Wuctun The npplication ofjurticc as fairness is 
limited to qucaioru wncsningthe basic institutional WucfUre of .society. +his 
in the type of codict which bath nee as 8 con- for j h c e  is dected in what 
both witera t&e to be the 90- of mmct .  For Kam the need for a nociny to have B 
- -ti00 ofjustice tom the &eng ofrational6ea beings. Far 
d N  which arc a con- forjusticq i.c, those conoaning tho basic sen- 
primarily arise from d m d s  made c if fomulatcd inf- ofpeople' divene moral. 
religious and pbilosophid dominer. For Kam, if is ownarurr an free rational beings 
which is the d h t e  sfPr6ng poim d a  cor~ception ofjustice For Fads, it b the 5cf that 
in rome sodsties people doaot snare the mme concep6~  ofthe good which is the 
dtlmate laring paint. From this dilf-cc in smf@ poim it fouows fha  the scope of 
theirpmjccn are alro &rent. For Kam,jur6cs kregvlati~ oEpople5~ m m b m  of 
the gmd with qwd to all q a r  of their liver. For Rawlr, on the other hand jyaice BS 
fakes is mguhtlve only within the politid realm Thus whcrc for Kam justice qdater 
aU arpem of n p r s m ' s  conmption o f  thegood to the mmf that if a s  othc~people, 
Rawk k n t r  theimposition on people's conception ofthe good to dix& 
concerning their mppppon forthe basic msfure. For -1% evm the he claMp pople 
nun adopt in ordertc "cspt a conception o f j u h  only hsvsapplidon inthe do- 
ofthe palitid. Funhamor% for Kart justice. as sef out by the r n d  law, he to be 
applicsbleto dl w c i m  dueto the fM that it ir bawd c appeals to OUT rational ram. 
For Rawls, the adoption of= U)IX&OI ofjustice b limitedto individual socistic. In 
fact. some Eodsties for Rawls, do aor m n e e d t o c %  e.g., 
his example of a society of $ahaimr 'Ihir is important w3h regard m the acgmnmtforthe 
primacy ofjfjus(ice. Where RawIs is able to limit the applicability ofhis argument for 
judce. f f i t  cannot. Where Raw19 claim that at IeM some societies g m t  prima7 to 
junice. f f i f  m w  claim the1 all rocietier should *ant primacy to a panidar conception 
ofjustice b d  onthe n- offhe &jm. WbereRmIr bases his m c m  forthe 
prlnacy ofjustice on a purptted fadud claim about wllar beliefs an widely accepted 
within sertaio naderie~ Kmt makes an .b~iyfemoral claim h t  amaf is j u l  within all 
sod&. Given the vnivsnalityofdmmological claims, it -that nnclibsal rodcticr 
onoot b@jul. For Radg this is dearly not the w . 6 5  Ifwe rraraminc what Ssnde1 
dabs is at the core ofthe dmmlogical podtion, we EM II that there is no real place for 
any type of consideratiom regarding q d 6 s  h i n o d  sirarmstrocer or partisvlar 
problem of s n a b i  or for the scope ofjustice. 
The diRkencer in the Npe and %om of the conflict nrith which Ksnt and Rmis 
roe justice concerned vndulie tbe diEenm grounds both propwe for gaming prinucyto 
justice. For Kam the adoption of a conaption ofjudce is Mmefbing pmpk because of 
thdr m u m 4  nwug have amoral obligtim m adopt J d n  is an d in W8ivm 
by the moral law to go- the relatiomhip bemeem rational beings Actingjurtly, 
indudii &g primacy to j u d m  ir an abroiute duty bawd on w no& n a ~ u r r . ~ ~  
Justin ovemler ends a r i a  out of pmple'r d i v e  conception ofthegood because of 
the nature of the person as a bdng with n o m d  W o r n  For Raarlr, the demand for 
primacy ofjustice ariw 60mtbe attempt to ddnrr the problem ofaabilitywithin 
plurdidc sodctis. ForRawlr,judce should be given primacy o w  people's conceptions 
of the good because of& role as a dispute soludon mechanism, not because ofthe nmre 
of the djm. That justice can act as B dispute mlvtioo mesh& allows for the 
pacdul madstmcc and  mopcxwionm4tb sodctia. Ivstia dmr do4 k t h c  
wy posd'bBty ofm.ny. In ~ way, juaice is seen dli the 5st M e  of11 so&y. 
Wnhoutjunicg there nimply d d  be DO v i a b l e p l e t y .  Thcmk ofiwice in a 
sociay and& qucnionwhy it should be p- werpeopIees cmscptiom ofthe 
g w d  is tkd not to the nature ofthe KLt but to therolcjofaice plays in wexodng 
m a n  and brio& about a a b W  within I society. In orda for a conception afjurtice 
to e&aivdy address m ~ n r  &g ern m e m W  diverse points ofview, it must be 
givm primacy ova  the competing demands made h m  these divmc points of view, at 
leastwith repard to q ~ ~ a r i o m  m&g the basic m m r e  Where Kmt basis tha 
primacy ofjunice on claims made inhis ~dermoralphilo~ophy. Raw11 b e e  with the 
problem ofntability witbin pltdistic mdetier In tlkiog ar his &g p imthe  problem 
of cannin withi" pluralistic rocietie% the initial poim ofdeparmre for RawW project - at 
its m o a  fundsmenfal level- is in tM closer to that ofHobben than ofKant. In other 
words +ie Kam denies Hobbesian orutilitarian positio~s 6om the sm=t based on his 
moral philosophy, at thin point in theargumat. FawW argument for the primacy of 
jvnice docs not m j m  Hobbes nor hlill. It dmr re- dear that Rawls doer not base his 
w m e m  forthe primacy ofjustice on his acceptance ofthe uoennrmbered &. 
Sandel considers the type of kmprnatirm1 give vcfFawl~ but in the end rejects It. 
First, Sadel c b j a r  that my interpretation ofRawIs -of gmmmee that jda dl in 
f.st be giuen primacy67 Rawk hoar-. dearly d m  forthe posdb i i  that certain 
sotietier will nor give p- to justice. He doen not dlim that his argument k t h c  
pimaq ofjndce @armtees the adoption of a cou)ccptioo ofju5ia. The adoption of a 
conception ofjunice is based on a choice which all goups within a society face between 
the primacy of ju . t i~  or sivil u m a . 6 8  for Fawls, the e@rid and 
condngmt mmre of the ofjunic+ the prwasy ofjudcc camm be 
unmnditionally aekled. Iho concoption of*= D society is asked to adopt will also 
pMay w h t h a  people will grim pimaq to it their OW conception of the 
gwd. It is thc rue, s.g, ar curnntly e i s s  in parts of the formcr Yugoslavia, Ulat people 
will metimes choose to p s u e  their dj&,t conceptions of thc gmd o v a  attempting 
to develop a stable society bared on a rharrd mncspGoo ofjustirr. Enough people must 
mant primacy to judce in ocdaforthtb de~elopmnn of a conccptionofjudce to be* 
viable pmjm. Because. for Rawls, manring primacy to jWise is based on the choice of 
goups witbin a society, he cannot, and doer not daim to. w a n f e e  6mt primacy will be 
always w e d  to juntice. 
If- primacyto jutice is bared on a choice, there will need to be some 
upped made to a conception ofthe gwd h order to Xf prefer- by which such a 
choice is made. Fawls mpbyr  henthe idea ofa thintheory ofthe goodds Although in a 
pluralintic ticety people hold ecring conceptions ofthe ~ o o d ,  there are artnin iupns 
ofthese d i m  conceptiom which may be common acmrr an mnceptiom within a 
-PL...xli 
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Plrtidar society Raw]* calk these 0 f t k  &om Ofth~good =thin 
conception o f t k  g w d  It Is this thin -option ofthe g d  on which RnarIr basis me 
ehoise for the @mcy ofjuNNsc. Snodcl mc'wfzes both that RruIs' -em tm the 
pMlacy ofjustice d o a  rely on choice nnd that choice q u i r e s  app& w at ks t  .thin 
Onsepdon oftbegod.  Yet Smdd docs nor p ~ r  that rvsh appeals to =thin &onof 
the good tbrratmthe Kmian natur. ofRawld project Fm Sand4 mgacdlas dRadr' 
appeals to athin conception ofthe goo4 t k p d m q  ofjustice remninrulfimarcly based 
onthe vnmcumbaed relt Sandel rays, "it b impnpomtu w note that dthoughthe thin 
thwry ofthe g d  is prior to the theory of right and the prindpl~ ofjudse, it ir not 
mbubEtamial mough a theory to undermine tk priority ofthc right overtk g o d  that gims 
the co@on its dsomoIo~ ch-erererer70 Rawlr would agreethat ulppding to D thin 
mnception ofthegood doanwt Ulrestmfhe p%wy ofjurSce(orrighf).7 Yet claiming 
the primacy ofjustice b not affscted by appealii to athhthcory ofthe good doea not 
rrquin apmjen have a dwntological character. E s d a U y  Sandei clainu that ifthe 
appds  to a conception ofthe good ace not nrbmtial  Uwy do not r d y  count a$ appeals 
to a conception of tk good. ro that the pmjea can dl be e s d y  K d m  inname. 
Yet Sandei misrathe key point that Kant'~ appeal w me wumenal wm-bsrd 
conception ofthe &in forced by his rcjenionof any appeals to empi id  mdr, regacdles 
how insubstawid such appeals -to be. Rawls m a i  the pMlacy ofthe right OW 
people &ply mating theircmnprshrmiw mnceptionr ofthegood, but he cleady does 
n n d o u i s i n t h e ~ ~ o r f o r t h e r a m e - n a $ K a m g i v m R a d ~ ' ~ o f a t  
Icut some empirical daIm.9. &Is clearly br& with Kam onr the need for a rtlict 
indwdencs fcom e c a l  elwomr in pmvidiog ajudlicptian of a conseptiao o f  
justice For Kanf the moral law, Sii is bc a moral Im, must be I pried, tbmugh .ad 
through. Sandel's tam ofpriority, htd diodependencq r & o t s W s  Mmpt u, get 
kyond my appdsto Weal ends. Yet Uiir is an attempt which Rawk clearly 
abandons WNeRawlr hold8 that justice should be to some - h d e p m d d y  d W ,  
he doe. m t  01aim that justice is d W  B pririri northat it mu* be j&ed i" - of an 
a priori canccption ofthe wV For Pawls, the priority ofjustice is bared and detembd 
by the developmmt of a fAir mept ion  ofjustice for a p l u ~ t i c  society T h q  wbubsrs 
f o r m  canringem d-n are contraband in detennirdng what is jurt; for Rnwk only 
what is mfemious is canecaband. FmRnwls, appealins to a thin theory dthe goad 
neithathatmsthe primasy ofjustice oornqIdres a commitment to the deomolo@d 
position. 
F i y ,  Sandel argues that ifRaarlr presents a conception ofjustice alongthc lines 
which I have rsid he do- we can no longa nay that a just societyi~ a moral improvc~c~t 
o w  an &st society Sandel w,ites: 4)ne comqucnce ofthe &a1 aspot ofjustice 
a.e., the idea that justice is s- m a d i w  solving mwhanim1 is h t w e  m o t  Say in 
advance wbRher, in any particular imtm% an io- injustice is -dated aith an 
o v d  moral impr~vemmt."'~ In €act Sandelgm on ta say that b m x  the 
drsumrtancc~ o f w c e  deny that a cemh 1 4  ofbenc~Ie11ce d & I sodety, it 
is possible that a raw whichlives i n d a n c s w i t h  a u)nc&on ofjusdcs is moraUy 
w a n e & t h s n ~ e ~ d o 1 ~ 1 t . 1 0 ~ t " a n ~ i n ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ t o b e ~  
with an overall maal Butthis reparation ofmoralityand justice is 
clearly w b I  Rawls intends. Fnn ofthe problem which= ~ ~ l l c c p t i ~ ~ o f j ~ ~ ~ i s  muntto 
address is thm what ir $em as a moral i m p r o m ~  within ~t sosicty is in dbpme If 
everyone could agree on wha would be P m o d  impmvemem for 6dr  society, there may 
be no need for a conception ofjwricc at 4 ag., ar Rads  nays would be the care for a 
mmmunity ofsaiots. It is the mrdlidng vim ofwhat is m o d y  tight which brings 
abwt  the ofcodkts which w a cmmem forjwricp. Justice is s dispute solving 
mchaoiwwhich nirm 6nt and foremost at brin&g about Wily Whether there is 
also a modimp~ovsment of a mcieyar a wsuh ofii adopting 8 u)nception is not iu 
prime consem It thus sems t ha  ths m o m  whish Sandel presents against my 
interpretdon ofRawlr are, inthe en4 to be dearly rejected by RawIs b L f  
Conclusion: 
In this chaptor, I have p"mted &a 6nt pM of RaWIsP W d o n  forjxdce as 
fairre:  his argament forthe p r i m q o f j ~ d c e .  Ihaw a l s  aied to showthat RadJia 
not P dsoaological l i b d  by showingthat the rationale for his projeot is tied to reslviog 
the pmblsnu faced by pluralistic rocictisn rathathan beiog based onscccpting a particular 
conception oftbe poson. F d y ,  in this chapter, I have shown how it is the problem of 
phualism which &er Lieral mmmirmmu to d t y  only to what is in conflict 
within a parr(olLu rociny. In rha .a shapm, I'LL p ~ m t  the lart two PMI of the 
jud6utionforjunirr as & m a s  and dewlop how b l r  is able to employ n c o ~ o n  
ofthe self M a r  to thc conepion of the unenmbend &without <oh638 the 
W t y  ofhin pmja.  
Chapter 2: 
h the previous chapter, we saw that what vndedien Rawlr' claim for the primacy 
ofjustice in the role which justice plays in helping to maintain stability* a p l d d c  
rosicty and tht ( c o w  to Sandd) his claim for the p h q  o f w w  do- nn rely on 
the acceptance ofthe unemmbcred &. Rawlr doa, howew, employ a rimaar 
conception dthc wlfwithinhis widerpmjcst We need to show then how im 
mplaymmt avoids violatbig his &tmmt to n e .  Furlhermore, %meed to 
d e  bow RawW claim for acegorid ti& 6tr d the seemingly mpirida mrure 
ofbin In this ctrapter, I will ad&- both ofthese con-. I will alro d e  
two imerpmtions ofRawlr' pmjst. Firrt, IwiU examine JOrgenHabm' claim that 
RBWls remains nKanrian liieral consemed with prer-~the political conwgu- ofa 
K a n h  conception of the rubjaf *out W r  metaphysics. I will then addrers 
concern Richacd b r t y  han regardingthe practice of i i b d  j u ~ c a t i .  Rorty'o 
concemr rest bothwiththe gemd practice of providing any political jum3Carion as well 
as wit ic  l i i d  attempts t o j u m  ifycgnical tights. WhereKant holds that categorical 
rights require an ahistotical bask, Rortydenies that such an ahiaaical baris is a-I=. 
We thus 6rd b w l s  facd with the a p p m t  dilemma ofsupporting categorical rights 
which reem to require an ahistorid bad% bur that claiming such an &orid basis 
would likdyviolate the neutdity of hip qmmt As in the previous chapter, I address 
au these con- within& d m  ofprepeming RawW thmry in t- o f t k  levels 
ofjust%cation. Intkis chapter. I present the Ian ruo ofthae levels: &Is' argument for 
a comepion ofjustice whioh is bath h i d  and no-, and bis v t  for justice IIP 
fairness ar a spaisc h i  rnmepion ofjustice. 
Section 1: Nonnative Conceptions of JuJtice 
Atthis poim in o u r ~ m o f R r a r I s ~  position. an have atabtirhcd f0u1 key 
wins: l)a~ooofjurd~.-play~rnkinhel~w~&tyvvithina 
p l d 5 i c  sd% 2) the primacy ofhrdce, in boththe moral andjd6cawry - (as 
defined by Sandcl) b based uprmthe r o o f  3) it b a deddon .moogn people 
witkin any p d m k  society whnher they dl gml p-cy w a conception ofjuP6ce; 
and 4) the Wrelihood afn co&m2r -ce EM be i n w d  by iimitiogtbe 
dma& placed on its acceptame. We have also rho- how this ftvrth point san be 
pursued both by developing a c o w t i o n  wEch is not dependent an any pmtidar 
&endve d b e  md by limit@ the application ofthe claim in tern ofwhich il b 
dwelopsd to the domain ofthe political Attb point in our examhati04 we havc not yet 
shown that juntice as fairness is the mo8 appmpriate conception ifjvntice for a q  s d n y  
We have so far only raid thatjurtice, in whaeva formulation we QC ofit, musf bc @VUL 
precedence over considerations ariringfcom parriarlar sooseptions ofthegood ifjustice is 
to W its role of helping to d a i n  rnabililywichb 1 p l d d  society: and &at justice 
s a n d y  play this raleifjudce and aabii are prsfmcd by the- majori  ofpmplc 
amhinthatr0dny.l 
Tbat j " d d  can play a mle in minlabkg dabiliw d m  not utnbliph thnt * S d e t y  
should adopt junice astaimess. Stability- be achieved under I m~berofdiSemu 
iWimtiona1 -emone, mnny "f~hich Mnd in opporition to h i  conceptim of 
jwice, including jurfid as taimcps. For -PI+ a b b e s  p p o w  the d l i o h m e o t  of 
an abrohtc 9ovexeigs who -cly retfler dl dispute3 c o d ~ t h s  bariC sVWD2rr 
the ks way to ma* dility wi&k a plwdistic society. In fact Hobbes d a b  
t b ~  not ertrblirhing an absolute ~te~teerri@ is iuelfz msc of Mi  due to the facI 
that i f tk  w dabrolvte power b laterrqu+ed, its rcinRatmmt 'hath the m m b l a n a  
of an unjust an; which dinpowth mt numbs. ofmen (when occasion is p m t e d )  to 
rebeu.'2 More -ly, Michaei WaLcr har set aut a m b e r  ofhiatorical - p o w  to 
the problem of Mi, again mmyofwhiuh are opposed to libad conception of 
junise.3 ~ v e n  h w l s  himself-sizes that the WMB o f b c y  to judd - as 4 as 
adopring the domain of the political - does not presuppose the asceptance Of a Ebaal 
mnccptioo o f j u s k  ict done justiceas &err as apart*ularlihd wncqtion' Af 
this poi% we cannot evnr demmke w ~ p m p l e  of aputicular laticty dl gram 
p r i m s c y t o ~ % d ~ t o t h e ~ c f f b a t t h e a ~ c m n c c p t i o n ~ j u m E e ~ ~ i ~ n r h d  
to adopt greatly in8u- wbethe~ornm it is ndopred How a p a r t i c u l u ~ o n o f  
junice dnmnines the basic ~ C P M ,  what if ~UOWI for and denier, thc fype ofrevidoos it 
quires ofpeopie's conception ofthe gooh an aEk.2 the Wdhood ofpeopiegrantingit 
primacy. We need thm to move t?om the s e n d  role ofjunice we woridaed in the &st 
Ehspfer, to somidermars rpoEific &rmWgnr ofju-. 
In duaf ing  panicular U)DCsPtignn ofjustice, there needs to be I critsion by 
which to damninethe appr0pMtmerr ofdizTerat candidate conceptio(18. The 
constraims p i a d  bythemle ofjustice b l n d i i  the urmmiment to nanrality, rrmain in 
ph% but srr bythmdves, hW?ident to dn-ethe best conception ofjugtie for a 
rodm to adopt. We n e d  then to demmine how we can base admice m n g a  6iff-f 
conceptions ofjwieaithout viohtiog acommimeot to neutrality. PM ofthe pmhlan 
beR in that the M n t y  d a n y  ofthe broader w n q u e r c a  of &rent mncep(nm of 
justice - to dichpeoplewould paint as& bais for di~ingui~hhg conaptions -is mwf 
Uely det& prLnarily in temu ofpeople's o m  pdsvlar mseption afthe @. 
mat peopie ad-fe a mx+m h w e i f  a l l o w s f o ~ ~ e r ~ ~ m i c  eESdmsy or is 
<PL 37+5 =solxhllepohlsl h€erausmts of- w -amameWmofofsbtand 
~ o c ~ - t o p h ~ d W ~ h ~ ~ ( b u a o r r m s i b c ~ m M I ~  m m o f t b e  
amme ngbt ofLmgr areurn &cola* may arlro wow lo u @y d d  baw -ng 
mmtmmofpokedngbtBnd~- a n d r o ~ n ~ p o l l D d ~ ~ ~ 5 0 ~ W  Thu5oftbeM.i~  
-g poma mncepaoru ofjmce wfAm pohud pbllbllbllphy some M M and nrme an 
om- 
able to eonuc l greats level of equality while mahI&hg nabilay sem. to lead us back 
into the type of diqmtes whish n concrpti011 ofjustic+ a~ r dispute solving m e c h i s n  is 
nuppowd to avoid. At ~ ntage in the -ern, we EM only BP- I w i h ~  to 
M o p  a conuption ofjustice in ordam avoid physical conflict and minub tid 
aabiiw 
Rwlr h e  di+nguirhcr moqtionr ofjurticein t- afthe m n  people have 
for adoptkg theq bmween conceptiom which are based on a normativeconvonus and 
those which are b d  on I modus vivendi. A modus vivmdi EM be defined s ~n 
agreement bawd solsly on the need to establkh a wmeption ofjustice. An ageemem 
dictated tothe loring tide in I conflict or one reached due rolely to -circunutanccand 
cxhoustion" would bah be ym IU modus vivadidiJ EPoamally, a modus v i d  isM 
agemat in which at lean one side acqui- to tho conception ofjustice adopted in 
orderto achieve w. A mnwwus, on the other ha04 specifies mat dl have come to 
recorn+ giva the sirmmstancen under which the W o n  o f j d w  a r b ,  that the 
conception adopted is the b m  available conceptio Given the conswims p W  on the 
fimherance afa penon'r conceqioian ofgoodmithin the public realm ofa pluralistic 
society. il is clear mat the mbjbjen of a uweuu~ wiU most Wrdy not be ~ e t y o o e ~ s  t t  
choice of how the basic Jrmcfvn should be or+mized. Yet given tbat in a plwnlistic 
sotietyno one's kt choice is M y  to be amqrahle, reaching a mnwnsus onwhat 
mnC@oion ofjunice to adopt is the best a d a b l e  option. Raths tbnn pmvidins the 
indiidual vith msons why they should accept a wncqtion ofjusticc in trmu of 
pmgmzic mnsidaarinu of cvrrsnt self-imaea, thc idea ofanormativecmsmma haw 
the h e w  oof a+on afjwtia onwhat people* &odd bethe concoption of 
justice adopted fatheir society Wen its p ~ r t i c  w. A nor& m o w ~ l s  ia an 
p a n  on a mseption o f j h  which peopleamvld suppm giventhe dmmutansep 
ofthe rocletyand Ute mncqu'onn afthegood atparrod by itl salcns, regsrdlcro of* 
partimlar p o t i t i o n ~ t h c  rodety. What is i m p o m  about this didmion k m e m  a 
madwvivsndi and a nomatie consemus b that Raw11 relafa ir to con- abont 
&ty. The type of -IU people have for yielding to a mmpion ofjustice in the 
politid redm manerr to the Edhood  dtheir  adherenceto. People me more Wrely, 
cspc*ally d u M g h r  o f m o i l ,  to adbere to the dictates ofa wncq ion  they hold for 
nodvereasoo  as oppored to a wmqtion ofjurtice they submit to odyfor prwmtic 
ones. Rads  is not claiming thar a modus vi-di solution to the problem of adilityis not 
viable, but that a normative conception ofjudcc is preferable in tams of maintaining 
rtlbity. If a conception of juotice which CM be the mbjecf of a 10rmati~ rnmasus is 
available, it theo &odd be adopted over ~~Iutionswhicb am bwed on mere modus 
vivendi. 
C.raming that a conception ofjurtice based on n normative unuenavr is prrfaable, 
we have still not estabtibedthe prdermce for any particular conceptionofjustis+ mr 
show how web a n o d e  mmqtionis  posable. Given the a p p m t  ban on claims 
about, for -pC the nature oftbe mbja  or their moral outlw4 there seems tobe a 
real question h u t  what Eould m e  as the h i s  ofa normative ~gnnenavs. It is 
imp-t to -em& here +hat f3r Rawk a cornmianem to mwlio d y  mends to 
claims that are io dispute with a @&ar sociny. This lcdbatiao o f W  cmmainm of 
n e w d i q  is key m how Rawk establishes the pomiiliry of a n o d v c  cmsemu with& 
violating bin wmmitmcmfo n~rmlity. W I D  basis the nmmmkity ofhis cooqnion of 
justice on the fact that "main fundmmtal i d -  
political arhure of a h o w t i c  sociny:'~ It may be the casethat @venthe diverse 
conepiom ofthe good f w d  within .parti& rod- tbatthere is no p - w  of its 
co- to n normaive consensus 00 a conuption ofjudce Yet as we haw - Rnwlr 
dearly sets &om on the type ofsoday m whish his wnepio(1 ofjustice is 
applicable. For example, Rawis stipdarcrthnt his conception ofjudoe is onlyspplifable 
to pluralistic aadcties. Another key stipulation which Rnwlr mkea con- ideas which 
are -fed (or at leant not disputed in fbe domain of the politicll) by all membcs of a 
n o w ,  i.e, the ideas inherent in &ek pubtilid-. W e  poplewiuithin a plu~alipdc 
notiny do not share the same mmceptioo of the good, Raw11 holds that within at I& 
some socictia, people bold enough common beliefs fmm which they EUL d d o p  a 
normative conception ofj&. F&ore. Rawlr holds +htthe beliefs inh-t in the 
pubtic dm ofrome societies allow for the devdopmmt of a lib& mnceptioa of 
jwioe. 
Rawlr is quite g d c  in characferidog the name ofthese ideas inherent in the 
public dm. F m  he holds that these ideas include considered judgments h u t j u d c e  
~ ~ m m h i ~ b ~ p d a n i ~ ~ ~ f h s m ~ ~ ~ i l ~ d m e ~ g h a - w h i ~ h  
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o&g at d lwdr  of-, €ram ede-mgiwmaral pincipI*i to ourjudgmcmr 
rm W u a l - .  Foragmpk we hold rpcdfis prin~@Ic% eg.. .ue nhwld newr treat 
other people ar mans. but only as ends and @ c j ~ c m s ,  ~ g .  the child m a s  the 
sueel b n l d  not haveto go to szhool hun@y. Smndly. thue considered iudgm- 
patain not only d i r d y  to the rype of political ksiNtionn whish people mppon, but also 
relate to the conditimynder whichthe choice of~comccption ofjunice would be 
recognized ar Fair (An wewill see below, thin &wed recognition ofwhat constitutu a 
fair cboice situation playa lo iwolmm roleinRawllr' argument forjustice u fairness.) 
Thirdly, these conudaedjudmens - even the mar  deeply held convictions - an o p n  to 
possible &on. For example. b theunited States that slavay is unjust is a -id& 
judgment inhem in the pyblic cultun: rlavay hah sadly ho-, not always been r a n  
ar unjur by American sodety. To lsy thaf beliefs inherem inthe public CUlfYTc M 
ultimatdy reAab1e is not to ray awthing about the moral wnh oftk  beliefs in queaion 
nor to deny that they can be held as objestive moral rmUu vui& I par6& 
comprehensive doctrine. FinaUy. the public CUlm aacpts cei& id- 
d d o p m e m  ofa liberal mnseptionafjuniee insluded in the ?rodidon of dem-+ic 
thought." Tbese ideas include: the idea offlociety ar afaL'yrtem of mopmtim wa 
time, from one gmeration to the n W 4  (ti% is opposed to seing society either as a 6nd 
natural order, i.e., u may have brol- inthe middleages, or an institutional hierarchy 
junified by rrli@our orarirto& vdw); and the idcaof a 'well-ordered society' u a 
society &edvely w i n 1 4  by B political conception ofjfjunice: and tk idea that &zms 
'Wp IS. 
n 
should be xol as h and equal Bccaue svch idem a n  inherent in the public 
culw h nblt to move 6 m  the problem ofhowto smblilh rtabw within a 
~luralinris otietyto the t i b d  question ofhow it is 'pam%leforthac to exist o m  h e  a
jmn and stable sotiny offree and q u a 1  dizem, who ~~ divided by 
-able rel i@w philosophid and moral d&s" ~ t h w r  Violating thc 0euUdiV of 
birjusawtiOns In other word% Rawls m i d *  violatkg bir urmmhenf to namPLi?. by 
h i t h g  the a p p l i m  ofhis argummt forjvntice as faMus to tho% sotietier in amid 
beliefs key to the development o f h i  wnccption ofjudfisc e.g. repen forthe 
individual as fne and equal, are mt urmemious amongrr the d i E k a t  Of thc 
goad (at lem *the domain ofthe politid. Rawlilr erseo6aUy claim fhst for 10m 
societies, cg., wntemporary W u t m  rocietier. thereis a M o w  pluralism svchthat 
comprehensive docuine annot sbre4 but many important m&e Ponido~ nboyf 
jmstice are. 
Rawls holds thatthe wrcq ion  of c&ms as ftee and equal is inh-t in the 
public culture of some sotietie. We need to aamine thin claim in ordm to SK exactly 
what Fawb is claiming and haw bin daim avoid$ Wgjuntice as fairnus on L panimlar 
cmmptioo ofthe p e m .  hwls  is quite dearthat this h c t e r i n U i o n  is a politid 
concepdonafthe peraos as opposedm a. metaphyrid one.' Although it is hard to define 
exactly, a metaphysical conception ofthe &basisally malter daimr about the essence of 
the w o n  The Kmhn mbjubjest, divided into noumenal and phenomenal realms, ir an 
-1e of a mcpphwsical cormpior. Mort impmtantly for Rawlr maspbyPical 
~ t i 0 r "  are C.,mp!m9i"e. Raww sbBRn* ofthe prso", on the aha hmd, 
oalymmku slaims -ding how people should beviewed whm developing aconcprion 
0fjurric.5. This ~ e r i r n f i o n  of the -0 thus oaly har ~ E c a t i o n  within the d& 
ofthe political. For Rawis, emh aspupen. ofthe pason haveto be d e d  in order to 
develop a conception ofjurrice. Thew a n p M P  have to be Kttlcdhm the pcnpesfive of 
the parom dwclopingthe mnseptioo ofjurriccthmuelver. In other words, thisis hoa, 
the people developing a conaption ofjustis. ve themselves and theirkUow citizens 
amhin the do- ofthe political. So what don Rnwk tahc as M1d by ddr& the 
conception oftbe -n is fire? Fw ofall Rmls holds hl p"p1~  M firs 
srithin thc political r e d q  to formvlnte and revise OW I-Ale comepion ofthe 
good 10 In order words a penon's standing as a dtknis not rdfebed byr&riom to 
their comprehensive do-9.11 GivmRawls' W n i o n  between political and 
cornpr&- commimumr, tba:the political consepfiao ofthe personis ro Eooceived 
does not deny comprehensive do- which hold thafthae DTC mds are held to 
be wuevirab1e.l Secondly. cirirarr are reen as tee in that they methee'df- 
authrntisating nouMofvalid claim" regarding justice13 It is the c i t k q  bornwhich 
the authority of a on ofJmIice uldmafdy arks. This is an idea wmmm to 
mod- danoaadc.. Thirdly, d&ms arc m 6e in that they are rrrp-ilc for the 
ads they -e and can rmir there ends. This M o m  is i m p o m  in that ir allom 
d&ms to amend their U)T~@OLU of the mcd so as to -rd with the dictates of a 
mnccption ofju5icc. What is imp- to --is fhaf all ofRawll' dsirm about the 
f s d o m  dthe politid d j m  dateto how the Jubjm is to b e v i d  when M o p i n g  
a mnqt ion  ofjustice and have application only within the domain ofthe politid 
Gi- allthe stipulations which W r  places onthe a p p l i c a b ~ t y o f h i s j u ~ o n  
in order to e m  its nawahy, e g., the idem inherent in the public dm, it is clear we 
are dpaling with a vay rpeci6c type of sodefy. In fact, Rawlr' cbmcmhtion dthc 
type of society with which hein conmned is modclcd quire explicitly on modem W u t m  
liberal drmacracier. The applicability ofhis theory to these mal socinie* will be 
demmined by the d- to whichRnwlr' characferiration accvnuely rdmr t h m  
scdnier. The neutrality of Rawls'junificstion o u l d  0of be mnimahble for a society as 
divided as, for example, Gemmy in the 1920's in which fhae were m n g  liberal, 
~~ communist and fawin political movmerm.14 Tbepoim in that Rawla' method 
ofjunifisotim quirrs L g m t  dcal of agrammt nmmgst the c i b  ef a e e t y  to 
which it b applicable k w h  claimr that there h this i d  of qmmaa in the sockties to 
which he addrew h i r j ~ w t i o o .  It may rcrm h o w  tbnt Rnwk reoufoo much of 
his argumem on this ltipulatim. In fhis way, RnwW theoty m y  aeon rn- For 
crrampk, i n e g t h c  ideatbnt dl m&onr, ofthegood support the bad- of h i  
demomatis society ems to -pp- t h c j w S m i m  Rwrlr' m u  fian the stan. The 
degree to which Rnwlr' ~ U ~ U L ~ ~ O I I  is a d y  m 5 i 4  rather than kd on arme 
c4mmamiza6rn of a society, is h m  D key test for his ju&carion ofjustice s 
fpimes. 'The a- ofhir method ofjurfifisation ir d d y  dependent onwhetha 
these d t i o n r  are mrc for anyreal society. Sp&cally, for k w h  one ofthe key 
questions b whetherthe me of society he dem3er rembler cornempow Western 
rodetier emugh for hirjus6cation to be viable e m  This is ulhateiy an duat ive  
jud-t But m n  some ofFawln' d s l  m a t  tbat key qrpms ofhir b c t a i r a t i o n  
of society are mre afthe mrnemptaq United States.13 It is inportam to note, how-, 
that F a d s  is not ciaitringthat ao acapwbie mnccption ofjuntice is .lmplywhar is 
inh- in the pub& culture of MY society. Rwrlr h not a drural relativiRwah regard 
tojurfioe Wbar Rawis does hold is that ~ v m  the type and iwel of shared beliefs inherent 
in the public dm of some smiericn. we rvl pmvide a neytraljuS66cation of a 
no& tibaal conception ofjxstice. This position docr not j e t h e  ~bandommmt of 
the liberal position ifkey tilibnal beliefs me not inherent in a lociety's public culnue. It b 
P 6 i ~ a m ' s m ' d ~ ( v o l Z Z . N a  3): pp. 9-37. 
*the neutrality of a lhd concqriom ofjurtice which dcpmds on the public a 
suppon far h i e d i m  doa not. ~n aher words, athe nartdity of-4s' q m m t  c d d  
oot be maintained, this doer not qu i re  that be abandon his mppon forju&~1 faimu3. 
The namali*- ofa urncephbn ofjustice is mmubg which remmmendr a mnocprion of 
justice for adoption by aphvalisic =defy. Ifno h i d  conception ofjuntice m d d  be 
shown to be numrl it wmld not nee-- refme the v i a b ' l  of the h i  positiaq 
rn far libad% like Rawlg who we the i m p m e  of ufendedjrutifictory tmadty 
As was pointed out in the immdum.bq there me a nvmberoftibaal padtiom which are 
not mn-ed withjusti6mxy nmtdly which muld be dl adopted if a ONtral 
justi6stion o f h i d m  is not available. These would rimply not be the prrOrrrd 
posi?iitian for h i s  like Rawk. 
Section 2: The Argument for Justice as Fairness 
Then is agood deal ofdebate about the stMlsRawb a r m i  to beliefs inherent 
i n t k  public m l u e  By bash8 bin jus6cation on ~ c h  appeal% Raw1.i 
obammaLed ar eitha an objectivirt L % d  dm b mktakmlytaken to be a hinmicirgL6 
ox a hi.oridaf who miazkenly holds to t h e E n l i g M ~ l ~ e m  project rhat politid insrihufoos 
need justificariom." BeCare aramhdng whaha either of these charancrintiom are rms 
I d  first sn out the Ulird and hl nage o f R a w I ~ ' j ~ c a d o  The debate about 
&IS' w e d s  to beliefs inkem in me public dtm c.m only be rmly appreciated by 
b e i n g 6 m ~ w i t h t h e 6 n d p s r r o f h i ~ ~ c a t i o n .  
We have xcn so tar how Raw13 argues for lhc devel0pmM of a c o b o n  of 
juaicc ~ y ,  and how he argues for a n o d v e  l i b d  comqtim. The third level of 
RawIs'ksrification arguer for his conception of'jurtiurti as fajmesr' ru a s p d i c  
n o m a k e  lib& mn=ption ofjudcs. Here again Rawis kcer the pmblrm ofhaving to 
dnmnine a method of selecting a concepion ofjustice as prefaable without violaring the 
nmmliq ofhirjurti6Ea6on E m  gmnfingthat the societies whichRawls address are 
U b d  we rtill need to det-ewhich h i  conception ofjuslice is  themost 
Pppmpriatepithout bashingthir xlption on contnRioun assumptiom. Rawk b-thir 
selecdon on tM, criteria, bath ofwhicb must be natirSe.5 by an appropriate conception. 
First. Rawlr employs the idea of rdlmlw eqdibriumas I m a  of seIntL,gtk mon 
appropriate conaption ofjudce. He holds that the concepion ofjudce whish b u t  
.chiwen reflective equilitiumGthin a panicular sot iqis the -+on whishthe 
aotiety should adopt Secondly, Rawis holds that the conccptioo munr be shoo  to have 
the a b i  to maintain ~abitity Gthk the 9ot iq.  This i n v o h  the idea ofbeing the 
nubja of an overlapping wnmms ofreawnable comprehmdve do&(*.. H n d y ,  
the comqion which best achieves rekctiye qd i i r i um and is able to be the m b j a  of 
an ovalapping womsur is the mon appropriate conception for that society. 
As~hawrai~RawlrhoIdsWtbaeare~beliefs~tinthcpyblic 
culture of m e  societies h m  whichwe can M o p  1 m w o o  ofjlusce. It is also the 
are 6x1 thex shared belim o m  at d I d s  of gnredty. 6om beliefs h t  r p d c  
 ax. to widar- principler. The idea behind RBec6ve q d i i m  is +hat M 
appropriate m e o n  ofjurtise can be dewloped by or@%% t h w  shared beliefs into 
a m h s n a  pynan'Uthwgh these Wef~ are all Bared the public eulfuyr they 
do not r,ecc.wily m r d  with each oths For orample, %society's initid ~ p p o n  for nn 
~ d a t e d  6ee madret economy may mnfliot with its hitid kkp about how wmkm 
should be eared. The f o d a t i o n  ofa mnaprionofjuaice in t- ofthac beliefs may 
rrqvirr that we revise some beliefs whichwereki6dIy h e l d 9  In doing this, beliefr at all 
I d s  of gmwliry are treated as equal. The ntrength of a judgment in 8 piid- coy 
may rrqvirr some wideranging pMsiple to be r c v i  Support for awidbrmgbg 
@tip* may requinthat we abandon a M y  held beliefabout what in jun in n plrtidar 
case. The process of d g o n  political pMdples ruluLeP a backand fath of 
the belie& shared withinthe public d-umil principles can be formulated which are 
mosinsm with the revised belicfs. For -pl+ a society Eould mmc to thc mndwion 
that a 6-e market system wbiich lmr for the protgtion ofworkerr rights is prdaable, 
1 % ~  -fa w e  mum nrh n ~ s d  connmw s tbc WLO r&sw tole- nnd mrrrrom 
o f , w n n d a y w ~ t b c b a v s ~ n n d ~ p l a ~ ~ t * V c u ~ m ~ ~ a m b c b c O 1  
p o h w w o n o r m a  ~ b r w m m m m n r a r r p m ~ ~ o d p ~ ~ o a ~ b a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ I e  
~ n o n o f m m a o m u m f o r  Wcrtsrrlbcs4lmhng~Mpubhcrul~loclfoclftbc~fvndof 
m@~n* -& bans ldar nnd p m p l a  a pohncal mncrprron of- W bc a w l <  m W  
ssrodntbavrmnnderedmmmonr,at~lNELrafgco~ry onduad6tlon" (I1 p 8) 
wising i u  M d  appart fox an m@md h e  mht The principles which are M y  
a through &is p-~s of mising bdieA are io r u l b  quilbriumrium 
IMktiyo epikiwn is, h a w e r ,  only an i d 4  rowsrdr which soncqiom d 
WFC aim The .hMdnYmbwofbeW and posiriom which would have to bc 
considend to m h  pafen d d v e  eqdblium, i f per fen  rdoctive equilbriumin wen 
ponuile, would catainly place alarge mcthodologid c o m d n t  onits a s h i m .  It is 
dso the case that giventhe number ofbdm which would bave to be formulated into a 
m h d  -84 it may not be apparentthat pMcip1es ofjurria M in&- 
equilibrium Rawktherrfom adopts a test for ruloctive equilibrium. He holds "if- 
rulectiectic eqdbri-is &e4 the principles ofpolitid justice may be repwmcd 85 
the outmmc ofa cataio pm- of m-do&-21 The test p r o d m  whichRawls 
proposes is that a concep&on ofjudce could b e r h r  
choice rimtion h w l s  holds it is neccssaryto employ afairchoice model dueto the 
complexity iwolved in reco~grSnectictieeqvilibrium In appealing to a tairchoicc 
situba Rawlr h rimply PdcWin8a mahod u)mmdy employed in 5odd theory of 
modeling 'a rimplified riwbod andtben rhowing how rational agcmr would an under 
. l a s s  ooly a5 a w of more clearly Blng fbe m- ln his &went 
thee limited ~mditim.~ The use of a fair choice model is -played simply = a means 
Raw& ofterr several s h m M o n r  offair choice h t i o m .  His fim 
chmzmimion is 'to let each paron pmpore me prhcipla upon which hc wishes his 
u)mphim -Uin be tried wifh the understand@ &at ifaclmowIed& the com- of 
otherrail1 C similarlytried, and that m camp!&& will be heard at all mtil everyoan is 
roughly of me m i d  u to h m  complaints p ~ e  to bejud& They uch understad M e r  
thnt the pMdplcs propard and nslnowledged onG% -on e biding on &are 
awaiom."24 The mast elaborate and welldeveloped chrmerkdonhe dls  Zbe 
originnl p o ~ 0 n . " 2 ~  The original podtionmodels nfair choice -tion by limit@ the 
. knowledge -M have about their oimmmance whm ohwsix~ ing -@en of 
ju5ic% i.e.. his use ofSe,'~vd o f i p r a c e "  which denis the q - v e  Imowledge of 
thdr mtwd tal- and social atuldiog.26 Thac c m c m h t s  arefaLmto be rnndi6om 
aide-gniad with a radctyto be fair w&fs w d a  which to chwr a 
r n n 4 0 n  ofjurtice. As Mid . bow fhns id- are fad within the public wlblre. The 
aiginal position is therefore nothing more than P device to repepmt what sad 
hdividualatah to be resonable conmaim m place onthe choics d a  a o q 6 a o  of 
imia to emnethat it is fsir.27 Rawls' origionl po.ition can tbus be - as dmply a way 
&dm-8 out the implication of beliefs h u t  a &r choice sirnation alwdy widely held 
within society We need to be clear that Rawk does not claim thnt aaual individuals are 
mebow bound by the decision made by qresmWiva  within the origionl positio~ BI if 
their decision atabliPhed the @yp&uical) a m o n  ofacfual individuals He is om 
attemphg to esfabtirhthat we bavc an obliwion to adopt a panicvlar ancepionof 
M i c e  b d  on the faathat we would a n s o n  to adopting this a m p t i o n  o f j u ~  
under ideal drmmstan~er. me decision of qrerentnfives in the original position 
ultimately only show amnaption to be in reflective equilibrium and it is this-and not the 
aaual agreement of the r e p ~ t i v e ~ w i t h i n  the original poritioo - which is the 10- of 
,%. 
xulcm.mch R . w a a i r l b . M l d ~ u h m d u l l a s l ' n o o u u ~ d m  
*raman2&ed lnlbrcbolcrafpnonpla h v l 0 u m m ; a f - m I  cbaorrorlbr & p c q O f d  
cm"mSm7,. lba, .paruaUar paruI,~I~I~dBlpBlpBlp.m% d -* r n T d o f h h  am6 do on 
m&z lbi o n o n ~ l a  dorned,' lod h t  'tt b d d  k Irn-blc la Wor  p o p l a  lo* clrsunufano. of 
0btiblignioa2~ In urhg the aria paitMs Ramis only c k  "that one urnccpcion of 
jurdsc is more -onable tbnn annhsS mjum3ablc with ~ ~ p c a  to it, if p m a n .  
inthc initinl siumtion ti.=., thc psifion] wovld choose its prindpl- o w r t h w  of 
the mh" for the m1lc 0fj"Qi~e!~Z9 
When considering thc bat conception for b a a l  saeietic~, Rawla asatidlylimitr 
collPiddoo to two wlreptioo: & conception of ?vatice m faimeu' (as rrprmcntka 
thc rocial sontracttmdilion) and utilitarianirm Thes me thetwo pmminmt 
conwom found in modem h b d  potidd thmry. R n d s  giw a numbs of 
chmctaktiom ofjudce ar faimers in t- of- principles, the hemost recent ofwhich 
ir the foUorVing: 
"a Each p a c n  han an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme df q ~ a l  bauc nghrr and bbnoeg uhsh rhcmc ,r 
compaubls wlh !he rams whmc for all, aod m h s  x h m  
the wual ooi~!~cal bbemcr and onlv tho* bbcmcr are to 
be &.rAeed their fair value 
i t h . ~ d m , p v i i i ) .  ~ m ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ d d ~ h ~ ~ i r ~ y p ~ g ~ d  
mnwct (bco'y. lb rc  are g d  @s Car c w g  g docr S i b  N h ,  that "ahahah Fmor [of 
~ s l c b a l c e & k l . I r h h h ~ n d ~ c b a i i f b o o ' y P I a ~ e 6 c O b S E O b S E ~ r s n h c  
r u b m r Y ~ f a r t b e m m r a a ~ . . s l o n s ~ t h e D a c i ~ a u b ~ ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ) ~ ~ s o d ~ ~ ~  
E ~ u a o o n U v o u g h N R i ~  CholcS i n Q - I ~ J o u r r n l o f E ~ ' ~ W [ v l .  88,1971).p 597. For 
.nothnmrmndog~ttbat~inbnddmp~~tf&m-(bco'yPeJ~ 
~ampmn'r. " m o m  aad c b i i  ~ a r  R ~ W I S  mve a smd mnwa neny7 in %humdof 
Philoropby Wol. 77: 1980). 
~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ b r i d l y ~ n d d e d e ~ t i ~ b u t ~ i t d u c t o 1 0 ~ 1 i n a b e ~ t o ~ d e . ~ & ~  
@.,*-to mnfiidng M o m .  scc TI, m. 3445. 
88 
b Social and sonormc rnoquaLtoa are to h s f y  two 
mndltions K q  Wan to be a m h d  to p i h m s  and 
officcr men to all vodn coodanonr. of f& esual~w of  
oppo&ty; and necood, thy  ace to be to tde gr& 
bsle6t ofthe 1- advantaged members ~faaciery."~' 
Rawk qu&?en these two principles by chiming that the -d pMdpleir subordhate to 
the f i t .  It is this categorical i n m e  of politid tights fmm my considemiom ofwider 
inmests or social advantage which is one oftha main d i € f e r e r ~ ~ ~ ~ j u r t i ~ ~  as 
fairness and nddiitarian mncepti~ns'~ Wth j d c e  as fairness, Rawls writes, ' ~ w h p m o n  
po- an imiolabWy faded on j v n i e  that even the h e b e  of rodny as a M o l e  
carmot override. Forthis reason justice daisthat  the 10s offreedom for some is made 
right by a gMter good s h a d  by othm. It docs not allowthat the d c e s  i!zmpwcd 00 
a few are outweighed by the kger sum o f a d v ~  enjoyed by many. Th&n in il 
j u t  Iodnythe hi& ofequal -hip aret&en as reftled. the tights skvnd by 
justice are not subject to political bargninins or to the calculw of- w." Yet 
thessfcahlnr ofthe social co-n tradition and dtariaoinm have been Im- for P long 
time. without one side bdag able to ~Laimviuo'y. Why is it that h w l s  holds thar he 
hall7 has showthe social mmwt option to be preferable? F i t  o f s 4  as we h v c  rce4 
Rawlr ford are^ justice as fairness wahout mvch ofthe metaphysical support which 
cat.gotical rights are often r l l n  to nquirc. By b d n g  tha appEcation ofhir theory, and 
making the daim for categorid rigmr only a@& shim abwf how people should bc 
treated. Rawlr is ableto anid many ofthe abolrcomings ansodaredwifhthc -a1 
mnuan mdi666. Secondly. Raw& ux of the origiml podtion wrvu m show fhnt under 
a f a i r ~ o t u a t i o q m o a r d h ~ g t o ~ n o t ~ p & d r i ~  Thevdl 
o f i m c +  i.e., that one dces not h o w  one's placew+thkthc ~ e l y ,  6- y1 m 
aosursthatthe wmat offpodtion ha9 u least baois political rights. Thus rupp~nfor 
amgor id  potitid tigAts is p&Ie forthoe kt& mi& poddo& the m01f 
appropriate coosepfion ofjusricefor aliberal noden/ulthmdy qrjects uamrim 
contentions and suppons megor id  rights. Thus by suppolting sntegotid rights, justice 
an fsimm is befts abbto achieve dest iyc e g d i i m .  
The aecond pan ofRawln' qumnn f a judce  an fsimess s ~ t i a l l y  the 
slectien of the W e  mnccption ofjustice back to the 6mtnuo saga ofhis 
jufiwaon: the pmblan of stability within a plural id^ nociefy and the idea of a nomtiw 
conrmsus Rawlr mslieJ the concernwith sfability q l i c i t  by holdingthat the conception 
ofjusticewhich is chonenwiulin a fair choice dwr ioh  iie., the outcome ofthe o r i W  
podtioh murt be able to maintain potiticai d i t y .  FurUlcmx,n. Rawls holds that the 
c o n ~ o n  must also be nhm to be based uponanomtive m m s ,  an oppoML to 
bdng b z d  on a m d w  vi-di. Rawlr holds that the 50n~cption ofjustice which best 
achieves rendve  qu3iirium must be rhownm bcthcpopuile rubjsn of an owla* 
coaenrur o F a U r ~ c a m p r l r ~ ~ w i f h i o t h e ~ .  Sh -ga 
m n q t b n  ofjusticeto bethe rubies d a n  -lam* connco~us rimply m- showing 
that the adoption of the conception ofjunice in the politid MLm is not ummqtatle to 
any d I c  wmprchemive do&e. The relatiomhip of&-nable 
wmprebmein dosninero the potitid wn@m ofjusticc-Ui4 ofw- be di2T-f. 
Fm example, someone who hol& a ~onsemdve Christian doctrine may ham d i 6 d  
m n s  faroot opposirg a wn@oo ofjustice th.n a h i d  & e i  Unlar~n 
-table rdatiordip can be rhorun between .LI reasonable wmprehemim doctdnn and 
tkw'tid wn+m ofjustice, ie.. unless tk wm.qtioo ofjutice can be shownm be 
the subject afan overlapping comemu, it is not a. acceptable conception of a phrdistic 
rodcty, even if it san achieve rrflective "1uiIiiri- 
The rearon why we must wnsidey ruhetbrthc wsac+on arrived at in the orieal  
position is ableto be the rubject of a normative wn-us is that the wo+on is tho- 
behind the veil of ignoraoce, so thatthe choice in madewithout people having bowledge 
oftheir spec765 wmpnhasive dosnines. We need to check* see iffhe conc+on 
chow in the fair choice rituatior is able to be the subject o f m  overlapping wnsems 
when people wnGdc it in Full kcowledge offheir wmprchensive do-. Much ofthe 
argummt farjudce as fairness as being able to achieve an overlapping w w r  has bem 
laid out inthe pnvious ~ O ~ S .  That the M e &  f",m which if is w-cted -eg., the 
idea of the paron as 6ee and quai, the idea of society as a fair *em of co~pe ra t io~  the
wnstraims on a fair choice W o n -  M maad by dl mooable d o h e  goes D long 
m y  to atablish the psnVIlily ofan owlawing w-PUS. That the applicstion ofthc 
mcepion is M e d  to the domain ofthe political also helps plmnne that it can be Ule 
subject ofoverlapping wo5nw1. Rwkthw concluder thahstice as fairness is able to 
b the puhja ofan w d + g  co- and that it ir the p d m h l e  mnccption of 
jmdce for the type of-- be 
Section 3: Two Interpretations of Rawlr 
Ha* set out the l i d  stag5 0fFawI1' jUstSCati0~ I will now rsaM to look at 
two connicting view of what Rwns is acmdly doing in appealing to fh beliefs inhaem in 
the public d m .  Thisis u d  for frwo -009. Fm it shows the signi6- of 
Rawls' npped to s s w W ~ ' s  public wlture. Withourredng this appeal withim the contexi 
oft iha1 debates one misses theimportance ofRawls' appeal to beliefs inhaem inthe 
public dm in allowing his judcation to avoid b  
the status ofits claim. secondly, it addressest~ pmminar mircbmmizatiom of 
Rawb' project: the continued claimthnr Fawk maims emtially aKantian(objenivist) 
s e a  and the claimthat Raw11 is ahi~foricit. The key point ofcoofention betweathe 
Mapmation ofhistoricists Lke Rmty, and ohjmkim, like Jmen &kmw is fh 
astur which Rawls @M to tbe beefs wiich he holds are inhaenf in the pubtic culture. 
Row is, however, one of the few hiaoricisD who rem- the posibiliry of= 
histoticirt intapretation ofRaw1s. Man historicins do rot appreciate thst WD' 
iusi&don is modeled on the hintorid cirmmstancen d s  p m i d a r  u)&. For 
-pl+ W a h r  daim that "beyond the minimlist claim for the "due dpeac+ and the 
d e s  offorbearance that it at&, ...there are no principlesthat governall regimes of 
tolsration orthar requireus to am in dl cimmmmcer, in all time and p l a q  on behalf of 
apartisuLusm ofpolitical or connmniond wm. P r d d n  arguments [i.e., 
the rypc ofju&stion w h i s h b h  pamu] won't help w hcrr precisely bbcuuacthey 
me not diffrrmiarcd by time and p h  they wenot properly chmmmhd." As was 
the easedth sandel. Walmaerma to mkcadRawls because ofhis early declsntionr of 
nupporl for Kant and the univ& appemnce of the original position awnmt, d d r g  
hoarRawb presents a p m d u d  urnceptim ofjruticcwhish is tied to the cirmmtanccl 
of panicular noticfier 
The-n why 1 fist pracmed the Ihl stage ofRawls ' j 6&n  is that 
Hpbemuu' and Rorty'o imerprrtarinu deny the Mporrance of keyasppects ofthir Ihl 
rtagr Rorty's interpretation o f b k  qvutions what is ascomplirhed fhmu@ the usc of 
rdccrive qdibrhrm. Rortyrejm the view*f h i s  DW be engage3 inthe 
practice of polificaljudication which attempts to put certain politid dictates beyond any 
debate within a -iety. As w e d  see, it in unclear whether Ronymam to also 
Rawlr' use of renectve equii- The reason for this ucmdmy about Row's 
is that his division be- a priori judication ~ n d  h&(~ricism doer not allow a 
de~rplacefor a historicist j 6 u t i 0 4  rn R a h '  use ofrdective equilibrium is meant to 
be. Hsbermas' interpretation ofRawl% on the mber hand, focuses too much on hihis use of 
the o t i a  position, leavingtheidea of an owlapping sonsmnur vrithoutjudcatory 
tifli6cance For Habemq Rawls is trying to pmvide a more ameptablc philosopbid 
basis for the K h a n  position It is only by addressing both of these mbimapntafions 
that we come to see the tmc nature and sue& ofRawlr' neund judcation ofjudca 
Habarnas would d i s a g r e e d  the &y historicist (or as he cab it 
'comnrmdkt') interpmtion o f ~ r  which Ihaveoffaed lo far. FJab- -9 
catain MQoricist implisations otRaarls' posi@hq but he umcludcr t ha t 'Wof  mungb 
don not e s h  to lima himpelfrolely to the t imdamdnodvemnv ic f ions  of1 
pampam&poIitid c u h n :  svm the presca-day RawI~.-RiEhard Rorty, bas wt 
become a contmalint."35 Habarnas seer Rzarls sr apost-Enlightenment Kantinn who is 
primarily concened with presenfiogthepolitid ur-en= otaKamian conaption of 
the a r b j q  i.c, the conception ofthe penon ss fcee and equal, withaithut Kam's 
mnap tqdd  baggagc.'6 For Habarnas, the guiding Lrmirion behind WJ' pmjm is 
that ?he mle ofthe ategorid imperative is taken over by an intsarbjmively applied 
pmcedurewhich is embodied in panicipation mnditionn, arch arthe equality ofpanis, 
and in situation ~ s ,  such sri the veil of i ~ o ~ a n c e . " ~ ~  Habemrar' imerpmation of 
Rawln gives a carnal phce to his ure a d  cbarastairation of the origid position as a 
means for daamining a co"septi0n ofjawisti f o r  ar fcee a d  equal, 
ignoring theimportance of rest ofhir jurtificafion 
' b b n c ~ d R - * l l ~ s r f a u l y m m m o n m & m L ~ e h ,  onah(l-olkeh,eh,ddd 
m o o r c t , o o b c r p l r o b d K m t ~ ~ " ~ ~  A ' a c h a c r s c q ~ h o l & . ~ ~ r m l n r ~  
Kc-BayDc,ab Ia~u;mrnnluprruRaahlraKaonanabcnhsrmn"Rauh A b o f  
~ w r , ~ w r , ~ ~ ~ ~ r a a r a ~ w r , ~ w r , d a ~ c m p l c m p l c m p l c m p l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a o l  spm~aby omamwspmoodd( .nd  
d~au.n&mdm& mmpremuon dck cslcgonal tmperan~aod m a w  of=?oooq a d  b 
-dog marc mo\mcmg I"~"hhMn for Ihcm ~hcIhc LLc mnbodof M d l c n c  cqullibnum " tBawe& p 
II 
Habmas recognizes a cbredationahip befa.een his andRwW philosophical 
projects. l h b w a s  also sea his podtion as away ofmhdnhg Wanpo l i t iw  without 
&e metaphytical baggage. Habermas, lk Rawla wants to establish P ramwive h W  
cowption ofjustice d e  nrpcting the flsf of pltdisy within many sodcties. 
Habemrar also lwm a w m q i o n  ofjutice wbicb  allow^ fm categorical right The 
main diffemncq and advantage, Hab- sees his poJitim ha* ova  R m k  is that 
many ofthe alemnns modeled in the o r i M  podti04 c.g, the conception ofthe -4 
"stands kneed ofaprior jus66mtion." 38 Hab- holds he can provide such B 
justi6anios while Rawls cannot. Ratherthan acceptbg Pads' a p p d  to beliefs inherent 
W n  a public o h r e  as I &am g o d  for a h3eral conaption ofjustice, Habe- 
attempts to md =me ofthe beliefs q t i m d  forthe development ofa liberal 
conception ofjustice on something lcrs ndmdynlative: hi$ analysis of commvnicetive 
action.3' 
Like Kam, Haberman attempts to bare ethical and political no- on a conception 
of m n  As we haw $em, for W ethid and p o  o w  
capacity far pranid m n .  For Kant, praaical reason is a M t y  univcdly dwcd by 
all d o &  wbjects. Bermuse what is d a d  in not dfected by empirid inbnccr, 
peoplc&g rationally uiU come to the same condluionr -dlen of nrlhml, 
3 9 ~ p r r u n u ~ ~ o f o f s . m c ~ 0 ~ 0 I h ~ a - c d ~ r p a n l u n l ~ l l l r .  
*,a l Goh -en rU mavl- mardm ffff",,, H a k m s  p u u o  cnh n,v.lr For*C 
k n o m l m o n a r h  Ibaor) % hn Mod -0err and Cmm-uve Amon 1- A%@ 
h 19% pp 43-116 aodPDY pp 294.167 
tbermdvq the fact that the -C "pacity for reason is m k r d y  disui i ted omongat dl 
d o n a l ~ m d i s n a & a s d b y q ~ ~ - a t b - c  
~onmtmmmbility of dl rationd Imodsdge In otherwords, for Kant, d rational mbjCSU 
=able to detemdnemdn b y t h d ~ .  i.e., monologidy, what is m e  for dl rational 
beings. Habmnar @ a s  the Kamim notion ofsubject-td r-a. But unlike 0th" 
writemwho rejathe idea dmbjm-cmmed m q  Habemas hddn E M  the mjaian 
of r ~ ~ b j c ~ f a m d  reason doer not deny ths posnibiLiy ofa rational b- for rodd 
airi-.a RntbaHabmnar develops an altemmive, imasvbjntive conscption of 
maso& in t- ofmmmunispSve acdoo. Communicative action is a d o n  diread 
towards bMging about m8flial udmanding. Speech snr are oremplary of Such 
actions. Unlike Kant'r co"ceptics of-oq whish aUowr for the monologid 
employment of reanon, ~mnmdcatit i~  action reqker the pmticipdon .of at least fwo 
persons. C o d c a t i v e  actionquirep the individual te8tthe"daims a@st the vim 
of o w .  Rational knorvledge is detcrmincd not, as it wan for Kam, by what the 
+dud aubjen m h t n  as a knowing m b j 4  bur by what is a p d  m by a 
carnucity of %palen. When for Kam the basis of a d  d d r m  is the ideal of 
m a t  bared on our s h a d  M t y  ofreason; for Habsmsq the bask of rosial 
aititiun b what in arrived at bydrn&cadve d o n .  
Habe- sea Rawls' use ofthe original posidon as an attempt to jvrrify a 
~onccprion ofjustice " i n f m ~ n t i v e l Y Y Y ~ ~  Habemas thus -Ra* and W a s  
&acing a s h b r  consem, is., m dewlop an ~ m b j ~ j ~ c a t i ~ n  ofKantim 
pliti-. Yet H a h a s  holds that his rn-on ofunnmunicativc action is able to Bivo 
k Kantim elements I 6merfoundation thnn Raw1 appeals m the public culture of 
celtain rod&. Key m Haberm~'j&atioo oflibedim is his claimthat d m  
eg in communicative actionthen a n d  normative posidoluwhich are 
implidtly mewed. For nab- "-ne acting r n ~ c a t i v c L y  must i~ performing 
any + d o n ,  raixwivenal velidity daimp Md mppor that they can be 
vindicated "42 H 8 b m  claims that when we ainseremmpt to arrive at n -ned 
4 1 ~ ~ , p ~ ~ m a d a b i r c b o i i d ~  ~ ~ e v e s c d o n ~ ~ ~ d m + w =  
m n c e p i o n o f j " , a e z b y ' ~ s l d d  ~ ~ b d . ~ ~ p " y . b y ~ b i s h s h s h  
c s n k ~ d b o m & ~ d d e b a I C U ) t h t h t h d ~  U ~ ~ m o d i ~ c g , i w o I ~ ~ I b e  
r i r r d d c a t h o r ~ l i d e s W a d - d ~ d y ~ ~ t m ~ m u l d b ~ O ~ ~  
m-oaofjuna. nabrrmarp.OwSs t b a t T + s c s n d e t ~ I b M I I a m ~ ~ ~ i s ~ a t  only 
tbmugb tk -lwatimrafmtional v e n s  ifil muld te arrived at m d 6  1d8181nd1tions. i c. undcr 
mndloool B urn lbc arpmme, Ofrn m p  P ew Hahrmar hddr tbal anymn%- 
~ M c b  n mu%d a mda VIVI mn&ti66 should be able U) meet& thsths-SN principle. llu 
~ u n r v e w U a b r l ~ p ~ p I I u r m E a n l l o - d ~ a , c n r o w h c ~ h e r a p a n i d a r m I  
caul* k arhmed m w  a ideal -h htm666 See hr MdCo~o~o~o~o~dC'cc'C66 
. n$rremenf we presuppose that we intend to p w   ensu under fair conditions m 
allow For other puhtipantr to chaUengeng us and OW &, r a i ~  other iuues and 
con-r. Funhermore, sinerely q B i n g  in cormmicafive d o n a b 0  pmpporer 
-thatthe puhtipsmr do 1101 n t i p m d y  d-y one another, do not lie; in g a d  that 
they-&e one anothths h i n g  e q d  ri@ts.''*3 Errezltially nabamas =!Aims 
=gaging in wmmuoicative aaien pnrupporer the wcptance o f d  d v e  
p o d o ~ . W  It is there p~eruppo~itions ofmmmwidve adon which allow for a 
m i v d s t  jusi6cation of d tmets of h i m  The a d  conqtioo ofjustice 
whish a society adopts will bethe d t  dan a m d  wmenmr reached within the public 
debate of a p u h d a r  society Regardless d w b  carsemus that people in a Satiety 
e~atually co-to, for nab-, it must accept the nomu inhow in c o d c ~ t i v e  
d o n  
IWema$ and Rawln do nor d i w  about the o o m  unddying a liberal 
m a p t i o n  ofjurdcc Then- which nabamas m & e s  as inhaem in the @ce 
of communicative action are d a l l y  the same l i b 4  n o m  which Rawbm@S as 
b&g inthe inherent public d u n e  ofcomemporary We- -&en, eg.. W t Y o f  
p- R s p a  for differences. Then is howewradbTermses to the baris whish both 
U ~ l r m ! ~ b c o a h j a n a a ~ ~ l l c m p l U I c n a b ~ ~ ~ m ~ o n o ( l v r o ~ b , W " 8 U ) I -  
m o  p-umr r n l b , ~  U w uvnalv s b r d  m0.L Wen G=."cmSdm. LhC - 
3pp-nUlrrga3loth ~ . < - o f b b ~ o ~  ~ t h ~ L b a l p ~ ~ - ~ ~  
LhC lpcnrndcmaod LhC "@, to *m Md aru.bcrag an* Lbrl mnn3tcnsy f o r a ! h r  agmt to ah-* 
she m r n x n n  n q h o c  n&L Lo 41 o t  t r  t U U d  m u  ICC b R-o .odMdmJ W<Ch,h,W l* 
claim ~pport forthue n-. HabamaS holds thaf these n- are mted  in the very 
prnctice of comuniaive a d m  Rpwlr ow claims that these no- are gmemlty 
q e d  within -me s&etic.. To put these- podtiom in c o q  inwinethat W 
ideaofpersons as 6ec equal and autonomous beings did ref find i s  way into wr public 
Ful- Ifthe American and French RNOImtiom did not w, i f k c o h  Ion in W 
debatcsto k g l q  andLuther, Lde, Roussc=& Kam and J&ermn were w t  bom. the 
idear i n h m  inthc publie Fulfun? ofwesfem raiefiesmay have b- quite diiI-t. If 
& l u a ~  the rus it would d& mdemhe the neutrality of RIwIs' j uMca t io  Rwrk 
would no longer be able to claim tbat the bads elan- oflib& are w e d  in the 
public cultwe. Although the mnqtioo ofjmicc devdopcd in mcb L sxinywould be 
rubstamiaUy dXerer4 forHabamaq the bads el-tr dl i ira l irm would bavcm be 
acapted when dewloping a oonception ofjustice due m the normativeimplications of 
uring ~mmuniwtive action. In otherword% the applidiliq ofRnwW juMcation is 
dependem on historical drcunutance, whilenabemas' ir not. 
The key qmestion N a W  raises in evaluating Rawb' pmjmjen is wbnherin 
developing a neutral conception ofjustice Habermas' uni& approash b preferable 
to ilppwbg to beliefs inhermf in W public culture. This quurion ivelfha-r 
to rhow the divide bmueenRawls' and Habermas' projects. Where Habanas is 
can~emed withthe developem of an alterative SOncqion of-& Fa* is 
concerned pdmarily with the developmmt of a neutral co-n ofjustice. Cmmq m 
Habsmuu' cornentin Rawlr holds that he and Habarnas have"- aim and 
motivafiona."~~ For atlmple, Rawk in mn-edwXh formdabkg and d&nding an 
a d  mncqdon o f ~ c c ,  where H a k m a  is mcocsned with showing the rationality of 
thebasis clnnents ofliicralisn.' This dilfer-55 inmotivations is dso rh-in their 
di&ren inifid starting points: Rawlr' project is motivated bythepmblcm ofdeveloping a 
m n w t i m  ofjluticc for a plvralipfic society, Hsbemrar motivnnd by therejmiot~ of 
rubjest--md reason. That Habemas m i a a  ~ *ey d'%T- is dearfmmhb 
tbeimponaocr ofthcideo ofan owlappins conreosus to Wls'jud!iu~tion. 
Habuaar qus$ions"krMher [the o d s p p h  mosennur] prLnarily mmIYter to the 
*jm3iuItion of the theory or whether it -eJ, in light orthe pr ior jdEa60n of 
thetheow, to explicate a neceo~a?. d o n  of nodd sabilay."" He ooncluda that'the 
overlappinp conwnw merely -ser the &aid  adb but ion that the theory of 
j d c s  can maketo the peasdvl i m i m t i o ~ a n  of nosial c o o ~ t i o n ;  ...hukicvalue 
ofajm3iedtheorymurt already be p~eaupposed"~ In ofhar-~rds. Habcmu. holds that 
the use ofthe overlapping co-s do- not add m a  
mn~eption ~fjuntice, n m  to the fin that it i l l umes  if8 functiodity in 
nabiityruithin a sociery Hubmaas talrea the idea ofanowrlqping mmmrun as "merely 
an index of the wiiity, and. .. [not] a mnKma60n of m-es of the thmry."49 Yet we 
have reenthar Raarls in uptin'tly notmnamad aith the"coneamem" ofj& ar 
FLp.373. 
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f-s, but with its rranonablcnessin addressing the p m b l m  faced bya phmlirtic 
society, kludlogtheproblem of stabw. Rather thsn addressing the ideal question of 
what is the correct wncep&n oEjun6ee. Rawls asks the quen600 how is D atable and just 
pl&c socistyposjble. If is wahmthc mmext ofthc pmblmu of a pl t rdini~ society 
thnt FavAr' project mi-. For RavAs. a conception's Monality in addrruingthese 
problems, prhmdy 6x ppmlem ofmbility, plays ao a r d a l  role in a mnception'n 
ju&caim 
lvGsisrprering the naauc ofRawlr' pmject I& Habanur to miss the main 
advantage which Rbwlls' pjkf has over his rrwnabjeetKst a p p b  to wmmunLcdve 
mion By a p p a  to the presuppositions ofmmmxicariw d o n .  Hab- preynts 
apodtionwhich in not limited to quertiona eon.em5g the &s srmcture, i.e., Hab-' 
poritioa is mmprehmdve For Rawls. ~MeHabamss preseats afairly powrrful 
politiaq it is ooe whish ultimately violates the limaation on the doma5 of the politic4 
and thereby for -1% is not accepPble as a n ~ m I j u s t i 6 d o n  of l i i e ~ a l i l m . ~  Because 
Habaras dwr not m&e the a c i d  importance ofthe problem of stabilityand the 
need to determine a Eanseption ofjusticethat all people within a sodefy ncogzize aa f.L, 
he is not con& with pw&g a l l c u W I ~ ~ t i 0  It is tbis lack of urn- with 
jurtificatory neutrality which all- Habermas to claimthat his projst gives a rnm 
wcun fouodarian to a l i b d  conception ofjultice. Yet tbe cmmnwith jurtificatory 
~levWlityis d to any yndamding ofRaw1s' pmject and his appeal to beliefs 
inhcrrm inthe public sllmre. 
m: 
Rony's exact intqmnion ofRswIs is a k d-t to d i m  Give0 that his 
aitidan of liberaljus3iEatioo ir not fomulated aifhRnwk explicitly in mind it in unclear 
at times whether heir also m g  to Rnarls' pmjcsf when he r e j a r  political 
jus3ieatioo~; or whcthsths disputewith b I s  in Phnply one o f ~ ~ ~ t i s s ,  n kRam, 
only means to njs t  objectivist justSEatio14 snd not nan-objectivist j&Kcatiom IrEc thI 
p-ted by m r .  The mxh seems to be somewhere in the middlc whh Rmry mveMB 
between b a h  poritionr. 
In PbiImqhyandffiedlirmrofN~)nq Rorryn!&$* a dininstion bcween 
epistemology and hammeutic~ R o w  idcmifics epistemology ~ 6 t h " ~  d- to 6nd 
'foundations' to which ow might cling, M e w a r b  beyond which one mu* not stray, 
objnrs whichimpose thmrlver. represmtationr which m o t  begalusid."" Rorty 
d d  id- soemptr to pmvide a priori politidjwti6Es6om, ar Kant and Hakmar 
mmpf  to do, with epioemology. Apriori politid jurti6atiom aim to establishthe 
1-cy of caainpolitirzl positions objdvely. m say k a Icgi'timate politid 
mu- m o t  njea or m y  Lorn c + d n  poitiom. Rony argun forthe rejedm of 
epistemology in aU its fom Althoughjun8irvien is often seen as being cloncly&ed 
to the mot ofthe l i M  Po~id~c.52R~ny holds the htddity to pmvide ajunific~tion is a 
good t b g  for l i M r  because 1) a rwiey not m n m e d  wilb univasal m t h  more 
cb.clyacconlp withthe pmpcr ideala o f a l i i  d a n o d c  raoiny, cg.. support of 
f o l d o n  and acccptanseofdi~sity; and 2) it cI- the way for social &dm to 
employ themore tools o f m r m k  md utopiap p ~ t i t i c p . ~ ~  Rorty supportsthe 
adoption of hamauneufieufi. Hsrmendss is not meant to replace cpiptemology, h the 
sense ofpresenting o new way of ertabliJhing orjuntifyiog p a c a l  &.ons. Rather 
"hermender is an qmsdm of hope thar the s u l u  space I* by the drndse d 
rpisDmology d not be filled - that our dm M d  bkome om h which the dsMnd 
formmmhf md ca&nrafion is na l o n g a f e l t "  Hameneutics entails m m a n ~ b e i n g  
open to th= pornvlity of adopeng *pan of meone else's podtion into YOYIOW to be 
willing to apdtnrnt to %d btmbtmmp of doingthings; to htm to otherpople and 
culrure~, &pad ofrimply ~laLnin~thar this is thcmys!i"gs must be. 
Wl!m his  upp port d h w a ~ t i a  means for political theo'y is that Rcw argue$ 
forthe rejection not only o f p w  objenivi~m, but aka for politisdjwIXcatioas more 
generally. Ephemology and judcation proceed "00 the asmptionthat all 
conm%dolu to a given discourse me u~onnenayabl." Political j d c a t i o n  assumes that 
c o m o n g m ~ n d  san be found. Furthemon, epinmrology and juPdSEation aPJume tha 
there are'a set ofrules which will tell YS how rational ag~enncnt can he w h e d  onwhat 
would Kttle the iuvc on every poiot where statemmfr seem to C O ~ R . ' ' ~  IfwefaLe 
ftrberma~' podtion for example. mot only d o e  it ammethat a g m e m  an be reached 
on catain political prkiples. it a h  rests onthe beliefthat p p l c  amhdi-political 
will be able m some to on tber pMdples when f h ~  consider thc 
n~vrr of ~n~nunisarive ~ O L  AS RO- -9: "TO conmust an epiaemology is m 6nd 
the msdrrmm amount of w.mm ground d others. The &an Ulat an 
epiaanology can be co-cted isthe asxoptionthnt svch -on m d  h a . " '  
 or Kaq this common gmmd d i n  are all being noumenal subjects. EmHabcnnas. 
this common gmund is in OUT all being kfslacvtors In con- Rony fyhodr that what 
comonponry poMliriw medo is not 6mhe mempm to justify or Ufabbh the legifimasy of 
~ ~ r t i d a r  poitiow but the opening up daspaa h e r e  -he political rolvtions be 
presented. 
Rony would agree withmch of my interpretation ofRawls. He mognircs that 
Rawlr, due to hir a p d r  to beliefs inhnmt in the plblic culfyre. is not attempting the 
type of episemological p m j a  rn Habermas or ?ant.- ForRorry. Rawls agrcen 
that we are not "able to isolate basic elemmtr except on the basin of a prior Loowledge of 
the h o l e  fabric wahio which these elem& O C C U T .  By appaling solely to beliefs 
contingedy comained within a parrimdm public cubre, -Is rajectg Kam'n nnd 
Habermas' ruggentions that any (~gardlus ofhwlimaed) jur66Eafion ofthe basic 
d c m w  ofjustice can be carried out i n d q e d d y  ofam/ ImoWge  ofthe rociny in 
9yntioa Rawir' istitication b not B priori in that it ~ c l ~  d W s  on B P F ~ S  m
beliefs inhueat in the publio ahme But this does Mf thu Fads holds e i h  that 
j~sti6ation as a whole should be r e j a  or that impolm mmfive palitid belie& an 
only thore that sre con- present witlGn a sociery. 
It b clearthat Rawln makes appeals to arodety's public d m  in order to gmund 
the key elements in bin neneaal j d c a t i o n .  Yet Rawln d o n  claim that the bask h h i r  
n o d v e  position is wha is sodgcntly held by a society. Ibe beliefs inh& in the 
public d m  snn be yen as being historid% but they do not n ~ e s d l y  have to be taken 
that way. While Rawk disagrrn with- approach ar away ofdeveloping a 
political wmqwion ofjuptise, he does nut deny it on the mound3 that the bclieb inherent 
in the public d m  mmst behimticin. Rawk should mt, and does not, make my claim 
@g the actual -s ofthe beliefs inhermt in the public c u l w  For the projen to 
m a i n  w i t h  the domain of the politid and m i n i d  burdens to be p W  on its 
acceptance, Rawk should only =&that there id- suc in the public cultwe, without 
sommfing on their -s nor quenioniog why they are held inthe pubEc d~rr. It b
by remaking a t e  about the status ofthcgc claims thu Rawla isahle avoid aft- 
either histmicia and objdvir t  libwls. Ahhough both sides claim that Rawk ~ W N  
~ - ~ u g d h b c f r p ~ . o m p n a m ~ m d m m ~ ~ d r h a t p o ~ ~ n s l l p g r a r ~ m  
man) q r d i p o d r m o n  ,l I" fa", u w h  mMo6ofxcmLncwbbn". t o a - n e m m ~  
18s mo>uuoo lhnc k b d ~  Th mlnl h t o p  ma& bnc a lhal Raalr sho3a not m lnto Lhc lvgl  cd 

the hedemsnm" by whlsh rue can- P m e p i o n  ofhstica R d s  provider P 
jWcatian for our public hdnniors  which docs not reject h i~o r i c im  Rmy- 
ha-ro mirvndcrrtaad the "amre 0fRnwlwlwl pmject. R o q  holds tothe vim& 
platifieation requirs objectivity. Md tbat bbmti&mthus entails a Mecrion of 
jwtXcation.6l Row vea fhe p d c e  ofjuatifidon s tied to the -to pmvide 
objnfirnfirj&d04jud~ti~.? b thy1 00 I1188aVdabk due fO the W@OO 0fthfh 
histmitirm of a0 knowledge claim. When it is  dear tbar h b  agrees tha aweah to 
objecriw lmawledge ate cot required to re- our politid hdNtions, Row is thus 
willing to grant that Zdlcctive equilibrium is s tit QI politid meow goO06Z Row 
doesthis, d o u t  d y  taldng inro account how WIRawIs U&I this lets POW fheory 
go Row misses the helrry pointthat Rawb' rdectivc eqilbrium Mcmp" to esfablish a 
moral ~ o l l ~ e e p t i ~ ~  ofjustice, one which ~ r i v i l ~  pMdpl s  vim,, the pybk lire of 
our society. The fype of ficging ofpMFiplez which Row sees e to the 
proper aim of h i  plitics. For Rony, given historicism the only t& I& fir the 
polkid philosopher to pcesent is a p i h o p h i d  alartisulationcfthe beliefs held aithin a 
p d &  society. Rony holds fbat'.thc philosopher [cg.. RawlsJ is not thereby j-g 
thee iwiflltiom b y r e f m c e f ~  more fundammtal p & 4  but the revers He or She is 
help phape wha these infuitiom should be. and to give supporr to camin pMciplcro9 
justice. Junice ar faimes is not meant to be rimply PII articulatioq ors deraipt io4 of 
'1 CB. p 9. 
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Mefs which we happa to believe. Rather, wide b d  solelyon claim which are opm 
to ahinaricin hnapmation, Raarlr doer not give demo- priorify wcr philosophy, io 
the sense which Rorty to lave philosophy the task of tidying up our -ted 
intuitions. R 8 w l r ' j u ~ t i o n  a f j u r t i ~  81 fahen ultimately d a i m  its o-hm 
the bet that it is daived solely h m  beliefs sbrd by all m m b l e  pmplc within B 
parti& -cry. Yet this doer mt mkejudce  as fairmu %imply M articulation of 
there beliefs The range ofRawk' wide d & e  q d i i  is meam to emwe that, 
ahhough objective danmts m o t  be used to m e  a m@on ofju5icece the h e n  
available basis Lrjudfying a wncqlon ofjvstice is uwd. AsNman Daniels phnr  
out, the fairness conmaintr (those which f o d P  the origioal psitian) are di%kmt 
*om the wmidaed judgmemr used in d g t h c  d a l  rrt ldve g d i i  Given 
that thir is the case, he slaims that %detour of daivingthe pMcipIa hmthe  w m  
[model] lddrjurrificatory forceto them [i.e the principles ofjudce an fairness], 
jurrification not f-d simply io ..[the] matching ofpMcipler andjudgementr."@ 
It may be auggened that Rorty'r cancpption of artidation ofthe b4i& m hold 
could be expanded to mean d y  this, a wide re8& equilibrium. Ysf it -3 
unlikely that this is what Rany m- by sldcvlatioh giventhat thir would move Rony 
too dose to mppning atype ofpolitical jud6catiq one which snmpts t~ privilege 
parddarpolitisal prinn'ph. But Rorty's rejection of politidjusti6cation does not sewn 
to be, .sit is with Hdxmm, bared on a philopophid disagr-em, but mtha on a 
dirapemnn of wrcetdng how to pwsle l i b d  politics. Part of the problan which thc 
use of re8cnivc equilibrium pre- for Ro* is that if is not open to the type of mitidm 
wbich he dirsns towards objectiviatjvsrificafi~~. Nsvstheless. Row sees h i d  pow= 
b- sewed by the onploymem of tdmiqnes ofha than politidjmi6cario~ e.8.. ths 
YW of- and utopilopowa. 65 Raty's disappmviogtonetods Rawis is thus 
not biucd on n philopophid dispute, but mthc in baxd more 00 il &C dispute 
h t  how to best fornard liberal politics 
h&sim: 
h this chaw, I haw snout the last two aopestr of Rawls' method of 
jurti6cati.q his appeal to beliefs inherent inthe public oulflve ar a way ofmmriq a 
neuwl justiEotion of a P i  conception ofjustice, and bir use of the method of 
rdlectiesri equilibrium and the idea of an owlapping consnuus ar a way of ideotifying the 
m m  appropriate liberal conception ofjustice. I have also rhourn, in t- ofthe 
junlcation as I presentit, howthe interprefatiri~ by Rorty and Habeamas miss 
nucisl asp- o f R a w W  project 
Conclusion: R w l s  and Political Rams 
In the last rwo chapters, I hwe laid out Rawlr' t-aged argument far justiceas 
Fairness In ra doing I have rhoam how many of RawW critics have &f"praed key 
anpens of hi$ position. I have also h a m  how his judlicafion canremain n d  for 
certain sodetiea, wwe auating n h i  masepfion ofjustice which rupporc, categorical 
rights. InW concluding &I. I w t  to nraminewhat Rads' pmjecr accompliahss 
and it docr not I win m e n  these o h ~ t i o ~ s f o  the vi&Wyofthc widerpmject 
o f j u ~ c i t o r y  mwlity. 
Ifwe look at j d c c  as Paimesr, we cao scc that it addrum a number ofcrucial 
polirical quentionr.1 For -pC junfice as f a k e s  anrwerr the foUm cpatio-: What 
scheme ofrights should a sodcry adopt? Wbnt rights should be guaranteed fair due? 
on what baris an r o d  and emnomis ineq&cs amptablcruithin a raciety? While 
these anwry important quentions which any sod- must answer, they do not wva all of 
the questions which arise within politid debate of pluralistic ratiden. Furthanon, 
although his rwo principle. ofjvstia an "cry su%gsstive. Rawlr in &a rarely commits 
himselfto podtionn in a number of men1  political debates. For example, he docr not 
specify wktha"fair equality doppommiW meotr  to suppon for a5hmh abion. or 
how enmnive an aiiinmtive action pm- I o d d  be  Given that Radr  dealnwith 
people's rtanLtg podtion in wiety, does the ditf-ce priocipleinclde Nppon far lif, 
long social asniaanoe? While it in clear that justice as faMw caoddres a number of 
many ofthc qu&m which M Wcofancn fase 
This In& ofcommitmna and sp&ciq  within most mnhlmorarl political 
debates has mush to do with Us method ofju#%ication We said at the oufMthat 
support for a nrh-tiiveLkal podtion while mhtahk  svppon for ~ 1 t d i l y i r  a 
&icky, ifnot @om endeavor. As we haw ~ m ,  RawlPpmporer to naomplishthis 
task by appealing to the beliefs thal happen to be inherem inthe public mhme of nome 
nosinies. Esentiany, Rawls b i t s  the applidon of his theory m &es in which key 
l i b d  ideals are s h e d  by all -onable &ons ofthe good and h i h g  the 
d d s  o f m t d i t y t o  ~ o ~ g  only reasonable r n ~ o o s .  In awing for 
justhmfaimes. Rawls doe. not w e  for the adoption ofliiaalian bynon-libaal 
societies. In fan, Rawlr' junifidoo doer not even provide a ddmre oftheliberal Mlver 
kom which he devdoprjusd~e as For Raw% the n 4 t y  of hisjunifiotioo 
rests then on& fact that key liberal Wkfs are simply found in the public cult- of l i W  
socistic* 2 mt is key regarding the range ofissve. w h i w h i h j c h j  
that ths plausldity of ascmcewithin l i b d  socider depends on fhei bdng u o i d l y  
b d  within lad  nodeti=. Giventhat the neytdity ofRadr'jus1i6cation depnds on 
the u n i v d  aaeprnoce offhe beliefs from whichhe develop his conception ofjunisc, it 
is not nvprising that Raw11 has f iculty mending his thmry ofjustice to ~ n s ~  when 
there is less agreement. For -pl+ Su- MoUer O k k  who is oympethetic to Raa.1~' 
project, points to the omisdon of&onr ofjurriseofthe M y  aithin !& cormpion 
ofjxwie.3 W~th R o q ,  one also gets thc seare that his ultimate dt i t i rm of -I is that 
he is not at the vM$uard o f t k  fight to further& a u b d w  i& of h i ed im,  m t  
anom* to ttirk up im&tive nea, ways w d&s the =emy rvrthcrmoq O h  
claim tha thc h i d u n  that she sees aod suppons inRDlub one which'Wuc~the 
i n d i ~ ~  that is promoted and preserved by the respn for p-nal prefererce and 
for theneed for privacy ... promoter theoppormniry of p-ns to live their own lives and 
to &out their o m  conception ofthe good; and is wcU awarr ofthc dangersthat rm 
result fromtheimposidon of f~mmuoiry dues.' [This is moa likely] ... to be ashicved in 
a mi* coderably more egalitrriantbnn the oligarchiddemdc W i d  flut the 
United States is today.'" While O h  s e ~  promine in j d c e  as fairness, she holds that 
R a d  needs to push the esditarian elanmm of his thmry further. Ye claim for a more 
egalitarian rociely or attempts to rkdch out the Lieral position or solvtioon W the 
problem w+ich l i W  theory is now to address ate beyond the reach afthc type of 
ju~EationwhichRawlspreaems. Wbilebothqudonrofjusti~edthinthe~yand 
the development of newways ofaddrenniog old and new palitid problems are important. 
they wem to require mows beyond the scope o f R a d  n d  justification I t  reems 
thcn that Rawls ir forced to pod& us only mith a p d  concqtion ofjwtice, one which 
is wdkdy to be wry helpful in addre&@ issues which M holly d m  withb 8 society 
Given the Fauwinu hie scscptansr of n d r y  places on hir j-mr, the 
only way which Rawlr can jmtty a pd&political position is by claiming that mmmy 
poitlom c ~ n m t  be held by a -cable conception d m E  good This is the approach he 
takes r r W g  one ofthe few mmeorious issue wk& he pays an* abm: the issue 
of abonion. Rawls w r  the i m e  o f h m ' o ~  rights as being about the b&m?qofm-n 
political values, indudingthe ri@r afw- as eqval ci&m and r u p a  for humanlife. 
Rawlo' podtion is that '.my reanonable balance ofthere values will give amman  a duly 
qdi6ed rig% to decide whether 01 not to md her p r w c y  dvring the 6m timster.*s 
Rawh supports his podtion m the basis that "at this early stage ofpmmucy the politid 
value ofthe equdity ofwomen h avariding, andm right is I* to piye it mbIf- 
and fo rce... my c o m p r e h ~ ~ ' ~ ~  docmi75 that leadr ro a Mane ofpolb'cal dcs 
ududing U1.1 duly qdideddghtio the& a-heszeris lo fiat extmf rammmbIn"6 
Wnbin the mnten ofdeveloping a n d  co-tion ofjustice for aumtrmpomry 
Wcnem sosiey, liLe theunited Stat- chimingthat claim for anabsolute ban on 
aborrionare an unreasonable podtion does not ysm to =cord *the belie6 ud-y 
held within the public N I ~ .  ITmEdinpufe wa abortion rights is not of d E h g  
political valueq but rather a conflict over the pmper balance of shared value, it is quite 
PL. p. 215. 
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powble that even if rmc supporn &don right% fhey may not are the mmrary po6tIc.n 
a$ b c i n g u n r a b l c .  By buildingthe ~ u b d v e  aspeas ofjuniu as fXrmss h m  
bcliefpMerrmin the public ~hure ,  the more nrbrt.mivcRawls msla his EO(~@OR 
the mare he e n a d s  itto addreu comemporqpolitid debater, the mora h c b s  to claim 
these ~ 0 1 ~ t i m  are i!I- in the pybtic dhlre. Yetthe more rvbstartivc is- 
oppo+ionw whish Rawlr h o l d s ~ d l ~  the Ley b l y  his theov d t e u k i m a e l y  
accepted. Oivmthat inths United Stater them an clearly xrme who oppose wfype of 
p s r r r ~  m abartian r e r k e %  the mwe by Raw13 to inslude ule I W  posifiom on abo@ioo 
umhiojvstiu as fainerr may lenm the numbs who acsept the obaractecLzation ofpublic 
culaur which he give. Given that the bdida inherent within the public & are what 
ensure the ~ t y o f R a w 1 ~ '  poritiq it I- thnf jurdcc cc faimw s t q s  on yerythin 
iceden it is mended to isuer for which thaeirnof widespread weemat. 
In many place. Rawis himself chafer apim the conswLnr his cornmimuat to 
ncutdity pl- on jurdce as ~ I W .  At the besimbg of Politkalfibedim Rawis 
rar mide anumber of qua60m. They indudethe quntiom o f j m  savingbmMn 
p d o " ;  the mmsion ofjurdce as fairness to the is- of Lnmmional 1117 the 
que0ic.n ofamat b owed to people who 0 wrmc ~~, are arounabk to act as 
normal and mopnting members of a society; and the pmbkm ofwhat bowed w .nimalr 
and the nn ofnature.7 Rawls also statesthat justice as fairness can be odeadd to 
a d d m  feminist con- includingthe qua60nofjustia in thefamily. Rawis docs rake 
up one d thcw fnrlo: thc ~ n e n d o n o f j u d  an fairness m quFstionr of kmmionelhw. 
ln his 1993 Oxhd A m n e s W ~ w e  %LsarofPeopler,ler,Raarb d d o p s a  b b e d  
mncepion ofintrmatiodjwrkehad onthe acccprancc ofjustice an-. One of 
the reasons Raanr gives far this mslnioo is the foUow@: "In the &mu of this 
enmion m the law ofpeople, a b i d  mnception ofpolitid justice would appear lo 6c 
hirmn'~~~Jfnodro ~pplyonly uo m'& l u 6 M p I i h " ~ N t i o ~ n o d ~ 1 ~  
IrW In maLing tho case for justice an fairness, and for similar more * e n d  h i  
concepfions, i t i s ~ e n t ~ d m s h ~ w & t  tbi~isnotm."~ It may be initially unclear why 
Rawis, who bad3 hisargument for-= sfaims on belief3 inhaem in apublis culture, 
would be con-cd to showtbm Lie~al alonccptim ofjustice a a  not m limited It is 
impartant m rrmemba however that if is only the mmMy ofjustice a$ &PI th.1 is 
dependent uponthe charmer ofthe public culum Liberalism remains a mbmtive 
political position beyolld RawW n ~ C a l  j v ~ c a t i o n  afit, and appon for& need not 
dcpmd an the somingent beliefswithin I Jociety*~ public culture. In drawing out the 
implicatiorr, ofjustice an mas for alaw ofpeopler, Rawls atandonnthir mmmirmanta 
" a r e .  Rather than uldng how an san develop n n d  conception of international 
justice, Rawk asks'a-hat torm den tolaatim ofnodiieral sodesktake in this ase?"9 
In other words, rather than uldng what wncsption ofjustice all rosinics muld agree on, 
Radr 6 given that b i d s  do not require all rodeties to be h i d  w b t  is  rhe 
minimum threshold libenlr should have for w b t  they view as acceptable mdi id  
rodnia. Ratherthan ad&+ infanational justia born the p-ve ofbuading s 
LP. p.. 44. 
cowemus, Rawk ad- it fmm the MM of h i m .  Yet Fads rcmgniru 
this poim He gmmsthat s number ofthe4uemom whichjustice as fairness leaves 
au-ding d mwt W y  r+m st w i n g  outddd "tk Pmpe ofjustice as fairoers as a 
political u)-o..'"~ ~ W I S  mgr6a~  the a-s D M- f0 0- 
places on the development of P comepion o f j u n i c  and that some6mcr P namal 
juatiflcatiania not available orthat one's mmmitmmf to likdiso nears thy must 
abandonthe m p t  to provide such annmal j ~ o a t i o n .  
There is ntill the qudon  ofwhaf b d t  a neutral conception ofjus6cg like 
justice as IXrmss has in addressing ou~mentpolitical debates ifit is hard p m x d  to say 
about what is d y  in dispute. D m  its inmmpletmes d t  in the -e 
failure ofRawls' atfnnpt to provide a namalj&~atim of l ibd im?  No, its 
inmmplnmcss docs not u n d e e  the wonh of the entire p r o j  It is not that &Pin 
o o d v e  ideals bappen to be inhered in the public d m e  which leads Radr to develop 
a moceptien ofjuaicc which is liberal. Rather, because certain n o r m a h  ideals are 
inherent in the public dm RawIs can pive a neutral defense of= liberal conception of 
judce. This doer nor tie lib& hands. Rawk doer not say Oldnand Rortywewrmg 
to warn to address camentiow political problems, only that thereis not d c i e n t  support 
w i t b t h e  public dm to allowfora n d  junifation of a concmtion ofjuaice 
which can address theseisma. It is not surprising that Rawlss appeal to beliefs 
uniwsaUy shared wahin the public sulfyre is not p ing to  d o w  justice as fairness to be at 
9m,p*2. 
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the fwehnl of ~ c a l  Yet p&pr the Vuc MpoRance of RawIs' work i s  that 1 
it s h  emdywhmthc political fight within Watcm sotieties begins, ruhilcpmviding 
botha strong d h  ofthe gaiar aleady made by h i d *  w i t h h h  sadeiu and a 
bpda h m  which M n  political agmmt could be made. Instead ofprerating a 
judIi&m of a complete conceprion ofjunice, what Rwvls bar rhorvn is the 
limits to a n a m a l j u ~ t i o n  of L h b m l  wncepti~n ofjvmSC. I d  of abandoning the 
idea that h i s  should attempt to provide a mnljwtScarion of their porition, Rawlr 
B m  the substmtial ground that can bepi- a n a w l  jud6cation about -political 
-an f o r s 0 ~ P r ~  Westem socistie% Ifthem is no a g e m a t ,  formample, 
about ismu -omding justice in the family and the role of political sobiom in 
addreuinp pmblems w i t h  family rrmSNrs, Rawls i s  unnblcto provide a neutral 
jmi6~1tion ofa umseption ofjustice wkioh mato to these area% The rrsnma to 
address thcse pmblm uringonly shared politid values do not &y* It 
brtherprovides a shard bakgomd in temr. ofwhish these cornentiour imes can be 
addressed Part of the benefit of RawIrIr jwtScafi(~n of h i d m  is  g5vm by the mnhad 
o f r d d v e  equilibrium. The process ofgive and talre between 0u1pMcipIu and moral 
iamitions and bnween these and the beliefs held b e  
porulily afa recomed common pn~pedke. This common concepi'on -ding areas 
muhas how people should betreated by OUT social kdf l l t io~  d o e  plIo1uUs CD See 
h s e  opposed to us in - ouch SJ abor6on righe, r6U 89 fellow citizens. She-g that 
there is wement h oder areas shows ther the porsiilay of an r-em with them mny 
mi*. Whether the soldon to k issw dl dfimstely require P i  i m p b  to &mert 
their podions based only OD their mppoR for h i  or whethex the ~)Idm to there 
fwthsisnuer can one day be givm aawtraljudiutim based onthe bdiefn i n h e d i n  
the p~bl ic  dm of some &m society is r6U M open qu&n In the end, Rads ohow 
both how far aracommimrent to n d r y  can and cannot go givcnthc -mt public 
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